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This thesis is motivated by recent advancements in applying completely pos-
itive and co-positive programs to obtaining bounds to NP-hard problems as
well as stochastic optimization problem. There are literatures establishing the
equivalence between completely/co-positive programs and several classic NP-
hard problems, such as nonconvex quadratic problem ([15]), maximum stable
set problem ([34]), and nonconvex mixed 0-1 quadratic problem ([22]). Following
Burer([22])’s work, Natarajan et al.([68]) extended the application of completely
positive program to stochastic optimization problem. Specifically, by adopting
the concept of distributional robustness and assuming the first-two moments of
the underlying distribution are known, they showed the moment-based bound of
a mixed 0-1 linear problem with random objective coefficients can be obtained
by solving a completely positive program. Inspired by their works, in this thesis,
we establish a framework showing that a more general form of distributionally
robust stochastic problem admits an equivalent completely positive reformula-
tion. The framework also incorporates different types of uncertainty sets and
constructs equivalent completely positive formulations to characterize feasible
moments. We apply this general framework to three applications in disaster
management.
In Chapter 2, we study the supply chain disruption risk mitigation problem.
Specifically, given a supply chain system, every node in the supply chain network
(including manufacturers, warehouses, and retailers) faces potential disruption
from events such as natural disasters. The performance of a typical supply chain
network during disruption can be illustrated by a “resilience curve”. It plots the
level of sales throughout the disruption till supply chain network’s final recovery.
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We apply two concepts, “time-to-recover (TTR)” and “time-to-survive (TTS)”,
motivated by Simchi-Levi et.al ([86]), to quantify supply chain’s performance
throughout disruption. We use the risk measure, “Conditional Value-at-Risk”,
to model the impact of disruption on the resilience curve, by strategically po-
sitioning inventory in the supply chain network. This problem is shown to be
equivalent to a co-positive program based on the theory established in the gener-
al framework introduced in Chapter 1. We apply this co-positive programming
approach to a numerical study. By solving the relaxed conic program, we obtain
a well performed inventory strategy with several interesting implications.
In Chapter 3, we address a post-disaster humanitarian logistic problem. The
key question is to strategically plan for the transportation capacities before ob-
serving transportation infrastructure conditions. Commercial best practices in
the logistics area is usually cost or profit focus, but our ultimate goal here is
to serve the the needs of the population in the affected areas as best as possi-
ble. We propose to use TTS as the performance metric for humanitarian efforts.
Specifically, TTS, in this context, is defined as the maximum time during which
relief items can fully sustain the demands of the affected population. We apply
a distributionally robust model and study the problem of capacity allocations to
each available shipping mode of relief items so that the supplies can reach affect-
ed people and maximize the TTS as long as possible under random disruption.
This problem shares similar structures to the disruption risk mitigation problem
in Chapter 2 and we show it can be equivalently characterized by a co-positive
program. We then apply the conic programming model to the Typhoon Haiyan
case and identify the capacities of each transportation mode used for shipping
relief items.
In Chapter 4, we study an antiterrorist problem where attacker can launch si-
multaneous attacks to multiple locations. In most of the attacker-defender game
literatures, the conflicts between two players are modeled as a one-shot game with
either both players allocating their forces simultaneously or attacker launching
the attack after observing defender’s defense allocations. In our study, we allow
the defender an option to redeploy his forces to respond to the attacks. This
reflects the realistic scenario in many environments, such as under the coun-
terterrorism and cyber security setting, where defender can rely on established
defense system or mechanism to respond to attacker’s intrusion. In fact, this
additional stage of redeployment is critical in many antiterrorist events. A good
vii
response strategy to the observed attack can significantly reduce number of ca-
sualties and injuries. In general, finding an equilibrium strategy in this game is
challenging. When the redeployment structure has a nice form, such as “k-chain”
structures, we can obtain closed-form equilibria. For the game under a general
redeployment network, we obtain an equivalent reformulation of the game using
a co-positive program. We further explore how the redeployment network struc-
ture affects the game, showing that a sparse redeployment network structure can
already capture the value of full redeployment flexibility for the defender.
Thesis Advisor. Professor Teo Chung-Piaw, Department of Decision Sciences,
NUS Business School, National University of Singapore
Contents
Declaration of Authorship i
Acknowledgements ii
Abstract v
List of Figures xi
List of Tables xiii
1 Introduction - Co-positive and Completely Positive Program-
ming 1
1.1 Review of Applications in Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1.1 Nonconvex Quadratic Mixed 0-1 Problem (Burer ([22])) . 5
1.1.2 Distributionally Robust Optimization - Moment Bound of
Mixed 0-1 Linear Program (Natarajan et al.[68]) . . . . . 8
1.2 A More General Distributinally Robust Framework . . . . . . . . 10
1.3 Applications in Disaster Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2 Disruption Risk Mitigation in Supply Chain 20
2.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2 Problem Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.3.1 Inventory Strategy in Risk Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.3.2 High-risk Supplier Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.3.3 Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) and Worst-case CVaR
(WCVaR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.4 Risk Mitigation Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.4.1 Inventory Mitigation Model - The traditional REI approach 42
2.4.2 Inventory Mitigation Model - Distributionally Robust Ap-
proach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.4.2.1 Second-Stage Completely Positive Representation 48
viii
Contents ix
2.4.2.2 First-Stage Co-positive Formulation . . . . . . . 51
2.4.3 Fixed Inventory Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.4.4 Worst-Case Expected Lost Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.5 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.5.1 Impact of Supplier’s TTR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.5.2 Impact of Capacity and Inventory . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.6 Numerical Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.6.1 The Effect of Inventory Budget to Inventory Deployment
and WCVaR of Lost Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.6.2 Inventory Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.6.3 Independent Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.6.4 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.6.5 Effect of Budget: Optimal Inventory Strategy is not Mono-
tone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.7 Concluding Remarks and Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3 Post-disaster Humanitarian Aid Supply Chain Design 74
3.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.2 Typhoon Haiyan Case Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.3 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.3.1 Post-disaster Supplies’ Distribution Problem . . . . . . . 86
3.3.2 Random Capacity and Random Yield Problem . . . . . . 89
3.4 Time-to-survive Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.4.1 Benchmark Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.4.2 TTS Model - Distributionally Robust Approach . . . . . . 96
3.4.3 Second-Stage Completely Positive Representation . . . . . 99
3.4.4 First-stage Co-positive Representation . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.5 Transportation Problem in Typhoon Haiyan Case . . . . . . . . . 102
3.5.1 Supply Chain Mapping and Data Summary . . . . . . . . 105
3.5.2 Effect of Budget on TTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.5.3 Transportation Mode Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.6 Concluding Remarks and Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4 Homeland Security Games with Redeployment 117
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.1.1 Colonel Blotto Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.1.2 Stackelberg Security Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.1.3 Process Flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.1.4 Computational Techniques for Security Games . . . . . . 130
4.2 Redeployment in the Classical Blotto Game . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.2.1 Benefit of Limited Flexibility in Redeployment Games . . 131
4.2.2 Hardness Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.3 Models and Analysis of One Sided Auction CSF . . . . . . . . . 136
4.3.1 Blotto on k-Chain Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Contents x
4.4 General Redeployment Network: Numerical Method . . . . . . . 145
4.4.1 Completely Positive Reformulation of Attacker’s Problem 147
4.4.2 Co-positive Reformulation of defender’s Problem . . . . . 150
4.5 Heterogenous Battlefields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
4.6 Numerical Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
4.6.1 Symmetric Redeployment - k-Chain Graph . . . . . . . . 154
4.6.2 Other Redeployment Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
4.6.3 Heterogeneous Battlefields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
5 Conclusion and Future Research 162
5.1 Supply Chain Disruption Risk Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
5.2 Post-disaster Humanitarian Aid Supply Chain Design . . . . . . 165
5.3 Homeland Security Games with Redeployment . . . . . . . . . . 168
5.4 Limitations and Future Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
A Chapter 1- Appendix A 172
B Chapter 2 - Appendix B 178
B.1 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
B.2 Feasible Region of Problem 2.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
B.3 The Specific Completely Positive/Co-Positive Reformulation of
Problem 2.9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
C Chapter 3 - Appendix C 187
D Chapter 4 - Appendix D 190
D.1 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
D.2 Covariance Matrices of Two Non-k-chain Games . . . . . . . . . 198
References 199
List of Figures
1.1 Thesis outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.1 Supply chain disruption risk management framework . . . . . . . 21
2.2 Performance of a supply chain during disruption . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3 Supply chain network and two inventory deployment strategies . 28
2.4 Resilience Curves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.5 Example for a rebuilt network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.6 Supply chain network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.7 WCVaR of lost sales for different inventory budgets . . . . . . . . 61
2.8 Inventory levels for each plant under same budget . . . . . . . . 63
2.9 CDFs of simulated lost sales using inventory obtained from two
models under the same budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.10 Inventory levels for each plant under same budget in independent
case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.11 CDFs of simulated lost sales using inventory obtained from two
models under the same budget in independent case . . . . . . . . 66
2.12 Sensitivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.13 Inventory levels under different inventory budgets . . . . . . . . . 70
2.14 Rebuilt network when inventory is disrupted. . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.1 Steps in humanitarian logistics in the response stage . . . . . . . 76
3.2 Typhoon Haiyan caseair transport, overland transport, sea and
river transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.3 Supply chain map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.4 Effect of capacity budget on TTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.5 Capacity(mtn/week) profiles under different capacity budgets . . 111
3.6 COP and LP capacity allocations comparison . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.7 COP and LP capacity strategies performance comparison . . . . 114
4.1 Terrorist attack map 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.2 Cities and the road network in the ancient Roman Empire . . . . 122
4.3 Auction CSF vs. One sided auction CSF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.4 Attacker’s mixed strategy under k-chain structure . . . . . . . . 139
4.5 Value of the game (defender’s expected payoff) . . . . . . . . . . 142
4.6 Attacker’s mixed strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
4.7 Non-k-chain graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
xi
List of Figures xii
4.8 Attacker’s mixed strategy under the two non-k-chain graphs . . . 157
4.9 Two games in interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
4.10 Attacker’s mixed strategy under dedicated graph and 2-chain graph160
List of Tables
2.1 Bill of material information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.2 Supply chain parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.3 Statistics of simulated lost sales under the same budget . . . . . 64
2.4 Statistics of simulated lost sales under the same budget in inde-
pendent case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.1 Supply chain parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.2 TTS under different capacity budgets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.3 Capacity(mtn/week) profiles under different capacity budgets . . 110
3.4 Means and standard deviations of TTS under COP and LP ca-
pacity strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.1 Values of the game and defender’s strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
4.2 Values of the game and defender’s strategies for non-k-chain graphs157
4.3 Values of the game and defender’s strategies for these two games 159
xiii
To my baby girl, Xiaoxiao.
xiv
Chapter 1
Introduction - Co-positive and
Completely Positive
Programming
The concept of co-positivity and complete positivity can be dated back to 1952
to the paper by Motzkin ([64]). Most of the related literatures since then studied
co-positive and completely positive matrices in the realm of linear algebra. It
is since recent decades, researchers started to apply co-positive and completely
positive cones in optimization, using the terms “co-positive programming” and
“completely positive programming”. A co-positive program is a linear program
1
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in matrix variables of the following form.
min C ·X
s.t. Ai ·X = bi, i = 1, ...,m
X ∈ COn
(1.1)
where C is coefficient matrix in objective; Ai, bi∀i = 1, ...,m are coefficient matri-
ces and right-hand side constants in constraints; and COn denotes the co-positive
cone of dimension n defined as
COn := {M ∈ Sn|∀v ∈ Rn+,vTMv ≥ 0}
where Sn denotes n-dimensional symmetric matrices; and A · B denotes inner
product of matrices. The dual cone of the co-positive cone is a completely positive
cone, defined as
CPn := {M ∈ Sn|∃V ∈ Rn×m+ , such that M = V V T}






If we consider Problem (1.1) as the primal problem, its dual formulation will
be a completely positive program which is a linear program over a complete-
ly positive cone. Murty and Kabadi [65] have shown that checking whether a
matrix is in co-positive cone is, in general, NP hard. We can infer solving a
completely/co-positive program will be, in general, also NP hard, except for
certain specially structured problems. Several approximation methods, named
hierarchies, which involve a sequence of tractable cones, are studied to approxi-
mate completely/co-positive cones. It is obvious that every semidefinite positive
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matrix is a co-positive matrix, so is every nonnegative matrix (i.e. the matrix
with nonnegative entries.). However, co-positive cone, in general, contains more
than semidefinite and nonnegative matrices. It is also easy to infer from the
definition of completely positive cone that a completely positive matrix must be
semidefinite and nonnegative (A semidefinite matrix with nonnegative entries is
called a doubly nonnegative (DNN) matrix). However, not all DNN matrices are
completely positive. Semidefinite programming (SDP)-based hierarchy is one of
the most popular approaches to solve co-positive and completely positive pro-
grams based on above observations. Specifically, the sum of a SDP cone and a
nonnegative cone, i.e. {M |M = M1 +M2,M1 < 0,M2 ≥ 0} is an inner approxi-
mation to the co-positive cone; whereas the DNN cone, i.e. {M |M < 0,M ≥ 0}
is an outer approximation to the completely positive cone. We adopt such SDP-
based method to approximate the related completely/co-positive cone through-
out this thesis.
Exactly because of the complexity in solving a completely/co-positive program,
its power of modeling intrinsic NP-hard problems unveils itself. In recent years,
many classicNP-hard problems of different structures are shown to be equivalent
to completley/co-positive programs. Bomze et al.[16] were the first to establish
an equivalent co-positive formulation of an NP-hard problem. They showed
the standard quadratic problem, which is a quadratic optimization problem over
a simplex, is equivalent to a co-positive program. Since then, other classes of
quadratic problems and combinatorial problems are found to admit equivalent
completely positive and co-positive programming reformulations. For example,
Introduction - Co-positive and Completely Positive Programming 4
it is well known that a maximal stable set problem is an NP-hard problem. De
Klerk and Pasechnik [34] showed the stability number can be represented by a
co-positive cone, thus the resulting co-positive program is exact for the stable
set problem. They also showed how to approximate the co-positive cone using a
hierarchy of linear or semidefinite programs to compute the stability number.
Outline of the Chapter: In this chapter, we will not review papers in linear alge-
bra literature, or any structural properties of co-positive or completely positive
cones. We refer readers to Berman and Shaked-Monderer [13] for more interest-
ing linear algebraic properties of completely positive matrices. In §1.1, we would
focus on the applications of co-positive and completely positive programs. We
will mainly review those most related milestone papers on reformulating classic
optimization problems into completely positive or co-positive programs. It will
be seen that completely/co-positive program can capture unfavorable elements
such as nonlinearity, nonconvexity, and nonsmoothness in the cone. Taking ad-
vantage of problem structures in specific contexts, better bounds to the original
problems can be obtained by analyzing the properties of the cones. In §1.2, we
present a more general class of problems with key structures which can lead to an
equivalent completely positive reformulation. This result is used to lay a theo-
retical foundation to the three practical applications which are briefly introduced
in §1.3.
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1.1 Review of Applications in Optimization
1.1.1 Nonconvex Quadratic Mixed 0-1 Problem (Burer ([22]))
Consider the following nonconvex quadratic mixed 0-1 problem, which is a classic
NP-hard problem.
min xTQx+ 2cTx
s. t. aTi x = bi, ∀i = 1, ...,m
x ≥ 0
xj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ B
(1.2)
where x ∈ Rn+ is the vector of decision variables; and B is the set of indices of
binary decision variables. Under the following assumptions,
(A1). The feasible region of Problem (1.2) is not empty and is bounded1;
(A2). If decision variables satisfy the linear constraints, then those decision
variables with indices in B are between 0 and 1,
Burer [22] showed the following completely positive program is equivalent to
1In the original paper, he did not assume the feasible region is bounded and explicitly char-
acterized the corresponding recession cone in the completely positive equivalent representation.
Here, we add this assumption to simplify the problem structure and our mathematical models
in the following chapters all satisfy this assumption.
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Problem (1.2).
min Q ·X + 2cTx





i , ∀i = 1, ...,m




where“cp 0” denotes membership in the completely positive cone. The decision
variable X is a linear relaxation of the product xxT. Note that the original
0-1 variables x is mapped to a continuous variable x in the new conic program-
ming problem, with x now representing a convex combination of the original
0-1 solutions. It is straightforward to see Problem (1.3) is a relaxation to the
original problem. The objective of Problem 1.3 is obtained by the definition of
X. Keeping the original linear constraint, three sets of additional constraints are




i is obtained by a “lift-




T = b2i . The second set of constraints is obtained by the observation
that for binary variables, x2 = x. Finally, the completely positive constraint is
added due to the original nonnegativity constraints of decision variables x.
Burer ([22]) showed through the following proposition that by considering the
original problem in the second-order dimension, and adding these three sets
of constraints, this new conic program is equivalent to the original nonconvex
quadratic mixed 0-1 problem.
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Proposition 1.1 (Burer [22]). Problem (1.3) and Problem (1.2) are equivalent.
The proof of this proposition is based on two lemmas. We here present those
two key lemmas and interested readers can refer to the original paper for the













where αk ∈ R+,
∑
k∈κ
α2k = 1, βk ∈ Rn+, ∀k ∈ κ . Let κ = κ+ ∪ κ0, where
κ+ = {k ∈ κ | αk > 0}, and κ0 = {k ∈ κ | αk = 0}.
Based on this decomposition, Burer ([22]) established the following two lemmas.
The proofs of these two lemmas are presented in Appendix A.
Lemma 1.2. βkαk , ∀k ∈ κ+ is a feasible to the linear constraints in Problem (1.2),




∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ B,∀k ∈ κ+.
Due to Lemma 1.2 and Lemma 1.3, we can rewrite the decomposition of com-
















Since α2k > 0, ∀k ∈ κ+ and
∑
k∈κ+
α2k = 1, we can see the feasible region of Problem
(1.3) corresponds to the convex hull of the feasible region of Problem (1.2). By
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applying these two lemmas, the equivalence between Problem (1.2) and Problem
(1.3) can be easily established.
1.1.2 Distributionally Robust Optimization - Moment Bound of
Mixed 0-1 Linear Program (Natarajan et al.[68])
Inspired by Burer ([22])’s result, Natarajan et al.([68]) studied the following
stochastic optimization problem.
Z(c˜) = max c˜Tx
s. t. aTi x = bi, ∀i = 1, ...,m
x ≥ 0
xj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ B
(1.4)
where x ∈ Rn+ is the decision variables; c˜ is the random objective coefficient vec-
tor, and B is the set of indices of binary decision variables. Given the distribution
of random coefficients, c˜, it is of interest to obtain the expectation of the optimal
value. In [68], they assumed c˜ is nonnegative with known first-two moments, i.e.
µ = E[c˜], Σ = E[c˜c˜T]. They adopted the concept of distributionally robustness





where c˜ ∼ (µ,Σ)+ denotes the set of feasible multivariate distributions supported
on Rn+ with first-two moments µ, and Σ. Define x(c) to be the optimal solution
to Problem (1.4) under a specific c. Since c˜ is a vector of random variables
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with finite first-two moments (µ,Σ), x(c˜) is also a vector of random variables
with well-defined first-two moments. They presented the equivalent completely
positive program as follows.
Zc = min In · Y
s. t. aTi p = bi, ∀i = 1, ...,m
aTi Xai = b
2
i , ∀i = 1, ...,m
Xjj = pj , ∀j ∈ B
1 µT pT








with expectation taken with respect to c˜, and In is identity matrix of dimension
n.
By the definition of p, X, and Y , it is straightforward to see Problem (1.5)
is a relaxation of Problem (1.4). The objective of Problem (1.5) is obtained
by taking expectation with respect to c˜ of the original objective function at
the optimal solution x(c˜). The first constraint is similarly derived from the
original linear constraints. The second linear constraint with respect to X is
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obtained via “lifting” the original linear constraints to the second order and
then taking the expectation of both sides with respective to c˜. Finally the third
constraint is obtained based on the observation that for binary variables, x(c˜)2 =
x(c˜), followed by taking expectation with respect to c˜. Since all the decision
variables and random variables are nonnegative, we have the completely positive
conic constraint. The following proposition presents the equivalence between
the original moment bound problem and the completely positive program. The
proof of this proposition is presented in Appendix A.
Proposition 1.4 (Natarajan et al.[68]). Problem (1.5) and Problem (1.4) are
equivalent, i.e., Zp = Zc.
1.2 A More General Distributinally Robust Frame-
work
In this thesis, we study a relatively more general distributionally robust problem
with special structures so that equivalent completely positive characterization
can be established. The result from this framework will be used in the three
applications to be discussed in Chapter 2, 3, and 4. Specifically, we consider the
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following moment-based bound problem.
Zm = max
v˜∼D(µ,Σ)
E [max cT1x+ v˜
TC2x+ x
TC3x]
s.t. A1x = b1
A2x = b2 −M v˜
(A3x) ◦ (A4x) = b3
xj ∈ {0, 1} , ∀j ∈ B
x ≥ 0
(1.6)
This problem is to find the moment bound of a quadratically constrained quadrat-
ic problem with uncertainty (i.e. random variables, v˜ ) in both the objective and
the right hand side of the constraints. x ∈ Rn+ is the decision variables; and B
is the set of indices of binary decision variables. v˜ is the random variable vector
and we assume it lies in the support set, D, with known first-two moments, i.e.
µ = E[v˜], Σ = E[v˜v˜T]. Note that c1, C2 and C3 are deterministic objective
coefficients; Ai,∀i = 1, 2, 3, 4 are coefficient matrices in the constraints; M is the
coefficient matrix of random variables in the constraint; bj , ∀j = 1, 2, 3 are right
hand side constant vectors; and ◦ is the Hadamard product operator.
We assume the following properties of the inner maximization problem.
(A1)’. The feasible region is not empty and is bounded;
(A2)’. If decision variables satisfy the linear constraints, then those decision
variables with indices in B are between 0 and 1 and they also satisfy A3x ≥ 0
and A4x ≥ 0.
(A3)’. b3 = 0.
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This problem is more general than the one studied in [22] and [68]. For exam-
ple, by having v˜ as deterministic (i.e. D is a singleton only containing a point
µ), A3, A4 being 0, we have Burer[22]’s problem; and by setting D to be Rn+,
C3,M,A3, A4 being 0, we have Natarajan et al.[68]’s problem. We will show in
this section that under assumptions (A1)’ to (A3)’, when the support set D has
certain special structures, Problem (1.6) can be equivalently reformulated as a




Y x := E[x(v˜)v˜T]
where x(v) is the optimal solution to the inner maximization problem with a
realization v. To see how we obtain the equivalent completely positive program,
we give the detailed construction below.
1. Objective. According to Burer [22] and Natarajan et al. [68], the three
terms in the objective can be easily represented as an equivalent linear objective
in terms of decision variables px, Xx, and Y x, i.e., max c1
Tpx+C2 ·Y x+C3 ·Xx.
2. Constraints. The transformation of the first set of linear constraints and
the binary constraints has been addressed in [68] into new constraints in terms
of px and Xx as A1p
x = b1, diag(A1X
xAT1 ) = b1 ◦ b1, and pxj = Xxjj , ∀j ∈ B.
The linear constraint with uncertain right hand side can also be transformed in
the similar way, into one linear constraint in terms of px by taking expectation
of the original linear constraint, which gives A2p
x + Mµ = b2. We also need
another linear constraint with respect to Xx and Y x by taking expectation of
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 µ Y x
Y xT Σ





. For the quadratic constraints, under Assumption
(A2)’, we have the following equivalent linear constraint in terms of X,
diag(A3X
xAT4 ) = 0.
3. Uncertainty Set v˜ ∼ D(µ,Σ)
To reformulate the uncertainty set, we need to first address the feasibility issue of
the presumed moments. We apply the definition of feasible moments in Bertsimas
and Sethuraman [14].
Definition 1.5. (Bertsimas and Sethuraman [14]) A sequence (µ,Σ) is a fea-
sible (n, 2,D)-moment sequence if there is a multivariate random variable v =
(v1, ..., vn) with domain D ⊆ Rn, whose moments are given by (µ,Σ), that is
µk = E[vk],Σij = E[vivj ], ∀k, i, j = 1, ..., n.
The theory of moments attempts to characterize valid moment sequences using
semidefinite program. Specifically, when D = Rn, the first-two valid moment
sequences can be exactly represented by a semidefinite matrix. Natarajan et
al.[68]’s result implies when D = Rn+, the first-two valid moments turn out to
be equivalently characterized by a completely positive matrix. The following
proposition gives the conditions on the support set D and the conditions of
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feasible moment sequences such that the uncertainty set can be represented by
a completely positive formulation. The proof is presented in Appendix A.








(M2v˜) ◦ (M3v˜) = 0
v˜i ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ Bv

and under the following assumptions,
(AM1). D is nonempty and bounded.
(AM2). For all v satisfying the linear constraints, M1v = b
v
1, we have vi ∈ [0, 1],
M2v ≥ 0 and M3v ≥ 0.
We have the sequence (µ,Σ) be a feasible (n, 2,D)-moment sequence if and only













wMT3 ) = 0, wi = X
w
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An example of such uncertainty set is a family of multivariate Bernoulli distri-
butions with given first two moments. In this case, the support set is as follows.
D =
 v˜ ∈ Rn+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 ≤ v˜ ≤ 1
v˜i ∈ {0, 1},∀i = 1, ..., n

Consequently, we would have the following constraints on feasible moment se-
quence (µ,Σ).
w = µ; Xw = Σ;
wi = X
w
ii , ∀i = 1, ..., n; si = Xsii,∀i = 1, ..., n;
wi + si = 1,∀i = 1, ..., n; Xwii +Xsii + 2Y wsii = 1,∀i = 1, ..., n;
1 wT sT
w Xw Y ws
s Y wsT Xs
 <cp 0
4. Nonnegativity of decision variables
The nonnegativity of decision variables are also handled in exactly the same
way as in [22] and [68], by adding the completely positive matrix constraint.
Together with the completely positive matrix constraint for the feasible moment
sequences, we have the following completely positive matrix constraint.

1 pxT wT
px Xx Y x
w Y xT Xw
 <cp 0
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With those transformations in mind, we present the following theorem which
gives the equivalent completely positive representation to the original distribu-
tionally robust problem (1.6) when the uncertain set is as specified in Proposition
1.6.
Theorem 1.7. Problem (1.6) is equivalent to the following completely positive
program.
max c1





1 ) = b1 ◦ b1
A2p




 w Y x
Y xT Xw
 MˆT) = b2 ◦ b2
diag(A3X
xAT4 ) = 0
pxj = X
x
















px Xx Y x
w Y xT Xw
 <cp 0
(1.7)
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The equivalence proof applies similar techniques employed in the proof of the
main result in [68]. We first show every rank-1 decomposition can generate
feasible solutions to the original inner maximization problem. By constructing a
probability distribution lying in the uncertainty set, we can show Problem (1.7)
gives an lower bound of Problem (1.6). Given Problem (1.7) is a also relaxation
of Problem (1.6), we can show these two problems are equivalent. The formal
proof of the theorem is presented in Appendix A.
1.3 Applications in Disaster Management
Disaster management involves decision making under uncertainty, especially dur-
ing the planning and mitigation stage before disasters happen. Relief workers
often have to make dispatch decisions before the state of the infrastructure is
precisely known. Therefore, it is a natural candidate to be modeled as an dis-
tributionally robust problem. Disaster management normally consists of four
stages, namely (i) disaster risk assessment, (ii) risk preparation, mitigation and
prevention, (iii) post-disaster response, and (iv) post-disaster recovery. Different
strategies and management wisdoms are used in different stages as well as facing
different types of disasters. In general, disasters can be classified into two types,
natural disasters and man-made attacks. In Chapter 2 and 3, we address risk mit-
igation and post-disaster problems facing natural catastrophes; and in Chapter
4, we study homeland security games when defender faces terrorist attacks. The
outline of the three applications can be summarized in Figure 1.1. Specifically, in
Chapter 2, we address the issues in business world where disruptions can occur in
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Figure 1.1: Thesis outline
a supply chain system and redundancy, such as inventory has to be strategically
built in so that the disruption impact of the whole supply chain can be minimized.
We adopt the risk measure “Conditional Value-at-Risk” to model the risk level
of the supply chain. Applying the concept of distributional robustness, we study
the problem from the worst-case perspective. The optimization model contains
nonconvexity, nonsmoothness and discreteness. Nonetheless, we manage to show,
after several rounds of transformations, the problem fits in the general frame-
work we proposed above and an equivalent completely positive and co-positive
program can be established. In Chapter 3, we consider a post-disaster human-
itarian logistic problem where humanitarian aid supplies have to be shipped to
the affected area right after the disaster, when conditions of the transportation
infrastructures around the affected area are highly uncertain and unknown to
outside decision makers. The objective is to strategically select transportation
modes and capacities to sustain the survivals as long as possible. The mathe-
matical model can also be addressed by the general framework and characterized
by a co-positive program. Finally, in Chapter 4, we consider a relatively different
setting in the terrorist attack context where attacker and defender are fighting
over multiple “battlefields”. Each player firstly allocates their limited resources
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(for example, troops) to each battlefield. Then defender, after observing the
attacker’s allocations, can redeploy its troops through a pre-designed redeploy-
ment network. This reflects the realistic scenario in many environments, such as
under the counterterrorism and cyber security setting, where defender can rely
on established defense system or mechanism to respond to attacker’s intrusion.
We analyze this game by finding both players’ equilibrium strategies and further
study how would the given redeployment network affect defender’s performance
in the game. It turns out for the attacker, as an adversary, his problem can
be modeled as a distributionally robust problem, which fits the general frame-
work proposed. By reformulating it as a completely positive program, we can
approximate the first two moments of his mixed strategy. Defender’s optimal
strategy can be then modeled as a solution to a co-positive program. We will
finally conclude the thesis in Chapter 5.
Chapter 2
Disruption Risk Mitigation in
Supply Chain
“ Limited resources mean it is essential to focus risk management efforts
where they are most needed and will deliver the biggest benefits.”
- Geraint John, Senior Vice President, Research, SCM World, 2014
2.1 Background
In 2014, Typhoon Halong hit South East Asia, and wrecked havocs on the supply
chains of many companies with operations in this region. The magnitude of the
financial impact was not only huge (more than 10 billion, according to “Apparel
[5]”), but the ripple effects of the disruption reached and affected even companies
with no operational footprint in South East Asia. This is not a rare phenomenon
confronting supply chain planners; a recent survey of 151 supply chain executives
20
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by Accenture shows that 73% of the companies surveyed have experienced supply
chain disruptions in the past 5 years ([39]). Companies must therefore take
measures to build more robust and resilient supply chains to cushion their supply
chain operations from unforeseen disruptions.
Figure 2.1: Supply chain disruption risk management framework
The common practice companies and supply chain managers adopt to cope with
supply chain disruptions consists of five phases: risk identification, risk assess-
ment, risk mitigation, disruption response and recovery. Risk identification,
assessment and mitigation are measures taken before disruptions. After detect-
ing the disruptions, companies take contingent actions to respond to and finally
recover from disruptions (cf. Figure 2.1). In this chapter, we focus on measures
taken in the first three phrases before disruptions happen.
1. Risk Identification. Supply chain disruption risk may come from events
such as fire or machine breakdown in a production facility, unexpected
surge in demand or reduction in supply, political conflicts, and natural
disasters. Disruption risk can be classified based on two dimensions: likeli-
hood (high/low) and impact(high/low), and positioned into four quadrants.
Usually, companies do not put their efforts extensively on low impact events
such as machine breakdown. Example of high occurrence likelihood and
Disruption Risk Management 22
high impact event would be a severe weather condition affecting compa-
nies regularly. For example, hurricanes through the Gulf of Mexico can
cause substantial losses to oil companies. Heavily invested infrastructures
are often damaged and have to be repaired. However, due to the fac-
t that hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico are annual phenomena and can
be well forecasted, companies have well established practices to prepare
for and respond to them ([82]). Therefore, high likelihood and high im-
pact events are not the most challenging issues to companies because of
sufficient historical information and management experiences. Unforeseen
natural catastrophes, such as earthquake, and terrorism attacks are usu-
ally classified as low likelihood and high impact events. In recent years,
the occurrence of large scale natural disasters has increased dramatically
(XXX). Once such events happen, the impact can be dramatic. Due to low
occurrence, there is insufficient information to predict and prepare for such
events. Therefore, they become the most challenging issues facing supply
chain risk management and require more management efforts.
2. Risk Assessment. In this phase, it usually involves utilizing technology
tools and experts’ inputs to assess the probability of the occurrence of a
certain disruption event and its implications on the supply chain perfor-
mance. It is generally impossible to have full knowledge of the occurrence
probability information of natural disruptive events. However, with the ad-
vancement in data analysis and information technology, many companies
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and organizations have developed softwares in gathering partial informa-
tion and estimation of future disruptions. Insurance companies are leaders
in risk assessment technology. For example, Applied Insurance Research
(“AIR”) is the leading catastrophe (“CAT”) modelling research firm. AIR
tracks natural disasters like hurricane, storm surge, earthquake, winter s-
torm, and wildfire over the world. By combining locations and property
damage information, their model can generate probability information of
disruptions. This probability distribution information can be used to mea-
sure the amount of catastrophe risk at certain nodes within the supply
chain. Many companies also develop internal risk assessment technology
(cf.[100]). CISCO, for instance, uses a six-step incident management sys-
tem to obtain warning of disruptive events, leading to more accurate and
better informed assessment of the disruption risks to its operations (cf.
[81]). Tomlin and Snyder([94]) described how companies like Eaton and
UTC have deployed supply-chain monitoring software to “give advance no-
tice of potential supplier instability in time to put safeguards in place.”
In fact, in August 2004, the system generated a financial alert for a key
castings supplier, prompting UTC to increase its inventory buffer as an
added layer of protection, to avert a disaster heading its way.
3. Risk Mitigation. After risk assessment, depending on the severity of the
potential disruption, companies may decide to build buffer and flexibility in
their supply chain to cushion the future loss if a disruption occurs. Several
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measures are identified in Gurnani et al.([47]) as effective mitigation strate-
gies to reduce the losses, including (i) inventory protection, (ii) capacity
protection, (iii) information protection and (iv) supply chain structure de-
sign. Inventory strategy and capacity protection are two commonly used s-
trategies. They function by providing extra stocks or production capacities
to compensate for the potential supply shortage. Information protection
is usually used when data or information infrastructures are critical assets
and protection measures need to be installed facing cyber attacks. Supply
chain structure design consists of strategies like supplier selection, facility
location, or multi-sourcing. It is usually implemented in very early stage
and requires long term planning.
In the following sections, we would zoom into a specific facet of this manage-
ment framework: targeting the risk from large scale natural disruptive events,
integrating information from risk assessment and formulating a well performed
risk mitigation strategy.
2.2 Problem Overview
A supply chain disruption’s impact on performance depends on the system’s
ability to discover and then recover after the disruption has occurred. Even
if we ignore the possibilities of long term damage on facilities and consumer
markets, it is nevertheless challenging to model the ripple effects of disruptions
as it propagates down the supply chain. Levermann ([62]) estimated that a
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cessation of export in Philippines due to typhoon Haiyan could affect up to 6%
of all US production, reflecting the state that supply chains have become more
interconnected and global.
Hopp and Yin [51] is an early attempt to analyze how disruption effect propa-
gates in a simplified supply chain (i.e., assembly network), with the additional
assumption that only a node can be disrupted to simplify the cost structure.
Keeping the latter assumption, Simchi-Levi et.al ([85] and [86]) proposed a novel
approach of using the Time-To-Recover (TTR) notion of each operation (repre-
sented by a node) to quantify the financial impact of disruptions on the entire
supply chain, measured by the Risk Exposure Index (REI). With this approach,
companies can now rank their direct or indirect suppliers using REI and hence
identify high risk parties in the supply chain. At the same time, Simchi-Levi
([84]) introduced the Time-To-Survive (TTS) concept, defined as the maximum
length of time the entire supply chain can continue to function before the ripple
effects of the disruption affect the fulfillment planned for the end consumers.
The performance of TTS can be easily computed by solving a linear program
(LP). The notion of TTR, REI and TTS are now being implemented in leading
organizations such as Ford Motor Company, Cisco and the United Nation etc.,
to manage supply chain risk. Risk mitigation efforts are driven by the desire
to make the supply chains more resilient to disruptions. Figure 2.2 shows the
hypothetical performance of a typical supply network during disruption, from
the onset to final recovery, and the level of sales sustained throughout the dis-
ruption. TTS and TTR here refer to the supply chain’s TTS and TTR instead
Disruption Risk Management 26
Figure 2.2: Performance of a supply chain during disruption
of those for each node. Specifically, we define supply chain’s TTS as the time
interval during which the whole supply chain is fully capable of fulfilling end
demands after disruption; whereas the supply chain’s TTR is the time duration
between disruption happening and the time when the supply chain recovers to
full functionality. In the rest of this chapter, when TTS or TTR is mentioned,
it is meant for the supply chain’s TTS or TTR.
The ultimate goal for supply chain risk management is to implement strategies to
reduce the net lost sales in Figure 2.2. This can be done by extending the length
of TTS, or reducing the amount of lost sales during the disruption, by building
redundancy or flexibility into the design of the supply chains. Ideally, when TTS
is not shorter than supply chain’s TTR, we have zero lost sales. Among the four
risk mitigation strategies introduced in Section 2.1, inventory is one of the most
effective risk mitigation strategies used in practice (cf. [55]). In our case, we focus
on the use of the inventory protection strategy to cushion the impact of shortages
of parts in affected facilities, as these shortages propagate down the supply chain
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to affect sales for end customers. The effectiveness of the inventory protection
strategy depends essentially on how companies perceive and quantify risks in
the supply chain in the risk assessment phase. This problem is exacerbated by
the fact that global operating environment has become increasingly volatile, and
more companies are developing early detection capability through weather or
social media monitoring, news tracking, and sensor deployment etc., to sense
and respond to supply chain disruption.
Can we use these risk assessments to quantify and mitigate the disruption risks
via appropriate inventory deployment? Note that the REI methodology proposed
by Simchi-Levi et al. ([85] and [86]) is void of risk assessment (i.e. probability of
disruption to an operation), as it is based on the assumption that at most one
node in the network can be disrupted. On the other hand, incorporating risk into
how shortages of parts propagate down a supply chain to affect sales is technically
challenging. As an illustration, consider the following hypothetical supply chain
(This is adapted from a supply chain system studied in [43].) that will be used
throughout our computational study (see Figure 2.3a)- eight key components,
ranging from analog display and circuit (ABX and ABN) to different connectors
(JK1 to JK3), can be assembled into 4 different configurations (CFG1 to CFG4)
and sold in 4 markets (nodes in N correspond to end products). Configurations
CFG1 to CFG4 in M2 can be used to meet end product’s requirement in a flexible
manner, with each configuration serving demands from two end products. The
bill of materials structure is indicated in the graph and the BOM values shown
in the boxes if greater than one. Two items in M1 are wrapped in a box in
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the figure if they are produced by the same vendor (i.e. ABX and ABN are
produced in the same facility), and hence will be disrupted jointly if the facility
of the vendor is disrupted. There are production limits per unit time for nodes
in M1 and M2, i.e. production capacities, which will be reduced to zero when the
nodes are disrupted. Each node takes a different amount of time to recover from
disruption. What is the optimal way to protect inventory in this supply chain
(a) Supply chain network (b) Strategic Inventory levels for each plant
Figure 2.3: Supply chain network and two inventory deployment strategies
to mitigate disruption risk? Figure 2.3b shows the inventories protected for two
classes of mitigation strategies (called “LP” and “COP” strategy) studied in this
chapter. The LP strategy ensures that there will be no lost sale when at most
one node in the supply chain can be disrupted (as in the REI methodology). This
strategy invests a small pool of inventory in Vendor 6 (or Node 9, i.e. CFG1
in the graph). With the same budget, the COP strategy, obtained using the
methodology proposed in this chapter, opted to invest less in holding inventory
in M2 (nodes 9-12, with higher unit inventory holding cost), but instead invest
more on holding inventory in M1 (nodes 1-8). The two deployment strategies
lead to different performance in lost sales in the supply chain when there are
disruptions. For instance, when both Vendor 4 and 7 are disrupted (with TTRs
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of 1.6 and 2.2 unit time respectively), the total lost sales and the resilience curves
over time of the two strategies are as shown in Figure 2.4. Clearly the COP
strategy performs better than the LP strategy in this disruption scenario. Can
we argue that the COP strategy is better than the LP strategy, after accounting
for the risk of disruption in this supply chain? To address this question, we
need to quantify the risk exposure of the inventory deployment strategy after
accounting for the risk estimates of disruption. More importantly, for a supply
(a) The resilience curve under COP in-
ventory allocation
(b) The resilience curve under LP in-
ventory allocation
Figure 2.4: Resilience Curves
chain with proper protection strategies built in, it is important, at an operational
level, to understand how additional effort can be further directed to “where they
are most needed and will deliver the biggest benefits.” To do this, we need to
understand the comparative statics of how change in the planning parameters
affect the performance of the supply chain under disruption. For instance, for a
given site in the supply chain, how do we determine whether it is more important
to shorten its TTR ability, to increase its production capacity, or to protect more
inventory at this node of the supply chain? We address these and other issues
in the chapter. The main contributions are as follows:
1. Risk Modeling Given the disruption probabilities to each individual node
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or each pair of nodes 1 in the supply chain, and the accompanied TTR in-
formation for each node, we would like to position inventory strategically to
build the most resilient supply chain. We built on the framework pioneered
by Simchi-Levi et.al ([85] and [86]) to model lost sales and develop the risk
resilience curve, and to determine the optimal inventory protection strate-
gy under probabilistic disruption. To account for ambiguity and errors in
the risk/probability assessment, we use the “worst-case CVaR” objective
to calibrate the performance of mitigation strategy. Note that CVaR is a
well-accepted concept in financial risk management, and is a more sophis-
ticated counterpart to the common notion of average performance. Using
a distributionally robust model, assuming only that the first-two moments
on disruption probability are known, we show that the optimal inventory
allocation under the worst-case CVaR performance of the lost sales under
disruption can be fully characterized by a co-positive program under mild
technical conditions. A relaxation of the co-positive cone can be efficiently
solved via a semi-definite programming relaxation.
2. Sensitivity Analysis To monitor the status of a supply chain facing a
volatile operating environment and changing risk assessments, it is im-
portant to understand the impact of the key planning parameters on the
overall performance of the supply chain under disruption. We show that
the optimal primal and dual solutions of the conic programs proposed in
this chapter can be used to perform sensitivity analysis on the lost sales
1We use this parsimonious set of information to build our robust model. Note that we need
to account for correlation in the disruption risks, but do not require full joint distributional
information.
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sustained during disruption. This exploits a key connection between the
conic program and the supply chain disruption problem in the worst-case
setting. Using this analysis, we can determine for each supplier whether it
is more important to reduce the TTR or increase the production capacity,
to exert maximal impact for the supply chain disruption planning problem.
3. Optimal Protection Strategy The conic program obtained is attractive
as it can be suitably relaxed into a positive semidefinite program that can
be solved efficiently. We use this approach to develop insights into the
structure of the optimal strategy. For instance, it is generally better to
build up inventory at nodes closer to end customers, since these are less
likely to be blocked from serving the market demands due to supply chain
disruptions. However, the higher unit holding cost at the downstream
nodes prohibit large volume of inventories to be installed at these places.
The optimal inventory deployment solution involves a delicate trade-off of
the cost and mitigating value of inventory at each node, and is in general
determined not only by the operating cost and network structure of the
supply chain system, but also affected by the budget that can be invested
to build up these inventories. Surprisingly, the inventory invested in the
upstream suppliers are in general not monotonic in the amount of budget
available, but exhibits a unimodal structure, whereas it is possible not to
invest in inventory at downstream nodes regardless of budget, despite their
proximity to end customers.
Outline of the Chapter: The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In §2.3,
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we review the related literature. In §2.4, we present our risk mitigation mod-
el. Specifically, optimal inventory allocation across supply chain is determined
with the goal of building highly resilient supply chain. In §2.5, by conducting
sensitivity analysis, we show how to make use of the solutions obtained in the
risk mitigation model to study the effect on lost sales when the supply chain
environment changes, such as the change of supplier’s reported TTR, capacities
and inventory levels. In §2.6, we present an application of our risk management
scheme in a case study. We conclude in §2.7. All the proofs are presented in
Appendix B.1.
2.3 Literature Review
Our problem covers a wide range of topics in supply chain management. We
divide our literature review along the key concepts used in our study.
2.3.1 Inventory Strategy in Risk Mitigation
There are extant literatures exploring and presenting different facets of risk man-
agement in supply chains. We focus here only on those studies related to the use
of inventory as mitigation strategies for supply chain disruptions. Meyer et.al
([63]) is arguably the first study on supply chain disruption risk mitigating using
inventory management strategy, followed by Song and Zipkin ([88]), Arreola-Risa
and DeCroix ([7]), Tomlin ([93]), etc. However, most of these papers presented
insights only on single product or simplified version of a supply chain. Gurnani
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et al. ([46]) succeeded to extend the problem to two-period, two-component
assembly system. More recently, DeCriox ([33]) studied the problem under the
multiple-period and assembly system settings. Simchi-Levi et al. ([86]), on the
other hand, considered a general supply chain network with multiple products.
Facing random demands and random disruption events, they adopted a distri-
butional robust approach to obtain the optimal inventory allocation plan with
minimal total inventory from the worst-case perspective. The uncertainty set
structure they used is, however, too coarse to capture interdependencies be-
tween different nodes in the supply chain. In our study, we built on the model
developed in [86], but adopt a conic programming approach to solve for the opti-
mal inventory deployment strategy, capturing the correlational structure between
different disruption events.
2.3.2 High-risk Supplier Identification
The assessment of disruption impacts are mostly studied from the perspective of
identifying key factors contributing or helping to mitigate the disruption impact
(Craighead et al. ([30]), Tang ([90]), Braunscheidel and Suresh ([20]), Kleindor-
fer and Saad ([57]), etc.). Simchi-Levi et al.([86]), introducing the concepts of
TTR, REI and TTS, is one of the first few papers to propose a scheme to rank
suppliers by the magnitudes of disruption impacts. Their method is embraced
and implemented by several leading businesses. However, this approach assumes
only one node is disrupted in each disruption scenario, and hence cannot offer in-
sights when there are breakdowns at multiple nodes in the supply chain. Yan et
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al.([102]) proposed another method to identify critical suppliers by introducing
the concept of a nexus supplier. However, their method is purely based on supply
chain network structure and also cannot incorporate the disruption probability
information. Our approach is an attempt to fill this gap in the literature, to
develop a risk-adjusted approach to find high-risk suppliers based on disruption
impacts.
2.3.3 Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) and Worst-case CVaR
(WCVaR)
Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) is a risk measure often used in the finance
industry to gauge risk exposure. For instance, let Z(r, v˜) denote the lost sales
associated with decision r and random event v˜. Given a confidence level 1− η,
say η = 0.05 (i.e. at 95% confidence level), let
V aR1−η(r) := argmin
{
t
∣∣∣∣P(Z(r, v˜) ≥ t) ≤ η}.






∣∣∣∣Z(r, v˜) ≥ V aR1−η(r)].
Rockafellar and Uryasev ([77] and [78]) showed that CVaR can be equivalently
solved by minimizing an auxiliary function with respect to the variable θ, i.e.,
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The work by Rockafellar and Uryasev ([77] and [78]) has helped to popularize the
use of CVaR as a replacement for the computationally intractable notion of VaR.












(Z(r, v˜)− θ)+]} .
where P is a family of distributions that can be used to describe the risk profile
v˜. Applying the minmax theorem, Zhu and Fukushima ([105]) further showed











Z(r, v˜)− θ)+]} .
In our study, we adopt the above WCVaR concept in dealing with lost sales
due to disruption, using only the means and covariances of node disruption to
capture the interdependencies between disruption events.
2.4 Risk Mitigation Models
In this section, we consider decision makers using strategic inventory allocation
as the protection measure for disruption events. Given reported TTRs by each
node, optimal inventory levels at each node with minimum total inventory in-
vestment are obtained to make sure there are no or minimal lost sales during a
disruption period.
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Network Structure:
We consider a supply chain network consisting of p plant nodes (in set P) and n
customer nodes (in setN ). For those plants supplying multiple products, we split
them into multiple nodes such that each node represents one type of product.
For instance, supposing plant node k ∈ P produces x number of products, we
replace plant k in the network by x plant nodes (grouped into set Ak) and obtain
a new supply chain graph. Figure 2.5 gives a simple example. Plant 1 in this
(a) Original supply chain (b) Rebuilt network
Figure 2.5: Example for a rebuilt network
example produces both steel and copper. We split it into two nodes with one
node for steel production and the other for copper production. After rebuilding
the supply chain in this way, we now have a new network, G, with an enlarged
number of plant nodes, say m plant nodes (in set M). Define set T p to be the
set of all product types; Tj denote the set of raw material types needed by plant
j. In our paper, we will refer each split nodes (in total m nodes) as plant nodes
or plants and the original vendors before splitting (in total p nodes) as vendor
nodes or vendors. We partition the nodes in M into set M1 containing all
highest tier suppliers, and set M2 containing rest of the nodes of the remaining
tiers in M. Define subgraph G1 to be the graph only contains nodes in N , their
connected nodes in M and arcs connecting them; whereas subgraph G2 to be
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the graph only contains nodes in set M and arcs connecting among them. Let
m1 = |M1|, m2 = |M2|, and tp =
∑
j∈M
|Tj |. Our network structure is much more
general not limited to strictly assembly line and can be multiple tier.
Before presenting the problem formulation, we first introduce the notations, pa-
rameters and assumptions used in our model.
• ri ∈ R+, i ∈ M is the finished good inventory in plant node i. We assume
plant nodes hold finished good inventory instead of raw materials or parts
due to the fact that once disruption happens, finished good inventory can
continue serving customers for certain amount of time.
• xij ∈ R+, (i, j) ∈ G is the material flow from node i to node j.
• ui ∈ R+, i ∈M is the number of goods produced at node i.
• li ∈ R+, i ∈ N is the lost sales at demand node i.
• di ∈ R+, i ∈ N is the demand per unit time at customer node i. We assume
demand is deterministic.
• ci ∈ R+, i ∈ P is production capacity per unit time of vendor node i. We
assume every plant node produces one unit of finished good by consuming
one unit of capacity.
• B ∈ R|T p|×|M|+ is bill of material (BOM) matrix, with Btj denotes number
of product type t needed to produce 1 unit of item in plant j.
• IPT ∈ {0, 1}|M|×|T p| is the indicator matrix with the entry on row i and
column t equal to 1 if the product produced by plant i is of type t.
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• hi ∈ R+, i ∈M is unit inventory holding cost for plant node i.
• fi ∈ R+, i ∈ N is penalty cost for one unit of lost sales at customer node i.
• br ∈ R+ is the total inventory budget for the whole supply chain.
Disruption Risks and Durations:
In our supply chain, the key disruption parameters are given as follows:
• vi ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ P is the survival indicator for vendor node i, i.e. if vendor
i is not disrupted, vi = 1, otherwise, vi = 0. If vendor i is disrupted, the
capacities for all the corresponding split plant nodes are all 0.
• TR(v) ∈ R+ is the supply chain’s TTR. It is define as the time period after
which the whole supply chain can recover to full capacity after disruption.
The value of supply chain TTR depends on disruption scenarios. So we
here represent it as a function of survival indicator.
• T ri ∈ R+, i ∈ P is the time-to-recover (TTR) reported by vendor node i;
• Superscript w,w = 1, ..., p indicates the scenario corresponding to vendor
node p being disrupted.
Supply Chain Resilience under Disruption:
For a given disruption scenario v and strategic inventory deployment r, the
optimal recovery operation to minimize total lost sales during the disruptions
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can be modelled as an LP:








xij + lj ≥ djTR(v), ∀j ∈ N
∑
j∈M∪N ,(i,j)∈G







− uj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈M, t ∈ Tj
∑
i∈Ak
ui ≤ (TR(v)− T rk (1− vk))ck, ∀k ∈ P
xij ≥ 0,u, l ≥ 0
(2.1)
Note that TR(v) denotes supply chain’s TTR, and TR(v)−T rk (1−vk) measures
the time period during which node k is fully functional while the whole supply
chain has not recovered from disruption. Then (TR(v) − T rk (1 − vk))ck is the
total unit of production capacity available during the disruption duration, after
accounting for the lost production when node k is itself disrupted. The first
constraint defines the lost sales during supply chain TTR for each final goods.
The second constraint specifies the total outflow of a plant must be bounded
by units produced and inventory held. The third constraint means the total
production in a plant is constrained by the raw materials supplied from upstream.
Finally, the last constraint indicates the total units produced in a node cannot
exceed available capacity during supply chain’s TTR.
Serial Chain under Disruption:
As an illustration, consider the case of disruption planning in a serial supply
chain. Specifically, there are n suppliers (with node 1 being the most upstream
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supplier and node n being nearest to the demand) and one demand node, denoted
to be node n+ 1. The lost sales is modelled as:
Z(v, r) = min fl
s.t. xn,n+1 + l ≥ dTR
xi,i+1 − ui ≤ ri, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}
xi,i+1 − ui+1 ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n− 1}
ui ≤ (TR − T ri (1− vi))ci, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}
xi,i+1, ui ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}
The model can be simplified under the assumption that the supply chain is
balanced, in which case the capacity ci at each stage of the serial supply chain is
the same as the demand rate d, and the amount is denoted by c. We can project
out the xij variables, so that the problem is equivalent to




cTR − (un + rn)
)
s.t. ui+1 ≤ ui + ri, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n− 1}
ui ≤ (TR − T ri (1− vi))c, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}
uj ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}
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By strong duality of LP, we have





















i−1 − w(1)i + w(2)i ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {2, 3, ..., n− 1}
−w(1)1 + w(2)1 ≥ 0,
w(1),w(2) ≥ 0
where w(1) ∈ Rn−1,w(2) ∈ Rn denote the dual variables corresponding the first-
two sets of the constraints. There are n possible extreme points of the above LP.
Let ei denote a unit vector in Rn with ith element to be 1. Then, in the optimal,
1. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, w(2)∗ = ei and w(1)j
∗
= 1 for all j ≥ i, 0 otherwise.
2. For i = n, w(2)
∗
= en and w
(1)∗ = 0n−1.
Hence










The lost sales in this balanced serial supply chain reduces to an order statistic
problem for fixed r when v is random. Note that finding the optimal value of
r to minimize the expected lost sales in this case is already a difficult problem,
since in general there is no analytical method to characterize the maximum value
of the order statistics problem.
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2.4.1 Inventory Mitigation Model - The traditional REI approach
We use the REI approach as a benchmark for our analysis. This builds on the
standard stochastic programming methodology, using scenario decomposition to
synthesize the impact of the mitigation strategy in each scenario. We assume
that each scenario has exactly one vendor node disrupted2, we can WLOG denote
scenario index w by elements in the set {1, 2, . . . , p}. Therefore, TR(w) denotes
the supply chain TTR for scenario w, and coincides with the TTR reported by
the disrupted node. To ensure that we have sufficient inventory in the system to






























(w) − T rk (1− v(w)k ))ck, ∀k ∈ P, w ∈ {1, 2, .., p}
v
(w)
w = 0 ∀w ∈ {1, 2, .., p}
v
(w)
k = 1 ∀k 6= w,∀w ∈ {1, 2, .., p}
x
(w)
ij ≥ 0, u(w)j ≥ 0, ∀w ∈ {1, 2, .., p}
r ≥ 0
(2.2)
2When a vendor node is disrupted, all the corresponding split plant nodes have 0 capacity.
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Note that v
(w)
k denote the event that node k is operational in scenario w. Fur-




i = maxk T
r
k (1 − v(w)k ) to model
the supply chain TTR throughout the chapter. This assumes that the TTR
of the supply chain is purely determined by the TTR of the node disrupted,
assuming that the latter includes the time needed to detect the disruption.
This model can be used to find an inventory allocation strategy r with the small-
est total investment, such that under all disruption scenarios denoted by v(w),
the supply chain always has zero lost sales during the period of the supply chain’s
TTR. The first constraint guarantees no lost sales are incurred in each demand
node for all p scenarios. The second and third constraints are flow conservation
constraints based on the inventory available. The fourth constraint indicates
for each vendor, its total production units are bounded by its capacity during
recovered time period. The last two constraints give corresponding disruption
indicators’ values for scenario w.
Note that this approach reduces the problem to a large scale linear programming
model that can be solved readily using commercial solvers if the number of sce-
narios is moderate. However, the solution obtained is largely scenario-dependent,
and requires the state of all nodes to be specified jointly in each scenario, whereas
it is often easier to estimate in practice the probability of disruption for each in-
dividual node only. Piecing this into the risk estimate for each scenario requires
another level of estimation for each event to occur jointly. Another disadvan-
tage is that the model could not differentiate further the quality of the solutions
obtained if there are multiple optimal solutions in the LP model. To handle
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this in a compact manner, we need a more refined approach to incorporate the
probabilistic assessments into the model.
2.4.2 Inventory Mitigation Model - Distributionally Robust Ap-
proach
We assume next that the disruption distribution information is partially revealed
to the decision maker. Specifically, survival indicator vi, i = 1, ..., p are random
0-1 variables. We assume the set of distribution of v˜, B(µv,Σv), is defined by
the binary support {0, 1}p+, with finite mean vector µv and finite second-moment
matrix Σv. We use v˜i to indicate vi here is a random variable.
The objective is to explore the optimal inventory allocations with minimum total
inventory budget such that the WCVaR of total lost sales during disruption peri-
od is within a threshold, say c0. Specifically, we consider the following problem:




s.t. WCV aR1−η = min
θ
{








s.t. θ + 1η maxv˜∼B(µv ,Σv) E[(Z(v˜, r)− θ)+] ≤ c0
(2.4)
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where Z(v˜, r) denotes the minimum lost sales given disruption scenario v˜ and
inventory deployment r. It is specified in (2.1). Let α ∈ R|N |,β ∈ R|M|,γ ∈
Rtp, δ ∈ R|P| denote the dual variables corresponding to each set of constraints
in (2.1).












R − T rk (1− vk))
s.t. (α, β, γ, δ, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5) ∈ F
(2.5)
where, F is the feasible polyhedron of dual problem. For simplicity, we give
the exact portrait of F in Appendix B.2. The nonsmooth nature of CVaR and
WCVaR poses a challenge in modeling and numerical computation. We overcome
it by reformulating (Z(v˜, r)− θ)+ into the following:













k (1− v˜k)− θy










y ∈ {0, 1}
(2.6)
The introduction of binary variable y guarantees (Z(v, r) − θ)+ takes value of
Z(v, r) − θ when it is greater than 0, and 0 otherwise. The last quadratic
constraint ensures that the dual variables take value 0 when y 6= 1, since they
are assumed to be nonnegative.
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This assumes that when there are multiple sites disrupted, they all happen at
the same time 3). We need to incorporate this nonlinear constraint TR(v) =
maxi∈{k|vk=0} T
r
i into Problem (2.6). This can be equivalently formulated as a
set of linear constraints due to an important observation given in Lemma 2.1.












With this observation, it is sufficient to replace the nonlinear constraint in the
definition of TR(v
¯
) by TR ≥ T rk (1 − vk), ∀k ∈ P, since optimal solution to
the model in (2.6) will force TR to take the value of maxi∈{k|vk=0} T
r
i , as the
coefficient of TR in the objective function is non-positive. We can, therefore,
add the following constraints into Problem (2.6).






7 = 0 (2.7b)
s6, s7 ≥ 0 (2.7c)
3This assumption holds in many disruption scenarios. For instance, when the disruptions
are caused by a catastrophic event like a hurricane or earthquake, all the plants along the path
of the hurricane or near the epicenter of the earthquake will be affected at around the same
time. Even if there is a delay of the disruption timing due to risk propagation, we assumed that
this effect is short compared to the length of supply chain TTR, and is therefore negligible.
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Note that according to [68], a basic condition to use completely positive conic
reformulation for quadratic programming problem is to first have a bounded
feasible region. By analysing the structure of feasible region F , we add several
valid cuts ((8a) to (8g) given in Lemma 4.12) to Problem (2.6) to bound the
feasible region.




















y,∀k = 1, . . . , p (2.8b)
y + s11 = 1 (2.8c)
αis
5
i = 0,∀i = 1, . . . , n (2.8d)







j = fjy (2.8f)
s8, s9, s10, s11, s12 ≥ 0 (2.8g)
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Let Zm(r, θ) denote maxv˜∼B(µv ,Σv) E[(Z(v˜, r) − θ)+]. We can reformulate the
problem as:





























y ∈ {0, 1}
(7a)− (7c), (8a)− (8g)
(2.9)
Note that this is a mathematical programming problem with a quadratic objec-
tive function, subject to linear and quadratic constraints, and random variable
in constraints (7a) in the quadratic problem. Fortunately, we show next that the
problem can be reformulated as a completely positive programming problem.
2.4.2.1 Second-Stage Completely Positive Representation
Recall that Problem (2.9) is to find the moment-based bound for mixed 0-1
quadratic programs with randomness (i.e. v˜) in the right-hand side of constraints
(c.f. (7a)). In the rest of this section, we state the completely positive refor-
mulation for a more general model, to make the exposition easier on notation.
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Consider






s.t. A1x+M v˜ = b1
(A2x) ◦ (A3x) = 0
xj ∈ {0, 1} , ∀j ∈ I
(2.10)
where I is a set of index of binary variables; Ai, i = 1, 2, 3 are coefficient matrices
of x; M is the coefficient matrix of v˜; and ◦ is the Hadamard product operator.
We can directly apply the general framework we proposed in Theorem 1.7 to
find its equivalent completely positive program because the problem structure
satisfies assumption (A1)’ to (A3)’, and the uncertainty set fits the conditions
specified in Proposition 1.6.
Let x(v) be the optimal solutions to the inner maximization problem of Problem
(2.10) for a realization v. Because v is discrete, it is possible that there are
multiple optimal solutions in the support of strictly positive measure. We define
x(v) to be a randomly selected optimal solution at v. Because v is binary, we
have all the realizations vi such that vi ≤ 1, ∀i = 1, ..., p. We then define random
slack variables s˜ such that v˜ + s˜ = 1 almost surely.
Then, define
px := E[x(v˜)],pw := E[(v˜)],ps := E[(s˜)]
Xx := E[x(v˜)x(v˜)T ], Xw := E[v˜v˜T ], Xws := E[v˜s˜T ]
Y x := E[x(v˜)v˜T ], Y xs := E[x(v˜)s˜T ], Y ws := E[v˜s˜T ]
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Consider the following completely positive program, with the corresponding dual
variables shown on the right:
Zmcp(r, θ) = max c1(r, θ)








 Xx Y x
Y xT Xw
 MˆT) = b1 ◦ b1 x
diag(A2X
xAT3 ) = 0 λ
pxj = X
x
jj , ∀j ∈ B ψx
(pw,ps, Xw, Xs, Y ws) ∈M
CP =

1 pxT pwT psT
px Xx Y x Y xs
pw Y xT Xw Y ws









; • is the inner product operator; and diag(·) nodes
the diagonal elements of a matrix. Recall set M is defined as
M =

(w, s, Xw, Xs, Y ws)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
w = µv; Xw = Σv;
wi = X
w
ii ,∀i = 1, ..., p; si = Xsii,∀i = 1, ..., p;





ii = 1,∀i = 1, ..., p;
1 wT sT
w Xw Y ws
s Y wsT Xs
 <cp 0

We denote the dual variable corresponding to first element of CP as ρ; and the d-
ual variables corresponding to the linear constraints inM as ν,Θ,ψw,ψs,φw, w
following the sequence of the constraints.
Proposition 2.3. Problem (2.10) and the completely positive program (2.11)
are equivalent, i.e. Zm(r, θ) = Zmcp(r, θ).
2.4.2.2 First-Stage Co-positive Formulation
We need the dual formulation to Problem (2.11) to solve the first-stage problem.
Given the dual variables listed by the side of each constraints, we denote B as
a matrix with the (j, j)-th entry as 1 for all j ∈ B, and with other entries as 0
and defineΓ = −BTΛ(ψx)B + AT3 Λ(λ)A2, where Λ(x) denote the matrix with
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dual formulation is thus
Zmco(r, θ) = min ρ+ µ















BTψx − c1(r, θ)
)
Γ− C2 O O
1
2 (ν +ψw) O Θ− Λ(ψw) O
1






















where matrices O are matrices with all 0 elements of proper dimensions.












Due to the fact that Zmco(r, θ) is the optimal value of a minimization problem,




s.t. θ + 1η (ρ+ µ
vTν + Σv •Θ + bT1φx + bT1 Λ(x)b1 + 1Tpφw + 1Tp w1p) ≤ c0
CO <co 0
(2.14)
The specific completely positive reformulation of Problem (2.9) and the corre-
sponding co-positive formulation is given in Appendix B.3.
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2.4.3 Fixed Inventory Budget
Inventory is, in some cases, not an objective to minimize but rather a constraint,
i.e. there is a budget on the total holding cost. The optimal inventory allocation
for a fixed inventory budget, say br, can also be obtained similarly by solving a
related completely positive and co-positive program presented below.
min
r≥0
θ + 1η maxv˜∼(µv ,Σv) E[(Z(v˜, r)− θ)+]
s.t. hTr ≤ br
(2.15)




θ + 1η (ρ+ µ
vTν + Σv •Θ + bT1φx + bT1 Λ(x)b1 + 1Tpφw + 1Tp w1p)
s.t. hTr ≤ br
CO <co 0
(2.16)
2.4.4 Worst-Case Expected Lost Sales
For the sake of completeness, we next show that the worst-case “expected lost
sale” under optimal inventory allocation, Z eˆ(r∗), can be solved using a special
case of the completely positive program (2.11), since CVaR generalizes the notion
of expected performance.
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Lemma 2.4. Given the optimal inventory allocation r∗, let Z eˆ(r∗) be the worst-
case expected lost sales, i.e.
Z eˆ(r∗) := max
v˜∼(µv ,Σv)
E[Z(v˜, r∗)] (2.17)
Then Z eˆ(r∗) can be solved by the completely positive program problem (2.11) by
setting r = r∗ and θ = 0, i.e. Z eˆ(r∗) = Zmcp(r∗, 0).
2.5 Sensitivity Analysis
In the previous section, we have obtained a characterization of the worst-case so-
lution to a distributionally robust supply chain disruption problem, using recent
results developed in the theory of conic programming. While there are various
ways to formulate such problems in a robust manner, our approach has the ad-
vantage that it admits a probabilistic interpretation in terms of the worst-case
distribution to the robust problem, and uses directly the risk estimates often
used in practice. We show in this section that this can be used to derive insight-
ful information on the sensitivity analysis of the key planning parameters used
in the model. We provide the intuitive reasoning behind the sensitivity results
using the worst-case distribution interpretation, and relegate the rigorous proof
utilizing the conic program to the Appendix B.1.
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2.5.1 Impact of Supplier’s TTR
In the following sensitivity analysis, we will examine the impact on the worst-case
expected lost sales when the TTR parameters vary, using the optimal solutions
to Problem (2.17). Note that in our risk mitigation model, the TTR values for
the suppliers are self reported. The risk mitigation strategy is predicated on the
assumption that these values reflect accurately suppliers’ ability to recover from
disruption. This assumption requires the supplier to have a reliable procedure
to estimate the time duration within which it can recover from a certain type
of disruption. What happen if suppliers can be nudged to reduce their TTRs?
Which supplier should we focus on first to reduce TTR? In this section, we apply
sensitivity analysis on the reported TTR to see how the changes in supplier’s
TTR affect the worst-case expected lost sales. Note that our analysis focused
on sensitivity analysis in the worst-case scenario, instead of the more traditional
expected lost sales setting.
Recall that for fixed v and r, the lost sales are given by








xij + lj ≥ djTR(v), ∀j ∈ N α
∑
j∈M∪N ,(i,j)∈G







− uj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈M, t ∈ Tj γ
∑
i∈Ak
ui ≤ (TR(v)− T rk (1− vk))ck, ∀k ∈ P δ
xij ≥ 0,u, l ≥ 0
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This is an LP, and the optimal dual solution δ provides valuable information on
the sensitivity of the input T rk for our problem. In particular, we know that in
the optimal solution,
• If vk = 1, then change in T rk does not affect the optimal solution Z(v, r).
• If vk = 0 and T rk < TR(v), then a unit decrease in T rk resulted in a decrease
of ckδk(v), where δk(v) is the corresponding dual solution.
• The situation when vk = 0 and T rk = TR(v) is more complicated, and
depends on whether there are multiple facilities attaining the same TR(v)
in the system. In the case that plant k attains the maximum TTR alone,
(and assuming after a unit decrease, k’s TTR is still the largest among all,)
then a unit decrease in T rk will result in a change of −
∑
j∈N αj(v)dj +∑
i 6=k ciδi(v) ≥ −ckδk(v) in lost sales. Otherwise, when k attains the
maximum TTR along with other disrupted nodes, a decrease of a unit in
T rk will result in a decrease of ckδk(v) units in lost sales.
In summary, we expect the function ckδk(v)(1 − vk) to be a upper bound on
the lost sales when T rk decreases by a unit. Since v˜ is random, we expect the
function ckE[δk(v)(1− vk)] to be an upper bound for the corresponding impact
on the expected lost sales, where the expectation is taken over the worst-case
distribution.
Proposition 2.5. Suppose (px∗, Xx∗, Y x∗) be the optimal solution of problem
(2.17). Let p∗δ be the sub-vector p
x∗ corresponding to the optimal value of
E[δ∗(v∗)]; and p∗δk is the k-element in p
∗
δ. Similarly, let Y
∗
δ be the submatrix in
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Y x∗ corresponding to the optimal value of E[δ∗(v∗)v∗T ]; and Y ∗δkk be the (k, k)-
th element of matrix Y ∗δ . Then the decrease in lost sales when T
r
k decreases by a
unit is bounded above by ck(p
∗
δk − Y ∗δkk).
As the dual information obtained constitutes an upper bound of the actual im-
pact with unit change in TTR, we could use this information to identify nodes
in the supply chain whose reported TTRs will have minimal effect of the perfor-
mance of lost sales - the accuracy of the reported TTRs in nodes with low value
of ck(p
∗
δk − Y ∗δkk) will have minimal impact on the performance of lost sales.
2.5.2 Impact of Capacity and Inventory
In a similar vein, we can use the probabilistic interpretation of the worst-case
distribution to the conic program to perform sensitivity analysis on other plan-
ning parameters. For instance, we can use dual variables to analyze the impact
on the change in the vendors’ capacities. The optimal dual solution δ, or more
specifically, (TR−T rk (1− vk))δk provides valuable information on the sensitivity
of the input ck. Notice that T
R − T rk (1 − vk) is exactly the slack variable s6k
defined by constraint (8a). By the same logic as what we have for the sensitiv-
ity analysis on vendors’ TTR, we expect the effect on vendor’s capacity change
should depend on the E[δ∗(v∗)s6∗T(v∗)].
Proposition 2.6. Suppose (px∗, Xx∗, Y x∗) be the optimal solution of problem
(2.17). Let X∗
δs6
be the submatrix in Xx∗ corresponding to the optimal value of
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E[δ∗(v∗)s6∗(v∗)]. Note that X∗
δs6
is a p-by-p matrix. Let X∗
δs6kk
be the (k, k)-
element in X∗
δs6
, where k = 1, ..., p. Then the decrease in lost sales when ck
increases by a unit is bounded above by X∗
δs6kk
.
In this way, we can use the dual information to rule out expanding the capacity
of nodes with low X∗
δs6kk
, since the impact of lost sales will be small in these
cases. We can apply the same logic to study the sensitivity analysis on inventory
level at each node.
Proposition 2.7. Suppose (px∗, Xx∗, Y x∗) be the optimal solution of problem
(2.17). Let p∗β be the sub-vector p
x∗ corresponding to the optimal value of
E[β∗(v∗)]; and p∗βi is the i-element in p
∗




In this way, we can use the dual information to assess the impact of locally
modifying the inventory strategy r by examining the value of p∗βi . In the next
section, we use numerical simulation to demonstrate that although our results
are obtained in the worst-case setting, the insights obtained can still be valuable
for the traditional expected lost sales setting, when the risk probabilities are
explicitly modelled.
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2.6 Numerical Studies
We develop the experimental setup using a case study motivated by a large in-
ternet service provider serving four different markets. This experiment setup is
adapted from a case study of risk analysis in [43]. This company provides four
types of internet configurations (CFG1, CFG2, CFG3, and CFG4). In the four
markets, to incorporate the issues of flexible supply, we assume that some config-
urations can be used exchangeably. More specifically, in Market 1, CFG 1 and 4
can be used exchangeably; in Market 2, CFG 1 and 2 can be used exchangeably;
in Market 3, CFG 2 and 3 can be used exchangeably; and in Market 4, CFG 3
and 4 can be used exchangeably. Demands at the four markets are 0.18, 0.21,
0.2, and 0.21, respectively. Lost sale penalty costs are all 7. The items needed
for each configuration, and the corresponding vendor, are listed in Table 2.1.
We map the supply chain network in Figure 2.6. Supply chain parameters are
Table 2.1: Bill of material information
Item ID Vendor Geographic Location CFG1 CFG2 CFG3 CFG4
ABX
1 US
1 1 1 0
ABN 1 1 1 0
GHY 2 Mexico 1 1 2 1
KIU 3 Mexico 1 0 1 0
PFR 4 US 1 0 1 0
JKI1
5 Mexico
0 3 0 0
JKI2 3 0 0 0
JKI3 2 0 3 2
CFG 1 6 US 1 - - -
CFG 2 7 US - 1 - -
CFG 3 8 US - - 1 -
CFG 4 9 US - - - 1
summarized in Table 2.2. The disruption probabilities are generated randomly
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with the sum of probabilities set to 1, so that the average number of nodes dis-
rupted is 1. This is to facilitate comparison with the traditional REI approach,
where exactly one node is disrupted in each scenario. We consider also that the
disruptions are correlated. We assume Vendor 4 and Vendor 7 are disrupted
with correlation coefficient of 0.9; whereas Vendor 1 and Vendor 9 are disrupted
with correlation coefficient of 0.9. the machine used to perform all the computa-
tions is Dell computer with Intel(R) Core(TM) 3.40 GHz, RAM 8 GB, Microsoft
Windows Windows 7 Enterprise cvx Mosek solver. We use Doubly Nonnegative
Matrix(DNN) to approximate co-positive matrix in solving the model. The size
of the matrix for our numerical study is 141× 141 and the computation time for
each DNN approximation is around 256s.
Figure 2.6: Supply chain network
2.6.1 The Effect of Inventory Budget to Inventory Deployment
and WCVaR of Lost Sales
To see how the inventory budget influence the inventory deployment and the cor-
responding change in WCVaR, we solve Problem (2.16) again for total inventory
budgets ranging from 0.2 to 16, and confidence level 1− η at 70%, 80% and 90%
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Probability (1− µ) TTR of vendor
1. ABX 31
1 1.2 0.0667 1
2. ABN 30
3. GHY 32 2 0.9 0.1333 1.2
4. KJU 29 3 0.5 0.2000 1.4
5. PFR 30 4 0.5 0.1667 1.6
6. JKI1 30
5 2.4 0.0667 1.87. JKI2 33
8. JKI3 31
9. CFG1 500 6 0.2 0.0667 2
10. CFG2 550 7 0.4 0.1667 2.2
11. CFG3 600 8 0.3 0.0667 2.4
12. CFG4 505 9 0.2 0.0667 2.6
respectively. The WCVaR of lost sales with respect to different level of budget
Figure 2.7: WCVaR of lost sales for different inventory budgets
is plotted in Figure 2.7.
Note that it is easy to reduce lost sales to zero with a high enough inventory
budget. In fact, with the maximum TTR at 2.6, we can pre-position the total
demand for the 4 markets for 2.6 unit time at the 4 nodes in the set M2, incurring
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a total inventory cost of
2.6× (0.18× 5 + 0.21× 5.5 + 0.2× 6 + 0.21× 0.505) = 11.203.
The challenge is therefore to pre-position the inventory with a much smaller bud-
get. Interestingly, our WCVaR model essentially recovers this insight, and shows
the diminishing return on inventory budget on lost sales mitigation - when total
inventory budget is small, a small increase in budget can significantly decrease
the WCVaR of lost sales. However, when the inventory budget reaches 10.5 to
11, the lost sales effectively reduces to 0, and any further increase in inventory
budget will not affect the WCVaR of lost sales. There is thus a diminishing
returns to the value of additional inventory budget in controlling for WCVaR.
2.6.2 Inventory Strategy
We compare the optimal inventory deployment levels under two environments,
one without disruption distribution information (LP based on the REI model, ig-
noring the disruption risk estimates), and the other one with limited distribution
information (COP model).
For the first case, optimal inventory allocations and total inventory budgets
are obtained by solving Problem (2.2). The total inventory budget obtained is
2.6186, with inventory allocation as shown by the white bar in Figure 2.8. Note
that this strategy is obtained with the optimistic assumption that there is a
disruption to at most one node in the system. This is often justified because
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of the low disruption risk to each node in the system. We use this case as a
benchmark to evaluate the performance of the COP model for this experimental
setup.
With this fixed inventory budget (2.6186), and given the first-two moment in-
formation, how would the optimal inventory allocation change using the COP
model? We solve the fixed inventory budget problem (2.16) with budget of
br = 2.6186. To study the risk-aversion effect, we test our model under three
cases of confidence levels, 70% (η = 0.3), 80% (η = 0.2) and 90% (η = 0.1). The
new optimal inventory allocation strategies are compared with the one obtained
from LP model in Figure 2.8. We further analyze how large the lost sales perfor-
Figure 2.8: Inventory levels for each plant under same budget
m under inventory strategies obtained by the optimistic-LP-based model using
REI, and the pessimistic-based-COP model assuming worst-case distributions.
Specifically, given the disruption moment information, we simulate the perfor-
mance of different inventory strategies and the accompanied lost sales. When
we assume that both models have the same inventory budget of 2.6186, the cu-
mulative distribution functions of lost sales under these inventory strategies are
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given in Figure 2.9 with average lost sales, standard deviations, 70% CVaR, 80%
CVaR, and 90% CVaR given in Table 2.3. From both the CDFs of lost sales
Figure 2.9: CDFs of simulated lost sales using inventory obtained from two
models under the same budget
Table 2.3: Statistics of simulated lost sales under the same budget
Mean STD 70% CVaR 80% CVaR 90% CVaR
COP Model (Confidence level 70%) 0.5633 1.1475 1.8720 2.4019 3.5173
COP Model (Confidence level 80%) 0.5372 1.1286 1.7846 2.3869 3.4562
COP Model (Confidence level 90%) 0.5612 1.1621 1.8623 2.4642 3.6396
LP Model 0.9569 1.9128 3.1897 4.6952 5.1541
and mean-variance comparison, we can see that the COP models perform signif-
icantly better than LP model. The optimistic assumption that at most one node
can be disrupted can therefore lead to poor inventory deployment strategy. Our
numerical example shows that the incorporation of risk estimates (probabilities
of disruption) can therefore be valuable for this problem, even if the model can
only be solved for the worst-case setting.
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2.6.3 Independent Case
To further compare the performance of COP and LP model, in this section,
we assume that the disruptions at different nodes in the supply chain occur
independently. Note that the solution to the LP model remains unchanged, since
the model does not utilize the correlation information in the model setup. Our
COP model adjusts its output accordingly based on the correlation information.
Interestingly, the insights obtained in the previous section remain unchanged
largely.
We, again, set inventory budget to be 2.6186 in our numerical study and solve
the fixed inventory budget problem (2.16) with confidence level of 70%, 80%,
and 90%. The new optimal inventory allocation strategies are compared with
the one obtained from LP model in Figure 2.10.
Figure 2.10: Inventory levels for each plant under same budget in indepen-
dent case
The lost sales under these two inventory strategies are simulated given disruption
moment information. CDF curves are plotted in Figure 2.11. The five statistics
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(the mean, standard deviation, 70% CVaR, 80% CVaR and 90% CVaR) are
given in Table 2.4. We can see from the simulation result that even when there
is no correlation, the inventory strategy obtained in COP model outperforms
that obtained by LP model.
Figure 2.11: CDFs of simulated lost sales using inventory obtained from two
models under the same budget in independent case
Table 2.4: Statistics of simulated lost sales under the same budget in inde-
pendent case
Mean STD 70% CVaR 80% CVaR 90% CVaR
COP Model (Confidence level 70%) 0.4553 1.0647 1.5176 2.0510 2.8868
COP Model (Confidence level 80%) 0.4352 1.0534 1.4506 2.0317 2.8768
COP Model (Confidence level 90%) 0.4329 1.0216 1.4429 1.9720 2.8408
LP Model 0.4642 1.3344 1.5474 2.3210 4.2365
2.6.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, given the optimal inventory deployment with the fixed inventory
budget 2.6186 obtained by the COP model, we would like to analyze the effects
of the key planning parameters on the performance of the supply chain. The
inventory strategy we use here is the one obtained with confidence level 70%.
By setting θ to be 0, we first solve Problem (2.17) to obtain the corresponding
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primal and dual optimal solution, to perform the sensitivity analysis vendors’
TTRs, capacities and inventory deployment.
To validate this result, we use simulation to check the impact when these pa-
rameters change one at a time. For instance, for the analysis on TTR, we have 9
cases where each case corresponds to decreasing one vendor’s TTR by 0.1 units.
We sample 105 disruption scenarios to estimate the mean lost sales for each of
these cases, and obtain the estimated change in performance level (lost sales).
We perform the same analysis for the cases when capacities or inventory posi-
tions are changed, by increasing the vendor’s capacity by 0.1 units,and inventory
position by 0.001 units each.
The comparisons are shown in Figure 2.12. The simulated changes in the mean
lost sales are normalized to be the change with respect to a unit change of TTR,
capacity or inventory position.
(a) Sensitivity analysis on
vendors’ TTRs
(b) Sensitivity analysis on
vendors’ capacities
(c) Sensitivity analysis on
nodes’ inventory levels
Figure 2.12: Sensitivity analysis
It is interesting that while vendors 6-9 are those with the highest TTR, our
sensitivity analysis on TTR (cf. Figure 2.12a) shows that the effect of decreasing
the TTR at Node 6, 8 and 9 have the lowest impact on the performance of the
supply chain, since our analysis yields the lowest upper bound for these nodes.
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Hence the TTR from these nodes, despite having the largest value, are not critical
to the performance of the system under disruption. In fact, the simulation results
confirmed this finding, since changing the TTR at these nodes has a negligible
impact on the expected performance on lost sales. On the other hand, the upper
bound on the effect of the TTR of Vendor 5 is shown to be large in the supply
chain. This is not surprising, since Vendor 5 is responsible for 3 items in the
set M1, and holds a large amount of the strategic inventory positioned in the
system.
More interestingly, in the case of capacity parameters, the situation is reversed
and our sensitivity analysis shows that Vendor 6, 8 and 9 now played the most
important role in the performance of the supply chain, with the simulation results
confirming this findings (cf. Figure 2.12b). The capacity parameters for other
vendors do not appear to be significant, except possibly Vendor 1 and 2, based
on sensitivity analysis. Simulation confirms that capacity parameter at Vendor
1, but not Vendor 2, has a non-negligible impact on the performance.
The situation with the impact of inventory positioning is more intuitive - vendors
6, 7, 8 and 9 are significant, and a slight increase in the inventory positions in
these nodes will have a larger impact of the performance in lost sales. This is
arguably due to the fact that these nodes are closer to markets, and the inventory
will not be destroyed in the case of disruption, unlike the case with capacity. This
possibly explains why Vendor 7 is now a significant node in the supply chain,
despite having also a larger disruption probability. The inventory positioning at
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all other nodes are not as important, according to our sensitivity analysis, and
again confirmed by simulation.
2.6.5 Effect of Budget: Optimal Inventory Strategy is not Mono-
tone
Given that the budget for strategic inventory positioning may change from time
to time, it is important to understand how we could build up the strategic
inventory position over time. To understand this effect, we obtain the optimal
inventory positioning strategy for a range of budgets. We show the different
inventory positions for different levels of inventory budget in Figure 2.13, with
confidence level 70%. Note that our earlier numerical results suggest that the
inventory positions are not sensitivity to the confidence level, since the solutions
are similar even at confidence levels 80% and 90%.
We can see tier-two suppliers (Node 1-8) and tier-one suppliers (Node 9-12)
respond to the increase in total budget in different manner. When the total in-
ventory budget is sufficiently low, it is optimal to spread any additional inventory
investment across all suppliers to increase their respective inventory level. How-
ever, when the total amount of budget crosses a certain threshold (in our case,
it is about 4 to 6), it is optimal to continue to invest more in the inventory levels
of tier-one suppliers, and also to strategically reduce the inventory positions in
selected tier-two suppliers. This follows from the complex trade-offs between the
higher inventory holding cost of tier-one suppliers, and their relative proximity
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to end demands compared to tier-2 suppliers. Essentially the optimal invento-
ry positioning strategy uses the following principle - when the total inventory
budget is small, the supply chain has to invest more on the tier-two suppliers.
When the budget is sufficient, the balance will be titled towards the tier-one
suppliers, allowing the supply chain to invest more on holding inventories for
these suppliers. The numerical results also reveal a consistent pattern - over the
Figure 2.13: Inventory levels under different inventory budgets
range of budgets considered, node 8 and 3 hold the largest and second largest
share of the amount of strategic inventory available, with close to zero strategic
inventory maintained at node 11.
2.7 Concluding Remarks and Extensions
In this chapter, we introduce a risk mitigation framework, which incorporates
disruption risk estimates into supply chain planning. Our mitigation framework
is developed based on the supply chain resilience curve on the performance of
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lost sales. We present a framework to determine the optimal inventory alloca-
tion strategy such that the anticipated lost sales are minimized. Specifically,
we assume the first-two moment of the disruption distribution are known, and
by adopting the notion of distributionally robust model, we obtained the opti-
mal inventory allocation across the supply chain which gives minimal value of
WCVaR of the lost sales.
We showed that this problem can be fully characterized by a co-positive program,
which can be solved via SDP relaxation. Moreover, our distributionally robust
model can be used to perform sensitivity analysis, and to estimate the changes in
the worst-case expected lost sales when certain supply chain parameters change.
We finally apply our framework to a numerical study. We show that in both cases
when the disruptions are either independent or correlated, the optimal inventory
strategy obtained by our co-positive program model outperforms that obtained
from the traditional REI model.
There are several interesting implications our numerical study reveals. Specifical-
ly, our numerical results highlight the important role that total inventory budget
plays in supply chain risk management. On one hand, we show there is a di-
minishing return effect to the value of additional inventory budget in controlling
WCVaR of lost sales. On the other hand, we find that the optimal inventory
strategy is not always monotone with respect to total inventory budget. The
single-crossing condition does not hold in this case. When the total inventory
budget passes certain thresholds, the optimal inventory for certain nodes may
begin to drop.
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We also would like to make some remarks and highlight several limitations in our
model. Firstly, we assume that when disruption happens at certain node, the
production capacity is completely disrupted without affecting the finished goods
inventory held at this node. This assumption does not limit us from modeling
the case when inventory is contaminated due to the disruption. This can be done
by modifying supply chain networks and introducing dummy nodes. Specifically,
(a) Node i (b) Split Node i
Figure 2.14: Rebuilt network when inventory is disrupted.
suppose node i’s capacity, c, breaks down with probability of p and the node’s
TTR is T ri , whereas the inventory held, r, is destroyed with probability of q
(Figure 2.14a). We split node i into three nodes (Node 1, Node 2, and Node 3)
illustrated in Figure 2.14b. Node 1 has capacity of c and 0 inventory level. This
node is disrupted with probability of p and its TTR is T ri . The in-and-out arcs
are of the same structure as node i. Node 2 is of 0 capacity but with inventory
level of r. This node is always functional. Node 2 has no inflow, it only has one
outflow to Node 3. Node 3 is with capacity of c and 0 inventory. This node is
disrupted with probability q. Its TTR is a large number, which we can put it
as the maximum TTR of all the nodes in this supply chain. This is implied by
the fact that inventory is forever gone once it is disrupted. Node 3 only has one
upstream node, Node 2. Its outflow structure is the same as node i. Through
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such reconstruction of the network, we can incorporate the case when inventory
can be disrupted into our model.
Secondly, we solve the SDP relaxation of the corresponding co-positive and com-
pletely positive programs using the standard Doubly-Non-Negative (DNN) re-
laxation. In general, the gap between the exact and the relaxed model may
be large, and we have introduced additional constraints that can be added to
the formulation to reduce the gap and ensure convergence. Note that there
are cases in which exact SDP formulation can be found to be equivalent to the
co-positive/completley positive program. Specifically, Natarajan and Teo ([67])
explicitly present those nice structured cases and order-statistic problem is one
such case. Recall that when the supply network is a balanced serial chain, our
risk management problem is an order statistic problem. Hence, we can have an
exact SDP model for this special structure. Whether there any other networks
possessing such tight formulations or, more generally, whether there any condi-
tions under which we can have a tight formulation is a promising future research
question.
Finally, in terms of numerical study, CVX Mosek cannot be used to solve large
scale DNN problems. When the supply chain is large, one possible way to apply
our framework is to decompose the network into blocks, and solve each block
one at a time to fix the inventory levels. It will be interesting to see if there is a
more compact way to model the supply chain disruption problem.
Chapter 3
Post-disaster Humanitarian
Aid Supply Chain Design
3.1 Background
On November 8th, 2013, Typhoon Haiyan, announced to be the strongest ty-
phoon ever, hit in Central Philippines. The magnitude of wind speed was as
high as 300km/hr, causing catastrophic damages. According to the UN Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 14 millon people were
affected including 4 million displaced people who lost their homes. There were
6,200 death and 1,700 were reported missing. One of the major affected cities
is Tacloban with population of 220,000. It was hit with the full force of the
typhoon followed by a storm which was, as reported, up to 5 meters and flushed
the whole city.
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In the past, we have witnessed thousands of people suffering from catastrophic
disasters. In 2010 Haiti Earthquake, there were approximately 220,000 casualties
and more than 300,000 injuries. More than 3 million people became homeless.
In 2011, Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami took away 15,889 lives. Nearly 6,152
people were injured and more than 2,600 were missing. According to the disaster
trend data on EM-DAT, there are 10 fold more natural disasters today than 50
years ago. If this trend persists, we might see more devastating events and more
people would be affected. There are several humanitarian topics on the world’s
list of biggest concerns, including energy, water, food, environment, poverty,
terrorism and so on. How to cope with disasters to save lives is also one of the
goals of humanitarian operations.
Humanitarian logistics is one of the most important link in humanitarian op-
erations. It has been observed that 80% of disaster relief efforts are related to
logistics activities ([95]). Thomas and Mizushima ([92]) defined humanitarian
logistics as “the process of planning, implementing and controlling the efficient,
cost-effective flow and storage of goods and materials, as well as related infor-
mation, from the point of origin to the point of consumption, for the purpose
of meeting the end beneficiaries’ requirements.” With the increase in natural
and man-made disasters in recent years, post-disaster humanitarian aid logistics
becomes a challenge worldwide. There are usually four stages in humanitarian
operations for disaster management, namely assessment of risk, mitigation, re-
sponse and recovery. Post-disaster humanitarian aid logistics takes place in the
response stage. There are several steps humanitarian logistic operations follow
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in this response stage in order to meet the beneficiaries’ needs (i.e. the needs of
those who survived). Those steps are needs assessment, sourcing, transportation,
warehousing and distribution (Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1: Steps in humanitarian logistics in the response stage
In the needs assessment stage, the objective is to gather sufficient knowledge on
the disaster conditions, damage magnitudes, and affected people’s needs. Based
on the assessment results, an action plan is formulated which usually includes
types and amounts of urgent items needed as well as total estimated budget
needed. The primary challenge in this stage is to obtain information and assess
beneficiaries’ needs in a very short time. This timeliness requirement is not easy
to achieve due to the fact that in the early stage after disasters, it is generally
difficult to send people into the affected places because of the damages in the
transportation infrastructures. Fujitsu recently launched a new initiative using
big data to gather disaster information to help government formulate evacuation
action plan. They use information on social media, such as people’s posts on
Twitter and Facebook to get timely updates on disasters. However, those social
media information can be difficult to access due to paralyzed telecommunication
systems.
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In the sourcing stage, there are, in general, three sources of relief supplies. The
first source is existing stocks of relief items pre-allocated in the affected country
before disasters. The second source is the existing funds and cash donation
reserved for emergencies. They would be used to procure relief items in local
markets and abroad. The third type is the relief items directly donated from
worldwide, which are usually called Gifts in Kind (GIK). Among those three
types of relief supplies, the first two are generally easy to access. They are
either located near the affected region or can be mobilized easily in the form
of funds. However, the issue with the existing stocks and local procurements
are their limited amounts and capacities, which could not be relied on solely.
The last type of donations are physical items delivered from outside world to the
affected locations, which will be subjected to uncertainties such as transportation
conditions and other issues such as timing of availabilities.
In the transportation stage, all means of transportation modes are used exten-
sively to meet the urgent demands. In the very early stage, military carriers play
a crucial role. The last mile shipping is usually the biggest bottleneck due to the
disrupted transportation infrastructures such as roads and bridges. Additionally,
transportation planning is usually done before having a complete picture of the
disrupted infrastructure conditions.
Warehousing is crucial in humanitarian logistics. There can be large amount of
relief items piling up along the supply routes due to bottlenecks in transportation
and limited storage facilities. In case there is no existing warehouses available,
alternative buildings such as schools can be used as temporary storage places.
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Temporary storage facilities can also be set up such as Mobile Storage Units
(MSU). Besides physical warehouses, complementary supporting assets and op-
erating and maintenance personnel are also needed. Warehouses are usually not
only used to store items but also for preparing and re-packing relief items and
make then ready for distribution.
Finally in the distribution stage, the first batch distributed is usually from lo-
cal stocks and existing relief reserves, followed by physical items arrived from
overseas subsequently. The main challenge in distribution is usually fairness in
the allocation to those affected. Different households have different number of
people with different needs. Special needs from infants, kids and women should
also be considered. There can be coordination issues between international hu-
manitarian organizations and local officials and governments.
In our research community, researchers “doing good with good OR” ([36]) are
using OR techniques in humanitarian applications that have a real impact on the
people and the world. In many of the humanitarian problems, decision making
needs sophisticated and systematic analysis, and disaster management is one of
those cases. For example, in case of post-disaster relief problem, decision making
requires several levels of cooperations and coordinations among groups with dif-
ferent interests. Some of those decisions also have to be made under the pressure
of time before sufficient information is gathered. There are plenty of uncertain-
ties and complexities. On the other hand, there has been extensive research and
best practices on commercial logistic operations. Many of those wisdoms shed
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lights on possible good strategies dealing with humanitarian logistics. The lat-
ter, however, has several unique challenges that need to be emphasized. Most of
those challenges have been presented, to some extent, when we discuss the five
stages of post-disaster humanitarian logistic operations above. The first one is
that the key objective in humanitarian logistics is to serve the end beneficiaries’
requirements and their demands. Whereas for commercial logistic operations,
satisfying end demand, in many cases, is not the ultimate goal. Various players
and stakeholders are involved and they might have different or even conflicting
interests. However, in most of the literatures in humanitarian logistics, cost
minimization is chosen to be the objective. In this thesis, inspired by the TTS
(time-to-survive) concept introduced by Simchi-Levi et.al ([84]), we propose to
apply TTS as the performance metric for humanitarian efforts. Specifically, TTS,
in this context, is defined as the maximum time during which relief items can ful-
ly sustain the affected people’s demands. This performance objective aligns with
the goal of post-disaster humanitarian operations much better than minimizing
costs. In post-disaster humanitarian operations, relief items are used to sustain
the people in the affected region for a period of time, during which evacuations
are taking place. The ultimate goal is to formulate smart and efficient relief
strategies to sustain the people’s lives until they can be eventually evacuated.
At the early stage of planning, time needed to evacuate all the affected people is
usually known. Hence, the objective can be revised to be sustaining their life as
long as possible, which is essentially maximizing TTS.
The second challenge lies in the source of uncertainties in supply and demand,
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which can significantly differ from those in the commercial logistic context. The
demand in humanitarian operations is usually more bursty with a sudden spike
close to the onset of the diaster. The amount of supplies and the timing of
availability can be highly uncertain as well because many of the relief items
are in-kind donations. The third challenge regards to the material flow. The
logistic infrastructure in humanitarian operations are less reliable. There can be
disruptions in the supply chain network due to the fact that roads and bridges
can be destroyed and cannot be used to ship relief items. Especially in the early
stage after disaster happens, the conditions of transportation infrastructures can
be highly uncertain to the relief workers.
In this chapter, we use the TTS model to address a real humanitarian aid logistic
problem, Typhoon Haiyan Case, in which one of the main challenges faced was
last-mile delivery of relief items given high uncertainties in the conditions of
transportation infrastructures around affected islands. We answer the question
of how to select transportation modes and decide capacities of each mode such
that relief items can reach and sustain the affected people as best as possible.
Outline of the Chapter: In §3.2, we present a detailed overview of Typhoon
Haiyan case to illustrate common practice and challenges faced in post-disaster
humanitarian operations. In §3.3, we review literatures in post disaster logistics
and other related research topics. §3.4 presents the time-to-survive model and
we show the post-disaster logistic problem can be equivalently formulated as a
co-positive program. We apply the TTS model to the Typhoon Haiyan case in
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§3.5 and present several interesting findings. Finally, in §3.6, we conclude this
chapter.
3.2 Typhoon Haiyan Case Overview
In this section, we present the real challenges faced during post-disaster human-
itarian operations after Typhoon Haiyan. This overview is adapted from a case
report by Stumpf, Wee and Liwag ([89]).
1. Assessment Stage. In the first few days, assessment of the conditions on
the affected area was very difficult to conduct due the vast damage of in-
frastructures such as roads, bridges, airports and seaports. There were also
unstable security situations around the cities such as looting. Therefore,
only limited essential personnel managed to go into the affected islands to
gain information on affected people’s conditions and needs. In the assess-
ment stage, some organizations made use of “tool kits” to collect relevant
information. For example, Plan International has a Children centric “tool
kit” to assess the need of affected children. All the organizations would
agree upon the basic assessment tool and then added on specific require-
ments serving their own targets. The initial need reports were drafted
based on the assessment findings. There was an urgent need for clean wa-
ter, food, shelter and medication. A detailed list of identified needs was
presented by UN OCHA, including clean water and water related infras-
tructure for 500,000 people; essential medicines and health service for 9.8
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million people; food for 2.5 million people including 100,000 children and
60,000 mothers who had special nutrition needs; shelter kits for 562,000
misplaced people; and road, sea, and air transportation support. Accord-
ing to the assessment report, the biggest challenge identified in the initial
stage was not the insufficient funding and resources, not the transhipment
from overseas’ in-kind donation suppliers to Philippines, but the last-mile
transhipment to the affected areas due to damaged transportation infras-
tructures. There was an estimate of 348 million US dollars to satisfy the
identified needs from November 13 to May 31.
2. Sourcing Stage. In the case of Typhoon Haiyan, all three types of relief
supplies were used (i.e., pre-existing stocks, cash and fund donations as
well as GIK). All three sources of supplies were in place timely after two
weeks of the disaster. For example, the large humanitarian organization,
USAID, during the first week after the Typhoon, donated more than 22
millions worth of relief supplies, including clean water and food items, and
other donations in the form of cash.
3. Transportation Stage. During the first week, most of the international
relief items were shipped by air through Manila International Airport, Ce-
bu International Airport and Tacloban Domestic Airport. The transport
from Manila International Airport to Tacloban was primarily by trucks
with the lead time of 1.5 to 2 days. Cebu International Airport was closer
to Tacloban and it became the first choice to receive international cargos
which soon faced congestion problem. Tacloban Airport and seaport were
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not functional after the storm and once they recovered, only limited ship-
ping capacities were used. The detailed transportation routes are given in
Figure 3.2.
4. Warehousing and Distribution Stages There were existing warehouses
at, for example, Cebu ariport and industrial areas. Many MSUs were
also built near strategic transportation hubs such as airports and seaports.
All MSUs were free to use hence there were challenges in the planning
and management. The support groups to the warehouses were, initially,
military forces. After their retraction, there was an increase in the demand
for technicians and operators. In the distribution stage, the very first
relief items distributed were from existing stocks held in and near the
affected islands or other items pre-located around the country which were
ready to ship immediately after the disaster by helicopter. In addition, a
voucher system was established and ready to distribute to the people. Each
voucher consisted of 2kgs of rice, milk powder, coffee/chocolate powder,
and instant noodles. It was initially planned to distribute one voucher to
one household per day. This system failed to address fairness issues in terms
of different family sizes and also delivered with bias due to human factors.
The beneficiaries used the term “colored” to describe the phenomenon
that people needed to have “relationship” with local officials in order to
gain more benefits. In the case of distributing physical relief items, there
were also issues of looting because there was a gap between the time when
items arrived and the time when they were ready to be distributed since
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Figure 3.2: Typhoon Haiyan caseair transport, overland transport, sea and
river transport
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the distribution could only start after officials have arrived and settled
personal matters. There were also coordination issues when different relief
item sources were using different distribution channels.
From the presentation of this real humanitarian logistic case, we can see one
of the biggest challenges faced is the uncertain condition of the transportation
infrastructures such as roads and bridges. This challenge hinders the assessment
step when it was difficult to send assessment experts in as well as the transporta-
tion step where physical relief items have to be shipped in.
In this chapter, we focus on this issue and zoom into the transportation stage
when needs assessment has been formulated into action plan and relief item sup-
plies are in place waiting to be coordinated to be shipped to the affect locations.
We would like to study how to allocate the supplies to available transportation
means subjected to different and uncertain infrastructure conditions. We do not
assume the decision maker knows the accessability of the infrastructure for sure
because in the very early stage, some transportation infrastructures are still ex-
posed to disruptions such as follow-up bad weather or human factors such as
looting. Additionally, timeliness is crucial for post-disaster supplies shipping.
The shipping of items usually happens before full information about uncertain-
ties reveals. Our objective is to design the transportation capacities such that
the relief items can reach the affected area and sustain the people as long as
possible.
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3.3 Literature Review
3.3.1 Post-disaster Supplies’ Distribution Problem
Humanitarian logistics comprise a wide range of operations in response to dif-
ferent types of disaster relief issues. We refer interested readers to Kova´cs and
Spens [54] for a comprehensive review. More details in terms of applying OR/M-
S techniques in humanitarian logistics can be found in a survey paper by Celik
et al. ([23]). In particular, humanitarian logistic operation involves four main
phases, including risk assessment, mitigation, response and recovery. Altay and
Green [2] investigated these topics in the OR/MS field and highlighted the sig-
nificance of “Response” in disaster management. In this section, we restrict our
discussions to those humanitarian topics that are closely associated with post-
disaster response phase and mainly focus on literatures studying post-disaster
supplies’ distribution problem.
Two types of strategic decisions–inventory management and relief item distribution–
are commonly studied in literatures of the post-disaster relief operations ([19]).
Research on inventory management targets at developing optimal inventory poli-
cies to improve the performance of supply chain. For example, Beamon and
Kotleba [10] developed inventory replenishment policies to address the unpre-
dictable demand patterns and irregular constraints resulting from complicated
humanitarian emergencies. Ozbay and Ozguven [69] proposed a time-dependent
inventory planning model and derived the minimal safety stock level for the post-
disaster relief items. On the other hand, given the supply chain network, relief
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item distribution decisions involve issues such as capacity configuration and re-
source distribution (e.g., [48], [1], [12], and [31]). However, most of those works
addressed the relief distribution problem in a deterministic way, i.e., design the
network flow and capacity configuration under some predefined disaster scenar-
ios. More concretely, due to the complex analysis in the post-disaster framework,
their underlying assumption is that all the logistic planning is conducted after
uncertainties are resolved. Therefore, these literatures mainly focus on the loca-
tion problem of temporary facilities, transshipment of materials among different
distribution centers, or transportation mode selection, ignoring the possible dis-
ruptions in the transportation infrastructure and uncertain material flow.
As presented in the Typhoon Haiyan case, the majority of decisions have to
be made without knowing the exact post-disaster conditions. Studying human-
itarian problems under uncertainty has piqued a surge of interests in the hu-
manitarian logistics literatures. Salmero´n and Apte [79] developed a two-stage
stochastic optimization model to study asset preposition problem for a budget-
constrained supplier before disaster happens. Bozorgi-Amiri et al.([19]) studied
a general disaster relief logistic problem where demand, supply, as well as the
cost of procurement and transportation are uncertain. They also considered
multi-objective where cost and demand satisfaction are both factored in the ob-
jective. Celik et al. ([24]) considered a stochastic debris clearance problem after
disasters when planners have limited information on the amount of debris. As
the clearance proceeds, information is updated. They modeled this problem as
a Markov decision process and proposed a computation heuristic to solve the
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model. Besides using a stochastic modeling approach, the framework of robust-
ness is also applied to address the post-disaster relief challenges. For instance,
Najafi et al. [66] developed a robust approach to model logistic decisions and
relief item distribution plans under different disaster scenarios. Ben-Tal et al.
([11]) applied distributionally robust model to formulate a robust logistic plan
facing uncertain demand. However, most of these works model the uncertainty
on supply or demand sides, with rare attentions to the infrastructure nodes. In
this work, we explicitly model the uncertainty of infrastructure conditions and
plan for the procurement & transportation by assuming the decision maker only
obtains partial information about the possible disruptions. Furthermore, we also
apply the distributional robustness concept to explore the shipping plan from a
pessimistic perspective in order to gauge against the worst-case scenario.
There are some other approaches to address the unreliability issue of relief dis-
tribution. For example, Barbarosog˘lu and Arda [8] provided the “emergency
response” mechanism and also designed a two-stage stochastic model. Bar-
barosog˘lu et al. [9] studied the use of the helicopter in relief distribution, provided
that the road-transportation may not be reliable in the disaster situations. In
this work, we provide a robust approach to automatically select the transporta-
tion mode according to different disruption probabilities, transportation costs
and budget limit.
As far as we know, most of the papers we reviewed address the humanitarian
management challenges from the perspective of minimizing the cost, which is
commonly studied in the context of commercial logistic problems. However, in
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the case of humanitarian operations, as what have been mentioned, reducing
cost is not the ultimate concern. Different from previous research, in this work,
we propose, instead, using TTS as the performance metric for post disaster
humanitarian logistics, with total budget being a hard constraint in the model.
We would like to study how to plan for the transportation capacities, which are
subjected to disruptions, so that TTS can be maximized.
3.3.2 Random Capacity and Random Yield Problem
Our problem is closely related to random capacity and random yield problem.
In the context of random yield due to unreliable supply, only a random fraction
of committed procurement quantities can be realized. Most of the literatures
stand in the shoes of downstream retailers and study optimal or near-optimal
ordering and inventory policies facing such unreliable suppliers. For example,
Hening and Gerchak ([50]) analyzed a multi-period production and inventory
system with random yield. They show a state-dependent order-up-to policy is
optimal. Anupindi adn Akella([4]) studied two suppliers with uncertain supplies
and explored optimal ordering policies for the retailer under different quantity
contract models. Federgruen and Yan ([37]) extended the case to multiple unreli-
able suppliers delivering orders subject to random yields to downstream retailer.
They showed base-stock policy is no longer optimal. They provided an efficient
algorithm to find the optimal policy.
Random capacity problem is different from the random yield problem defined
above. It is the problem where only capacity (i.e. upper bound of production or
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procurement quantity) is random. Once the randomness resolves, any amount
produced below capacity level can be delivered for sure. 1 In this case, the
delivered quantity is the minimum of order quantity and the realized capaci-
ty. Ciarallo et al.([28]) is arguably the first paper exploring the implications of
random capacity in periodic review production problem of single product fac-
ing random demand. They modeled manufacturer’s capacity level as a random
variable under a given distribution. They obtained optimal production policy
for single period case, finite-horizon case and infinite-horizon case. Hwang and
Singh ([52]) studies single period multi-stage model with setup costs and random
capacities. Wang and Gerchak ([98]) included both random capacity and ran-
dom yield into the periodic review production problem facing random demand.
The formulated the problem as stochastic dynamic program and obtained the
optimal production policy for finite horizon problem. They showed the solution
for the finite-horizon problem converges to that of the infinite-horizon problem.
Subsequent literatures extended the problem in different ways in terms of modi-
fying the underlying assumptions on distributions (e.g. Yang et al. ([103]), Iida
([53])) or incorporating other decisions such as pricing (e.g. Chao et al.([25]),
Feng ([38])).
The critical difference between our problem and those studied in the literatures
is that they take random supplies as a result from upstream exogenous random
yield or random capacities. However, we study the problem from supply-chain
perspective and include the decision making process of both upstream unreliable
1Yano and Lee ([104]) applied a more general scope definition of random yield problem and
they included random capacity problem as a special case of random yield problem.
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nodes and downstream procurement nodes. We partially endogenize random
capacity in our problem. In the first stage, we decide the capacity allocation to
each node in the supply chain network acknowledging the future probabilities
of capacity disruptions. This capacity decision essentially sets a deterministic
upper bound to the realized capacity in the second stage. How to optimally
determine the first stage capacity allocation, as far as we know, has not been
studied in random capacity literatures. Another key difference is our objective
is to maximize TTS not minimize cost which is the most common objective in
random yield and random capacity literature. These two differences essentially
lead to a very different model from classic random yield and random capacity
problems.
3.4 Time-to-survive Models
In this section, we consider a more generic setting where decision makers design
the supply chain network capacities (which are subjected to uncertain disrup-
tions) strategically so that the goods can be shipped to the final demand and
can sustain the demand as long as possible. Adopting Simchi-Levi et al. ([86])’s
Time-To-Survive (TTS) concept mentioned in Chapter 2, we can directly link
our problem to the disruption risk management problem where objective is to
revised to be TTS maximization.
Network Structure:
We can use the same network structure defined in Chapter 2 with p plant nodes
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(in set P) and n customer nodes (in set N ). We treat plants supplying multiple
products similarly by splitting them into multiple nodes such that each node
represents one type of product. After rebuilding the supply chain in this way,
we now have a new network, G, with an enlarged number of plant nodes, say
m plant nodes (in set M). Define set T p to be the set of all product types; Tj
denote the set of raw material types needed by plant j. We partition the nodes
in M into set M1 containing all highest tier suppliers, and set M2 containing
rest of the nodes inM. Define subgraph G1 to be the graph only contains nodes
in N , their connected nodes in M and arcs connecting them; whereas subgraph
G2 to be the graph only contains nodes in set M and arcs connecting among
them. Let m1 = |M1|, m2 = |M2|, and tp =
∑
j∈M
|Tj |. We define most of the
notations and parameters same as those presented in Chapter 2.
• ri ∈ R+, i ∈M is the finished good inventory in plant i. We assume plant
nodes hold finished good inventory instead of raw materials or parts due to
the fact that once disruption happens, finished good inventory can continue
serving customers for certain amount of time.
• xij ∈ R+, (i, j) ∈ G is the material flow rate from node i to node j.
• ui ∈ R+, i ∈M is the number of goods produced per unit time at node i.
• di ∈ R+, i ∈ N is the demand per unit time at customer node i. We assume
demand is deterministic.
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• ci ∈ R+, i ∈ P is production capacity per unit time of plant node i. We
assume plant produces one unit of finished good by consuming one unit of
capacity.
• B ∈ R|T p|×|M|+ is bill of material (BOM) matrix, with Btj denoting the
number of product type t needed to produce 1 unit of item in plant j.
• IPT ∈ {0, 1}|M|×|T p| is the indicator matrix with the entry on row i and
column t equal to 1 if the product produced by plant i is of type t.
• hi ∈ R+, i ∈M is unit capacity cost for plant node i.
• bc ∈ R+ is the total capacity budget throughout TTS for the whole supply
chain.
• Cui ∈ R+, i ∈ P is total capacity upper bound throughout TTS of plant i.
Disruption Risks and Durations:
In our supply chain, the key disruption parameters are given as follows:
• vi ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ P is the fraction of capacities which can be used at plant
node i.2
• T ∈ R+ is the time-to-survive (TTS);
Supply Chain Resilience under Disruption:
For a given disruption scenario v and strategic capacities c, the optimal ship-
ping plan to maximize the TTS during the disruptions can be modelled as the
2Different from the survivor indicator defined in Chapter 2, we here allow the capacities to
be partially destroyed. This can represent those cases when part of the relief items are lost
during transhipment or the road is not fully functional but with limited capacity.
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following optimization problem:







xij ≥ dj , j ∈ N
∑
j∈M∪N ,(i,j)∈G







− uj ≥ 0, j ∈M, t ∈ Tj
∑
i∈Ak







T ≥ ck k ∈ P
xij ≥ 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ G
ui ≥ 0, ∀i ∈M, T ≥ 0
(3.1)
Note that the objective is to minimizing 1T , which is equivalent to maximizing
T . We can treat 1T as a decision variable to transform Problem (3.1) to a linear
programming problem. The first constraint assures the goods shipped to the
destinations must satisfy the demands. The second constraint specifies the total
outflow of a plant must be bounded by units produced and inventory held. The
third constraint means the total production in a plant is constrained by the raw
materials supplied from upstream. The fourth constraint indicates the total units
produced in a node cannot exceed its capacity. The fifth constraint is the total
capacity budget constraint and the last constraint is the total capacity upper
bound constraint for each node. We can also incorporate other types of bounds
to capacities throughout the whole TTS duration in such forms as long as they
are linear. The underlying assumption is that the total amount of budget(or
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allowable capacities) is evenly consumed over time.
Remarks. This linear formulation of time-to-survive model shares a similar struc-
ture as the linear program of lost sale model presented in Chapter 2. The main
difference is our overall problem (first-stage problem) is essentially determining
the capacities, c, other than the inventory levels r. This can make the first-
stage problem structure more complex due to the fact that the random variables
representing disruption scenarios, v, are present as coefficients to c. Due to
this challenge, we need to carefully design well performed valid cuts in order to
improve the numerical performance of the corresponding conic program.
3.4.1 Benchmark Case
Given the marginal disruption probabilities, a natural and simple way of capacity
planning is to assume deterministic fractional capacities are destroyed with the
fractions exactly equal to the marginal disruption probabilities. Specifically,
denote the first moment of v˜ as µv. The capacity of node i free from disruption
is assumed to be µvi ci. Capacity planning problem can be address by solving the
following LP. We refer to this model as LP model and use it as a benchmark to
assess the performance of the capacity strategy obtained from our TTS robust
model. Note that when there is no disruption, LP model gives the most efficient
capacity allocation strategy. We expect to see a good performance of LP model
when disruption probability is small. In the context of random transportation
capacities when a disaster has just happened, infrastructure disruptions are not
rare. The TTS robust model we propose essentially take such disruption risks
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T − ck ≥ 0 k ∈ P
xij ≥ 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ G, ui ≥ 0,∀i ∈M
ci ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ P, T ≥ 0
(3.2)
3.4.2 TTS Model - Distributionally Robust Approach
We assume that the disruption distribution information is partially revealed to
the decision maker. The uncertainty set are defined similar to the indicator
variables in Chapter 2. Specifically, survival variables vi, i = 1, ..., p are random
variables between 0 and 1. We assume the set of distribution of v˜, U(µv,Σv)+,
is defined by the support [0, 1]p, with finite mean vector µv and finite second-
moment matrix Σv. We use v˜i to indicate vi as a random variable. We wish
to see how to invest in capacities facing distributions. In particular, at the first
stage, decision maker determines the capacity of each node in the network. In the
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second stage, after disruption happens, given the first two moments of survival
variables, the worst-case expected TTS is solved. Specifically, we formulate the
problem as follows.
Z = min Zw(c)





The inner minimization problem is linear. Hence, we can apply strong duality
result to obtain its dual formulation.
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l = 0, k ∈ P, i(k) ∈ Ak, i(k) ∈M2







α ∈ Rn+,β ∈ Rm+ ,γ ∈ Rtp+ , δ ∈ Rp+,
λ ∈ R+,κ ∈ Rp+, s1 ∈ R|G2|+ , s2 ∈ R|G1|+ ,
s3 ∈ Rm2+ , s4 ∈ Rm1+ , s5 ∈ R+
(3.4)
The strong duality result implies Z(v˜, c) = ZD(v˜, c). Firstly, we assume at least
one inventory level is not less than 1. Under this assumption, since all dual
Post-disaster Humanitarian Aid Supply Chain Design 98
variables β, λ, κ and the slack variable s5 are nonnegative, we have a natural
upper bound for every βi,, λ and κk of 1. The first constraint with respect to α
and β implies an upper bound for every αj of 1. With those two sets of valid
cuts added, our inner linear program becomes





















+ s2l = 0, i ∈M, j ∈M2, (i, j) ∈ G1
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i = 1 i ∈M
αj + s
7
j = 1 j ∈ N
λ+ s8 = 1
κk + s
9
k = 1 k ∈ P
α ∈ Rn+,β ∈ Rm+ ,γ ∈ Rtp+ , δ ∈ Rp+,
λ ∈ R+,κ ∈ Rp+, s1 ∈ R|G2|+ , s2 ∈ R|G1|+ ,
s3 ∈ Rm2+ , s4 ∈ Rm1+ , s5 ∈ R+, s6 ∈ Rm+ ,
s7 ∈ Rn+, s8 ∈ R+, s9 ∈ Rp+
(3.5)
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3.4.3 Second-Stage Completely Positive Representation
It is easy to see Problem (3.5) with additional valid cuts fits the general frame-
work in Chapter 1. We can have an equivalent completely positive representation.
Before we give the direct formulation, let us first define several key notations and
decision variables. Let sl denote a vector packing all the slack variables.
Let
(
α∗(v),β∗(v),γ∗(v), δ∗(v), λ∗(v),κ∗(v), sl∗(v)
)
be the optimal solutions
to inner maximization problem for a demand realization v. With a little abuse
of notations, we define
x∗(v) =
(
α∗T(v) β∗T(v) γ∗T(v) δ∗T(v) λ∗T(v) κ∗T(v) sl∗T(v)
)T
.
The corresponding uncertainty set in this problem is
U =
 v˜ ∈ Rp+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
v˜ + s˜v = 1
v˜, s˜v ≥ 0

Based on Proposition 1.6, the constraints to feasible moment sequences in this
case are
pv = µv; Xv = Σv;
pvi + p
s
i = 1,∀i = 1, ..., n; Xvii +Xsii + 2Y vsii = 1, ∀i = 1, ..., n;
1 pvT psT
pv Xv Y vs
ps Y vsT Xs
 <cp 0
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We then define
px = E[x(v˜)] px = E[v˜]
Xx = E[x(v˜)x(v˜)T ] Xv = E[v˜v˜T ]
Y xv = E[x(v˜)v˜T ] Y xs = E[x(v˜)s˜v
T
]
Denote objective coefficient vector as a(c)1 and coefficient matrix as A2(c) which
are functions of first stage decision variables, i.e. capacities, c. We can have the
equivalent completely positive reformulation as follows.
Zcp(c) = max a(c)
T
1 p
x −A2(c) · Y xv Dual Variables
s.t. Dxp
x = b φx
diag(DxX
xDTx ) = b · b x
pv = µv ν
Xv = Σv Θ
pv + ps = 1p φv




1 pvT pxT psT
pv Xv Y xvT Y svT
px Y xv Xx Y xz




where Dx is coefficient matrix. The exact details of the coefficients, a(c)1, A2(c),
and Dx are given in the Appendix C.
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Proposition 3.1. Problem 3.5 and the completely positive program 3.6 are e-
quivalent.
3.4.4 First-stage Co-positive Representation
Similar to the disruption risk management problem in Chapter 2, we need the
dual formulation to Problem (3.6) to solve the first-stage problem. Given the
dual variables listed by the side of each constraints, where Λ(x) denote the matrix
with elements of vector x lying on the diagonal position. The dual formulation
is thus
Zco(c) = min ρ+ µ
vTν + Σv •Θ + bTφx + bTΛ(x)b+ 1Tpφv + 1Tp v
s.t. CO =





xφx − a(c)1)T 12φvT
1













where matrices O are matrices with all 0 elements of proper dimensions.
Our two-stage problem now can be formulated as
min
c≥0
ρ+ µvTν + Σv •Θ + bTφx + bTΛ(x)b+ 1Tpφv + 1Tp v1p
s.t. CO <co 0
(3.8)
In the following section, we would zoom into the transportation stage of Ty-
phoon Haiyan case and apply our conic programming approach to plan for the
transportation of relief items into the affected regions.
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3.5 Transportation Problem in Typhoon Haiyan Case
This numerical case is adapted from a teaching case by Kuehne Foundation NUS
HumLog Centre Asia Pacific. Right after Typhoon Haiyan hit Phillipines, a
local disaster management agency in Phillpines is facing the task of securing the
supply for the worst affected people in cities Tacloban and Guiuan. Based on
the initial assessment report, there are 200,000 people from November 2013 to
January 2014 in dire needs of food and water. The ratio of affected populations
in Tacloban and Guiuan is roughly 3 to 2. After the disaster, there are active
and overwhelming efforts in providing assists and donations. The humanitarian
organizations and local government have decided to supply lifesaving kits which
include supplies such as ready-to-eat food, and hygiene kits containing water
tabs and hygiene items. One lifesaving kit and one hygiene kit can sustain one
family for one month. The two kits are of the same weights (20kg per kit)
and dimensions. One 40’ container can take 1000 kits. The affected population
prefers to have rice as main food and one family is estimated to consume 4kg of
rice per month. The supplies at current stage are as follows:
1. GIK and local storage
• Rice. There is a total of 600 metric tons (mtn) of rice stored in Davao.
• Lifesaving Kits(LK). There are 50,000 lifesaving kits donated by the
Government of a neighbouring country, which are ready to be de-
livered from Kuala Lumpur International Airport to Manila or Cebu
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International Airport. A local NGO donates 50,000 similar kits, which
are stored in Cebu.
• Hygiene Kits(HK). A company in Europe donated 30,000 hygiene kits
which is ready to be shipped from Rotterdam Port. The sea freight
from Rotterdam to Philippines is US$2,000 for a 40’ container and
the lead time is 6-8 weeks. Air freight is US$3,500 per mtn.
2. Procurement from suppliers.
For lifesaving kits and hygiene kits, two potential local suppliers are iden-
tified. One is from Cebu producing lifesaving kit with unit price of 80 USD
and hygiene kit with unit price 140 USD. The other from Manila supplies
lifesaving kit with unit price 70 USD and hygiene kit with unit price of 130
USD. Both suppliers do not provide shipping services.
The initial assessment gives a report on infrastructure and transportation capac-
ity conditions.
1. Air
The international airports in Manila and Cebu are fully functional. The
airports in Tacloban and Guiuan are partially damaged with very limited
capacities. Priorities are given to military flights which are assigned to
evacuate victims. Domestic airfreight rate is about USD2,000 per mtn.
2. Road
The main roads and bridges in the affected areas are heavily damaged and
only allow 10mtn trucks to pass by for the first few weeks. There can be
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uncertainties in delivery due to bad weather and looting. There are also
rebel groups along the road. They are reported to attack trucks and steal
relief items. There are truck services provided which can be rented. For
10mtn truck, the rents are listed as follows.
• From Manila to Tacloban/Guiuan: USD 1,600/1,800 per 10mtn truck
(including ferry costs).
• From Cebu to Tacloban/Guiuan: USD 2,000/2,200 per 10mtn truck
(including ferry costs).
• From Davao to Tacloban/Guiuan: USD 2,000/2,200 per 10mtn truck
(including ferry costs).
Despite the shipping by truck from Manila to Tacloban and Guiuan is much
cheaper than shipping by truck from Cebu or Davao, due to long distance,
it is subjected to much higher risk compared with shipping by truck from
Cebu and Davao.
3. Sea
The seaports near Tacloban and Guiuan are seriously damaged. The local
agency decides to utilize air and road firstly in the early stage.
For the last mile shipping, the lead time by air is usually within one hour in the
case; and the lead time by truck is within half day, which is considerably short.
We ignore this marginal effect of lead time in this case. The local agency has
to plan the transportation given the supplies, infrastructure and transportation
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conditions so that relief items can reach the affected population and sustain their
lives as long as possible.
3.5.1 Supply Chain Mapping and Data Summary
We map out the supply chain map in Figure 3.3 as follows, where M, C, D, T,
G, and EU are initials of locations, standing for Manila, Cebu, Davao, Tacloban,
Guiuan, and Europe.
Figure 3.3: Supply chain map
1. Donors: We represent each donor as a warehouse. The total amount of
relief items donated is equivalent to the inventory level at each warehouse
node, and the “production capacities” of those donor nodes are set to be
0. In reality, donations are usually shipped all at once from overseas. They
are stored locally near affected regions and consumed throughout the TTS
duration. We model it equivalently as inventory held in the donor nodes,
regularly shipped to the affected cities throughout TTS and consumed
directly after arrival.
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2. Suppliers: The scope of capacity planning does not include the produc-
tion capacity decisions for the two suppliers of LK and HK in M and C
since they are not part of the humanitarian decision. The original term
“capacities per unit time, c” in our framework, in this case, corresponds
to the quantity purchased per unit time. The total amount purchased is
obtained by multiplying c with obtained TTS value. The “unit capacity
cost” parameters correspond to the unit price data.
3. Transportation modes: Instead of modeling transportation as material
flow, our framework represents it as a node connecting supply and demand.
Specifically, we use one infrastructure node to represent the shipping of one
type relief items from one supply node (either a donor or a supplier) to one
demand node via a specific transportation mode. For example, node (M-T
Air LK) represent the shipping of LK from M to T via air. Infrastructure
nodes hold zero inventory and their “capacities” represent the shipping
amount. For example, if we have the optimal “capacity per week” of node
(D-T Truck Rice) being 70 mtns per week, it means we plan to ship 70
mtns of rice by truck from Davao to Guiuan per week. This implies we
need seven 10mtn trucks per week from Davao to Guiuan to ship rice.
The total amount of budget is assumed to be evenly divided and consumed
throughout the whole TTS period and is used in purchasing relief items from
suppliers as well as transportation. For the node representing same transporta-
tion mode from same origin to the same destination but delivering different items,
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we assume they are of the same “vendor”. They are subjected to the same dis-
ruption conditions. For instance, if one shipping line is fully disrupted, both HK
and LK cannot be shipped. We assume there is no disruption correlations among
“vendors”. In order to have valid first-two moments of random variables v˜, we
generate those data from beta distributions. Specifically, for each node i, its
first moment is given as (1 −Marginal Prob. in Table 3.1). Its second moment
(i.e.V ar = ab
(a+b)2(a+b+1)
) is generated from a beta distribution with parameters
given in 3.9 3. Because of long distance, the disruption marginal probabilities
from Manila to Tacloban and Guiuan by truck are much higher than others as
stated in the case. Air is assumed to be fully reliable.
a = 5× (1−Marginal Prob. (Table 3.1)))
b = 5− a
(3.9)
According to the demographic report, the average family size in Philippines is 4
to 5. We here assume the family size is 5, and the demand for lifesaving kits and
hygiene kits can be estimated. We summarize the key supply chain parameters
in Table 3.1. The machine used to perform all the computations is Dell computer
with Intel(R) Core(TM) 3.40 GHz, RAM 8 GB, Microsoft Windows 7 Enterprise
cvx Mosek solver. The size of the DNN matrix for our numerical study is 200×200
and the computation time for each DNN approximation is CPU time 2468s,
approximately CPU time 40mins.
3The choice of distribution parameters is to make the shape of the beta distributions to be
negatively skewed with single mode.
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Table 3.1: Supply chain parameters
Supply Nodes




1 Davao (D) Donor 1 Rice - 600 mtn
2 Europe (EU) Donor 2 HK - 30,000 kits
3 Cebu (C) Donor 3 LK - 50,000 kits
4 M LK Vendor Supplier 4 LK 70 -
5 M HK Vendor Supplier 5 HK 130 -
6 C LK Vendor Supplier 6 LK 80 -
7 C HK Vendor Supplier 7 HK 140 -
Infrastructure Nodes





8 D-T Truck Infra 8 Rice 200 0.04
9 D-G Truck Infra 9 Rice 220 0.05
10 EU-T Air Infra 10 HK 3,500 Reliable
11 EU-G Air Infra 11 HK 3,500 Reliable




13 M-T Air HK Infra HK 2,000




15 M-T Truck HK Infra HK 160




17 M-G Air HK Infra HK 2,000




19 M-G Truck HK Infra HK 180




21 C-T Air HK Infra HK 2,000




23 C-T Truck HK Infra HK 200




25 C-G Air HK Infra HK 2,000




27 C-G Truck HK Infra HK 220
Demand Nodes





28 T Rice Demand - Rice - 24mtn
29 T LK Demand - LK - 6,000 kits
30 T HK Demand - HK - 6,000 kits
31 G Rice Demand - Rice - 16mtn
32 G LK Demand - LK - 4,000 kits
33 G HK Demand - HK - 4,000 kits
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3.5.2 Effect of Budget on TTS
We increase the total capacity investment budget from 1 million USD to 14
million USD with increment of 1 million. The corresponding values of worst-
case expected TTS are given in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.4 obtained from the
relaxation problem of the first-stage co-positive program.







1 2.84 8 8.51
2 3.79 9 9.37
3 4.58 10 10.00
4 5.34 11 10.24
5 6.09 12 10.36
6 6.79 13 10.47
7 7.59 14 10.45
From Figure 3.4, we can see when the total budget is low, its increase will lead
to significant increase in TTS. When the total budget reaches 10 million USD,
further increase would not add much value to TTS. This is due to the fact the
bottleneck resource, rice, is depleted at round 10 weeks after accounting for its
loss during transportation.
3.5.3 Transportation Mode Comparison
We apply co-positive framework to this numerical case and solve the first-stage
relaxation problem and obtain the capacity allocations under different levels of
total capacity budget (from 1 million USD to 14 milltion USD with increment
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Figure 3.4: Effect of capacity budget on TTS
of 1 million). The detailed capacity profiles are given in Table 3.3. To facilitate
the comparison, we plot the profiles in groups in Figure 3.5.




































1 73.57 34.24 316.54 345.34 35.64 24.25 0.01 0.01 0.06 16.77 0.08 41.43 0.03 308.93 0.03 189.68
2 122.26 69.22 260.37 410.44 39.47 26.84 0.03 0.04 0.98 23.68 47.71 37.56 0.09 330.28 0.13 140.88
3 126.94 72.15 219.53 439.97 40.24 27.42 0.06 0.09 7.08 17.99 78.72 23.44 0.19 339.47 0.33 109.95
4 119.77 97.45 219.48 304.44 40.54 27.66 0.06 0.08 10.37 11.61 155.11 1.80 0.18 349.77 0.40 6.11
5 134.00 100.63 194.63 311.77 36.18 24.92 0.09 0.11 27.97 9.23 158.95 0.33 0.33 334.64 0.38 1.07
6 188.60 96.21 133.43 229.42 35.06 24.20 0.06 0.06 85.39 7.54 159.62 0.12 0.31 249.40 0.19 0.36
7 195.04 193.73 57.68 13.98 37.95 26.12 0.08 0.08 212.88 1.92 159.58 0.13 0.56 43.85 0.23 0.39
8 207.43 202.43 9.66 5.10 35.22 24.27 0.11 0.11 238.59 0.15 159.65 0.11 0.39 1.87 0.25 0.31
9 206.48 202.45 7.36 3.82 32.65 22.47 0.10 0.10 239.53 0.06 159.78 0.07 0.23 0.54 0.18 0.17
10 210.60 204.12 11.38 5.64 30.21 20.66 0.16 0.16 239.68 0.06 159.80 0.07 0.25 0.33 0.22 0.16
11 270.60 228.79 72.34 34.77 28.85 19.68 1.03 1.02 239.50 0.20 159.68 0.24 0.88 0.72 0.82 0.45
12 286.69 235.51 88.34 41.65 28.38 19.24 1.16 1.15 239.78 0.20 159.89 0.23 0.76 0.60 0.71 0.40
13 319.17 248.98 116.67 55.03 28.05 19.06 1.23 1.22 240.24 0.20 160.33 0.23 0.70 0.54 0.67 0.37
14 488.10 316.42 273.56 126.51 27.96 19.09 2.26 2.26 241.49 0.40 161.60 0.44 1.15 0.86 1.08 0.61
We first look at the transportation mode selection results from Figure 3.5c,
Figure 3.5d, Figure 3.5e and Figure 3.5f. In general, for the shipping of LK
and HK, when total budget is low, less reliable transportation mode, truck,
is used extensively compared with air. The transportation mode selection is
reversed when we have higher budget. Specifically, the demands of LK and HK
at city Tacloban heavily rely on trucks from Cebu when total budget is below
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(a) M vendor (b) C Vendor
(c) Air transport to City T (d) Air transport to City G
(e) Truck to City T (f) Truck to City G
Figure 3.5: Capacity(mtn/week) profiles under different capacity budgets
4 million. With the increase in the total budget above 4 million, the shipping
mode gradually switches to air from Manila. When the total capacity budget
reaches 8 million, trucks are never used and all the demands are fulfilled by air
from Manila. Trucks from Manila are seldom used due to its high disruption
probability. Air from Cebu to Tacloban is never used because it is much cheaper
to ship supply items in Cebu to Tacloban by trucks. Similar trends are observed
Post-disaster Humanitarian Aid Supply Chain Design 112
for the supplies of LK and HK to Guiun. Due to the resulting transportation
model selection, we can see Cebu supplier is relied on heavily when budget is low
even though it charges higher price than the supplier at Manila. When budget
is high, the main supplier is then switched to Manila vendor. (Figure 3.5a and
Figure 3.5b). The air transport from EU to T and G is never used because of its
high cost, which implies the donation of HK from Europe is not accepted due to
high shipping cost. It is better off to procure from the two nearby vendors. The
shipping capacities of trucks from D to T and D to G are constant throughout
the whole budget range because they are dedicated to shipping of rice and truck
is the sole transportation mode. The ratio of capacities allocated to D-T and
D-G are roughly 3 to 2, which is exactly equal to the demand ratio of rice in the
two cities.
To evaluate the performance of weekly capacity allocations, we compare our s-
trategy with the benchmark case under two budget scenarios, bc = 1 million and
bc = 2 million. Specifically, we firstly solve the benchmark LP problem 3.2 and
obtain the corresponding weekly capacity allocations. The two set of capacity
allocations are given in Figure 3.6. We can see the two capacity allocation strate-
gies suggest two very different procurement and shipping plans. When budget
is not sufficient (as in these 1 million and 2 million cases), LP strategy invests
much more in Manila supplier and trucks from Manila. To the contrary, COP
strategy suggests to procure mainly from Cebu supplier and ship via trucks from
Cebu. The underlying intuition is that LP model assumes deterministic fraction-
s of capacity can be used and selects Manila due to low procurement cost and
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shipping cost without considering the risk. Our COP model obtains the capac-
ity strategy from the worst-case perspective and takes risks into consideration.
Therefore, it avoids choosing high risk transportation mode and the procurement
and shipping are mostly from Cebu.
(a) COP and LP capacity allocations with
budget of 1 million
(b) COP and LP capacity allocations with
budget of 2 million
Figure 3.6: COP and LP capacity allocations comparison
In order to make comparison, we assume random variables v˜ are independently
beta distributed with the specified parameters a and b in 3.9. We generate 5×104
samples of v˜ and simulate the corresponding TTS by solving the second stage
linear program 3.1. Note that because the capacities obtained are essentially
capacity rates, if they are not sufficient to sustain one unit time demand under
certain disruption scenario, the total TTS obtained from simulation will be 0.
Otherwise, it can sustain the whole period until the bottleneck inventory depletes
or total capacity budget is used up. Therefore, there are only two values of TTS
obtained for both capacity strategies, either 0 or maximum TTS. The histogram
of TTS under both capacity strategies are shown in Figure 3.7 with means and
standard deviations given in Table 3.4.
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(a) Simulation results with budget of 1 mil-
lion
(b) Simulation results with budget of 2 mil-
lion
Figure 3.7: COP and LP capacity strategies performance comparison
Table 3.4: Means and standard deviations of TTS under COP and LP ca-
pacity strategies
Vendor
Budget: 1 (×106 USD) Budget: 2 (×106 USD)
COP LP COP LP
Mean 3.72 1.31 5.19 1.98
STD 1.97 3.02 2.45 5.08
We can see the capacity strategy obtained by the benchmark case is over con-
fident. Although the maximum TTS is much higher than the maximum TTS
obtained using COP capacity strategy, in most of the disruption scenarios, it
cannot sustain the demand. The COP capacity strategy performs much better.
3.6 Concluding Remarks and Future Research
In this chapter, we consider post-disaster humanitarian logistic problem where
transportation capacities are subjected to disruptions. We propose to use TTS as
the new performance measure for humanitarian relief effort instead of minimizing
cost. We approach the uncertain capacities from the distributionally robust
perspective and show the two-stage capacity planning problem is equivalent to
a co-positive program which can be solved by an SDP relaxation. We apply our
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framework to a case study of Typhoon Haiyan adapted from a real humanitarian
operation problem. We observe that the transportation capacity allocations
significantly depend on the tradeoff between reliability and cost. When the
budget is low, risky but less costly transportation modes are used whereas when
the budget is sufficient, more reliable transportation modes are used.
There are several limitations in our framework which are worth mentioning here.
The primary limitation is that our model cannot address the logistic problem
adaptively. We assume there is a constant rate of demand and supply during the
whole TTS period. The total budget can be represented in the form of constant
budget per unit time, which limits us from studying the adaptive allocation of
total budget as time goes by. For example, at early stage, when disruption infor-
mation is not known, more budget can be allocated to air transportation mode.
As time passes by and more information is gathered or when more infrastructures
recover, we can gradually shift to less costly transportation modes which were
previous of higher risk. In order to study the adaptivity problem, multi-period
stochastic model is needed. However, it can be a challenging problem since the
objective is to maximize TTS, which implies this problem is not only of finite
horizon but the number of period is essentially a decision variable. How to for-
mulate an adaptive transportation strategy in humanitarian logistics can be a
very interesting future research topic. Additionally, lead time is an important
consideration in post-disaster humanitarian logistic. It is not addressed in our
framework exactly because we model the material flow by its flow rate not by
batch. How to incorporate lead time or even uncertain lead time can be another
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In the past 5 years, the world has witnessed a soar in the number of terrorist
attacks with devastating impacts. In 2015 alone, the total fatalities were more
than 38 thousand people with more than 43 thousand people injured. Figure 4.1
gives the snapshot of terrorist attacks in 20161. Many major attacks happened
in Europe and US, including the infamous Brussels suicide bombings on March
22, causing 32 deaths and more than 300 injuries; Orlando night club shooting
on June 12, taking away 49 people’s lives and wounding 53 others; and Nice
1https://storymaps.esri.com/stories/terrorist-attacks/?year=2016. The size of the circle in-
dicates magnitude of impact (numbers of attack and total death). Different colors represent
different terrorist groups (with the yellow color indicating ISIS)
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truck attack on 14 July, resulting in the deaths of 86 people and injuring 434
people.
Figure 4.1: Terrorist attack map 2016
The task of defence preparation is different from mitigating disruption risks
from natural disasters, as terrorist attacks are not random events but are strate-
gically orchestrated, at times to confuse and mislead the authrity, even though
they may appear to be irrational and incoherent to outside observers. Game
theory is therefore extensively used to model the behavior of attackers. Sev-
eral game-theoretical models are developed and used for terrorism prevention
and detection purposes. For example, a system called ARMOR (Assistant for
Randomized Monitoring Over Routes) is developed to assist vehicle checking in
airports. This system has been successfully deployed since 2007 at Los Angeles
International Airport ([71]). Another application named “TRUSTS” (Tactical
Randomization of Urban Security in Transit System) is used to formulate op-
timal patrolling strategies in urban transit systems. It models the patrolling
problem as a Stackelberg game and generates optimal patrolling strategies to
deter fare evasion, crimes and terrorist attacks in transit systems ([3]).
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There are many facets in homeland security problem including but not limited to
crime detection, illegal flow of drugs and weapons, protecting critical infrastruc-
tures, and cyber security. Many of those issues are aligned with the problem of
deploying limited defense resources to different locations which are under poten-
tial threat of attack. For example, the heartbreaking Nice truck attack happened
when people were celebrating Bastille Day on the Promenade des Anglais. Fac-
ing such special event, plan for the deployment of the police forces is a critical
problem since these events are usually prime targets for attack. Furthermore,
authority must move from planning against lone terrorist attack to incorporate
the case of multiple coordinated attacks, as demonstrated in the case of Brussels
suicide bombing, when three locations were hit almost at the same time. The
resources needed to protest against multiple coordinated attacks is prohibitive,
and authority must look into better deployment of existing forces to safe guard
the community.
The study of resource allocation problem in two-person game setting dated back
to Borel ([17]) when he introduced the Colonel Blotto game. This is a two-person
zero-sum game where two players simultaneously allocate limited resources to
multiple battlefields , with the outcome determined by a contest success function
U(x, y), when x and y are the size of the forces deployed by the defender and
attacker respectively. For instance, in the classical Blotto game,
U(x, y) =

1 if x > y
0.5 if x = y
0 if x < y.
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In general, the player who wins more battlefields wins the game. This is a zero
sum game, where the defender solves the following problem, when defender and































The classical Blotto game is deceptively difficult because of the non-linear con-
test success function, and the large dimensional space in the mixed equilibrium
strategies. In general, no pure equilibrium strategy exist for the defender and
attacker. Its main theoretical insight is that a weaker force should extend the
number of battle fields and randomize on the deployment of troops (forgoing
some battlefields) to gain on the game outcome. However, characterizing the
equilibrium strategies in this game has eluded the community until recently.
Behnezhad et al. (2016) exploits the discrete solution space and uses an extend-















yi,k = 1, yi,k ∈ {0, 1}.







By characterizing the convex hull for the extended variables, Behnezhad et al.
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(2016) solved the classical Blotto game in the extended variable space as a stan-
dard zero-sum game with bilinear objective function using standard LP. Their
extended reformulation uses O(N(A2 +D2)) constraints and variables, and can
be shown to be the tightest possible (up to a multiplicative constant), unless
P = NP .
The classical Bloto game has been extended in many ways in the literature to
incorporate other realistic conflicts in the contests. Most of the extensions study
different variants of U(xi, yi), and hence can be addressed similarly using the
extended reformulation.
Motivated by the issues on terrorist protection, we model the game as a sequen-
tial game where the defender can re-allocate the resources after observing the
attacker’s deployment in each battlefield. The redeployment option reflects the
realistic scenario in many environments, such as under the counterterrorism and
cyber security setting, where defender can rely on established defense system
or mechanism to respond to attacker’s intrusion. In fact, how well the system
responds to the attack to redeploy forces often plays a crucial role in alleviat-
ing the damages of the attacks. In one of the recent terrorist attacks in Paris
on November 13th 2016, for instance, the specialized antiterrorist unit did not
reach the Bataclan concert hall where 90 people were shot dead, until half an
hour after the attack had begun, and it took the officers nearly three hours to
secure the venue. French police finally had to apologize to the public for this
mistake in delayed response and the associated problems in the deployment2.
2The Australian News ([91]).
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We define the “Attacker-Defender Game with Redeployment” as a two-person
constant-sum game. As a concrete example, consider Emperor Constantine’s
challenge to secure the Roman Empire (cf. Figure 4.2) - how to deploy a fixed
number D of mobile armies across the cities, in the given road network system,
to defend against possible enemy’s invasion (with A number if armies) into the
empire? We assume that mobile army in neighboring cities (linked by an arc in
the network) can reinforce each other in time against enemy’s invasion.
Figure 4.2: Cities and the road network in the ancient Roman Empire
More specifically, suppose A := λD troops, for some λ > 0. For ease of expo-
sition, let D˜ (resp. A˜) denote the set of all possible initial deployment of the
defender (resp. attacker). We define the pre-configured network structure for
redeployment options as a bipartite graph, G. If troops initially allocated to
front (battlefield) i can be redeployed to front (battlefield) j, (i, j) is an arc in
G (i.e.(i, j) ∈ E(G)). Since it is always feasible to send troops from any node to
itself, there is always an arc between node i on the left hand side and node i on
the right hand side of the bipartite graph.
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We describe next how the game dynamics evolve.
• The defender and attacker allocate troops to each battlefield simultaneous-
ly: Let {d1, . . . , dN} and {a1, . . . , aN} denote the deployment decisions of
the defender and attacker.
• Given a pre-configured network G, defender can re-allocate the troops,
under the constraint that only nodes connected to each other in G can
reinforce each other. The number of troops reallocated from battlefield i
to battlefield j is denoted by xij .
• Based on the new deployment profile of the defender, the payoff of the game






xk,i ≤ dk as a result of the initial deployment of the troops by the defender.
WLOG, we assume that the defender obtains a payoff of n, if he wins n bat-
tlefields, and attacker gets payoff N − n. In the rest of the paper, we also call
defender’s expected payoff “the value of game”.
In general, two types of CSFs are studied in literature- an auction CSF where
the player who allocates more resources wins surely (as in the classical Blotto
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Blotto game with lottery CSF is also called stochastic Blotta game due to the
fact that the winning of a battlefield is stochastically determined based on the
troops allocated by both players. Lottery CSF is attractive in computation as it
is a convex continuous function. It unfortunately gives rise to unique pure strat-
egy equilibrium for both defender and attacker, losing some of the interesting
properties embedded in the game with the auction CSF. However, the redeploy-
ment problem under the auction CSF is unfortunately NP hard, making the
equilibrium analysis intractable.
In this paper, we also study the Blotto game with redeployment under the pro-





, if di ≤ 2ai, ai 6= 0
1, if di > 2ai, or ai = 0
(a) Auction CSF (b) One sided auction CSF
Figure 4.3: Auction CSF vs. One sided auction CSF
From Figure 4.3, we can see that the one sided auction CSF uses a linear function
to “smooth out” the discrete jump in the auction CSF. It basically implements
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a simple rule: if the defender has twice as many number of forces, the contest
results in a sure win for the defender. Otherwise the outcome is probabilistic
and depends on the ratio of di with 2ai.
Unlike the auction CSF, the modification renders the re-deployment problem
for the defender in our problem tractable (as an LP problem), but nevertheless,
we will see that the equilibrium strategy for this “one sided auction CSF” can
already be very complicated for the attacker - the equilibrium strategy for the
attacker retains the features of the solution found in the classical Blotto game
with auction CSF. This modified CSF leads also to a nice conic programming
problem that allows us to compute approximate optimal strategies for the de-
fender and attacker via solving a semidefinite program. Note that the LP based
approach fails for this game, since the payoff function now is not separable, i.e.,
cannot be simply written as
∑N
i=1 U(di, ai).
Outline of the Chapter: The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We
present a review of the related literature in §4.2. In §4.3, we show that the re-
deployment problem for the auction CSF is NP hard, but nevertheless demon-
strated via a graph expander structure that the redeployment options, even on
a very sparse structure, can add tremendous value for the defender, using the
auction CSF (i.e., classical Blotto game). In §4.4, we focus on the one sided
auction CSF, and show that when the redeployment network is a k-chain graph,
we can obtain a closed-form solution for the game. In §4.5, we show the new
game under a general redeployment network can be equivalently reformulated
as a co-positive program. §4.6 extends the game to heterogenous battlefields.
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Finally, in §4.7, we apply our conic framework to several numerical examples
and conclude this chapter in §8.
4.1.1 Colonel Blotto Game
The study on Colonel Blotto game originated with the pioneering work of Borel
([17]). The classic settings of the problem are that two competing parties deploy
their (continuously partitionable) symmetric resources (i.e., the same number
of troops) on n fronts (or battle fields). The problem is a difficult zero-sum
one-shot game mainly because the payoff function (i.e. CSF) is discontinuous
in the resources deployed. Borel and Ville ([18]) presented the first solutions
when there are three battle fields and both players have the same amount of
resources. In 1950, Gross and Wagner ([45]) extended their result to more than
three battle fields but still with symmetric resources. Roberson ([75]) adopted
n-copulas functions to map n (marginal) univariate distributions to a joint distri-
bution with a n-dimensional random variable. The study shows that the widely
adopted uniform mix strategy is an equilibrium strategy. The results hold in the
symmetric/asymmetric resources and discrete pay-off function cases.
The classical Colonel Blotto game has been extended in various ways. One stream
of studies explore the situations when the payoff functions are continuous. The
player who put (relatively) more troops on a battle field will get a higher chances
to win. The continuous settings can lead to simple pure equilibrium strategies
([83], [29], [72], [44], [35]) for both defenders and attackers. Another stream
of studies extended the one-shot simultaneous game to a sequential game. [73]
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studied a two-stage sequential nonzero sum game in which the attacker deploys
his troops after observing the defender’s deployment. The study shows that a
simple pure equilibrium strategy exists when the attacker and defender’s payoffs
are different and nonidentical.
Other extensions of the Colonel Blotto games includes behavioral experiments
([6], [27], [32]), different forms of Blotto games(e.g. Colonel Lotto game ([49]),
Colonel Gladiator game([74]), non-constant sum Blotto game ([76]), multiple
players ([59] and [60]), and various applications such as adverting expenditure
allocations ([40]), R&D competitions ([42]), politics ([99]), etc. For more details
on Colonel Blotto game and conflicts with multiple battle fields, we refer the
reader to the survey by Kovenock and Roberson ([59]).
4.1.2 Stackelberg Security Games
Instead of modeling the conflicts between attacker and defender as in Colonel
Blotto game, there is a stream of literatures formulating attacker-defender game
as a Stackelberg game. Specifically, defender first sets up his defense system.
Attacker is assumed to fully observe defender’s strategy and then launch attack
in the second stage. Interested readers can refer to An, Tambe, and Sinha [3]
and the references within on Stackelberg security games and its applications. To
solve this Stackelberg game, the standard solution concept is Strong Stackelberg
Equilibrium (SSE) ([21], [61], [96]) - when there are multiple best responses,
the attacker will choose the one favoring the defender. This condition can be
seen as contradictory to attacker’s adversarial nature. It is well known for finite
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two person zero-sum game, SSE, minmax, maxmin and Nash equilibrium are
all equivalent. Korzhzy et al. ([58]) further showed SSE is equivalent to Nash
equilibrium in the context of finite nonzero-sum security game when attacker
only attacks one location. However, this is not true when attacker can attack
multiple locations. Nevertheless, for finite zero-sum games, it is well known that
the different game theoretic solution concepts of Nash, minimax, maximin and
Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium give the same answer.
Applying the solution concept of SSE, the Stackelberg game can be modeled as
a bilevel optimization problem. It is usually addressed by applying optimization
theories to equivalently convert the second stage problem into optimality condi-
tions and bringing those conditions to the first level problem in order to search
for defender’s optimal strategies. In most of the security Stackelberg game litera-
tures, it is usually assumed the attacker only launches one attack to one location
with the highest payoff. Under this assumption, the second stage best response
can be simply represented as a linear constraint, thus reducing the complexity
of bilevel optimization problem significantly.
4.1.3 Process Flexibility
The process flexibility literature considers the following problem: A company has
m plants producing n products. Demands for n products are random. In order
to better fulfill random demands, the company can invest in process flexibility in
each production plant so that each plant’s capacity can be used to produce mul-
tiple products. In the most ideal case, when all plants are capable to produce all
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n products (i.e. fully flexible process), matching demand and capacity is easier
due to the risk pooling effect. However, full flexibility is rather costly to achieve
and implement in practice. Most of the process flexility literatures are there-
fore devoted to the analysis on how a limited flexible structure can mitigate the
demand-capacity mismatch problem. The k-chain structure has received a lot of
attention in this literature. This is a general symmetric graph, where the first
capacity node can be used to produce demand of type 1 to k; the second capacity
node can be used for product demand of type 2 to k+1 etc. The milestone paper
here is Jordan and Graves ([56]) - They postulated that the 2-chain structure is
already as efficient as a fully flexible structure (i.e. n-chain) when demand and
capacity are balanced and symmetric, and when demand variability is bounded.
Following their work, one stream of research analyzes the performance of the
chaining structure. Chou et.al.([26]) used random walk techniques to compute
the asymptotic expected performance in a 2-chain structure, and compare it’s
asymptotic performance to that of the fully flexible structure. Simchi-levi and
Wei ([87]) characterized the 2 chain’s performance using the difference between
two open chains. Based on this characterization, they proved that the 2 chain is
the optimal structure among all 2-flexible designs. Wang and Zhang ([97]) de-
rived a closed-form distribution-free bound on the ratio of the 2-chain’s expected
performance relative to that of full flexibility.
The homeland security game we study here can be viewed as the problem where
the defender has the flexibility to redeploy its troops to “cover” the attacker’s
allocations, which is unknown prior to the initial deployment. The key difference
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is that the “demands” now are not randomly generated but are strategically
determined, in anticipation of the initial deployment adopted by the defender.
4.1.4 Computational Techniques for Security Games
In many applications of game theory, problems are complex and sometimes in-
tractable, especially for infinite games where the action space of players consists
of infinite number of pure strategies. There are many studies applying novel tech-
niques to reformulate these games into an optimization problem. Consequently,
the structure of game as well as its computational complexity becomes lucid and
thus well understood. For example, it is well known that for two-person zero-sum
game with finite action spaces, Nash equilibrium can be obtained by solving a
linear problem ([41]). In the class of infinite games, Parrilo ([70]) showed that
two-person zeros-sum infinite games with polynomial payoffs can be formulated
as a semidefinite program. Shah and Parrilo ([80]) further showed that infinite
stochastic games with polynomial payoffs can also be solved via semidefinite
programs. More recently, Xu ([101]) has shown that security games with bilin-
ear payoffs are equivalent to combinatorial optimization problems. Hence the
computational complexity can be determined from analyzing its combinatorial
counterpart.
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4.2 Redeployment in the Classical Blotto Game
In this section, we study redeployment games in the Classical Blotto game setting
where the contest success function (CSF) is essentially an auction form. We first
demonstrate the benefit of the redeployment option for the defender, even when
the network is very sparse. We then conduct hardness study and show that the
second stage redeployment problem when we use auction CSF is NP hard. This
fact motivates us to focus on the one sided auction CSF in the subsequent sections
enabling us to further analyze the equilibrium structures of redeployment games.
4.2.1 Benefit of Limited Flexibility in Redeployment Games
The structure of the redeployment network reflects the degree of flexibility the
defender can exploit. This is analogous to the process flexibility concept where
the connectivity of network represents how flexible the process is in satisfying
multiple types of demands. One of the famous results in process flexibility lit-
erature established that with limited flexibility added in the right place, can
the performance be very close to that of full graph. An interesting question is
whether a sparse redeployment structure can capture most benefits of the fully
flexible graph in the redeployment game.
Definition 4.1. Given a bipartite graph G(D,A, E), for any subset S ⊆ A, its
neighbour is defined as Γ(S) = {i ∈ D|(i, j) ∈ E , j ∈ S}.
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Definition 4.2. A bipartite graph G(D,A, E) is a (κ, η,∆)- Expander if deg(v) ≤
∆ for every node v ∈ A, and for any subset S ⊆ A with |S| ≤ κ|A|, its neighbour
size |Γ(S)| ≥ η|S|.
An (κ, η,∆)- Expander ensures that for a small subset S with |S| ≤ κ|A|, its
neighbour is large enough to defend the forces in S. The nice property of the
(κ, η,∆)- Expander is that the degree of every node is bounded by a constant ∆
and thus ensures the sparseness of the graph if ∆ is reasonable small compared
with number of fronts, N . The following well known property gives a lower
bound on ∆.
Proposition 4.3. For any 0 < κ < 1, η ≥ 1, and κη < 1, and for N sufficiently
large, there exists a bipartite graph G(D,A, E) which is a (κ, η,∆)- Expander with
|A| = |D| = N and
∆ ≈ 1 + log2η + (η + 1)log2e−log2(κη) + η + 1.
Proposition 4.3 ensures that ∆ is independent of N and G is a sparse but highly
connected structure, if N is sufficiently large.
We consider next the case when the defender and the attacker have equal number
of troops that they need to deploy on N battlefields. In the classical Blotto game
under the auction CSF, the value of the game for the defender is N/2, since the
game is symmetric. Even if we allow the defender to win for sure when there is
a tie, the value of the game for the defender is still N/2. For ease of exposition,
we consider this modification in the rest of this section, to demonstrate next
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that with a sparse redeployment structure such as an expander, the defender
can already greatly alter the game and achieve at least a value of (N − dNλ e).
Note that the value of the full graph game is N in this case. If N is sufficiently
large, we can choose a large η, and a sparse structure with only ∆ × N edges,
to achieve a game value close to that of full graph. The redeployment option
in this case improves the value of the game by close to 100%, compared to the
classical Blotto game (with value of N/2), despite having only a limited set of
redeployment options per node that does not scale with N .
Proposition 4.4. When defender and attacker have same number of total troop-
s, and the defender’s initial allocation is to evenly distributes its troops on each
battlefield, he could use an (κ, η,∆)- Expander, where 0 < κ < 1, η ≥ 1, and
κη = 1 − 1η , to redeploy after observing attacker’s strategy. The defender can
achieve at least a value of (N − dNη e) with this strategy.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can normalize the level of defender’s (resp.
attacker’s) resources to be N . Given a bipartite network G(D,A, E), let D =
{di = 1, i = 1, ..., N} and A = {a1, . . . , aN} denote the initial deployment of the
defender and attacker respectively. Suppose
ai1 ≥ ai2 ... ≥ aiN .
For a parameter η(η > 1), let l = dNη e and call front i1, i2, ..., il as large nodes
and other fronts as small nodes. Since the average deployment is 1 per node, we








Obviously, the attacker’s deployment on a small node is no more than η, other-
wise the deployment on each of the large nodes will be at least η, and the total
forces will be greater than N , violating our assumption. Hence the forces de-
ployed on a small node is naturally bounded within [0, η], and the total number
of forces deployed on the small nodes is no more than N − dNη e.
We now construct a revised deployment for the attacker, with
a′j =

aj , if front j is a small node;
0, if front j is a large node.
If G is an (κ, η,∆)- Expander with κη = 1 − 1η , and since a′j is bounded within








η|S| − η|S| = 0, if |S| ≤ κ|A|;
N − dNη e − κη|A| ≤ 0, otherwise.





















Hence, the defender can win all the small nodes and guarantee itself a value of
(N − dNη e) at least.
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4.2.2 Hardness Result
The previous section provides a loose analysis on the value of the redeployment
option in the case of an expander structure. However, we show in the rest of this
section that any tight analysis of this game is unlikely, because even the second
stage re-deployment optimization problem is NP hard. We use a reduction
from exact cover by restricted 3-sets problem, which is a well-know NP-complete
problem, to prove the hardness result.
The “restricted exact cover by 3-sets” problem is defined as follows.
Definition 4.5 (Restricted Exact Cover by 3-sets). Input: A finite set S =
{s1, s2, ..., sn} with nmultiple of 3; A collection of 3-element subsets S1, S2, ..., Sn ⊆
S such that each element si appears in exact three 3-element subsets.
Task: Find an exact cover of S by subset S1, S2, ..., Sn, i.e., each si ∈ S is
contained in exact one of the selected subset.
Theorem 4.6. The redeployment problem in classical Blotto game is NP hard.
Proof. Given an input of Restricted Exact Cover by 3-sets specified by a finite
set S = {s1, s2, ..., sn} and the 3-element subsets S1, S2, ..., Sn ⊆ S, we define
following redeployment problem: Construct a bipartite graph G with node sets
{s1, . . . , sn} and {S1, . . . , Sn}, with an edge (sk, Sl) if and only if sk ∈ Sl.
Since G is a 3-regular bipartite graph, it has a perfect matching, say {(s1, S1), . . . , (sn, Sn)}.
Let {1, . . . , n} denote the battlegrounds, and troops deployed on node i can re-
inforce node j if and only if (si, Sj) ∈ E(G). The defender has n units of troops,
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with one deployed on each node i. The attacker has 3n units of troops, with
3 deployed on each node. The defender need to re-deploy its troops, and again
we assume that it wins a battle as long as it has equal or more troops on the









xij ≤ 1, ∀i = 1, ..., n.
∑
i:(i,j)∈G
xij ≥ 3yj , ∀j = 1, ..., n.
xij ≥ 0, ∀i, j : (i, j) ∈ G
yj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j = 1, ..., n
(4.1)
It is easy to see now that there exists an exact cover of S by some of the subset
S1, ..., Sn if and only if the second stage redeployment problem has a solution of
n/3.
4.3 Models and Analysis of One Sided Auction CSF
We study next the Blotto game with redeployment, under the one-sided auction
CSF. This is a simplified version of the classical Colonel Blotto game with the
redeployment option for defender, but is yet rich enough for us to examine the
strategic behaviour of the attacker in this model.
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Let d and a denote the initial deployment of the defender and attacker respec-
tively. Note that
∑N
i=1 di = D, whereas
∑N
i=1 ai = λD. We assume d ∈ ∆D,
and a ∈ ∆A. Let piD(d) and piA(a) denote the probabilities that the defender
and attacker uses the strategy d and a respectively. The payoff of the game is
determined by3








xij ≤ 2aj ,∀j;
∑
j∈Γ(i)
xi,j ≤ di,∀i, xij ≥ 0, ∀i, j.
}
where Γ(·) is the neighbourhood function in the redeployment network G. Note
that P (d,a) is concave in d. Hence
P (EpiD(d),a) ≥ EpiD(P (d,a))
for any a and mixed strategy piD(·). So there is a Nash equilibrium strategy for









We call the inner problem the attacker’s problem for fixed d.
4.3.1 Blotto on k-Chain Network
Solving this game is challenging in general. Especially with the redeployment af-
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on the redeployment network structure. In this section, we will show when the
redeployment network is of a symmetric structure, k-chain structure, a closed-
form equilibrium can be obtained. We define the k-chain structure exactly like
the one defined for process flexibility problem. The first defender node connects
to attacker node 1 to attacker node k; The second defender node connects to
attacker node 2 to attacker node k+ 1; and, in general, defender node i connects
to attacker node i; i+ 1; ...; i+ k − 1 (modulo N).
Recall defender’s first deployment problem is concave. Let d∗ denotes an optimal
solution for the defender’s problem. If the redeployment network G is symmetric
under the permutation Π in the group Π(G), then d∗ •Π will also be optimal for





will also be optimal. In this way, for many symmetric network, we can use its
symmetry group to argue that an optimal equilibrium strategy for the defender
is to evenly allocate its troops across all the battlefields. Attacker’s problem is
not as obvious. We have next the following theorem giving the subgame equilib-
rium for defender and attacker under a general k-chain redeployment structure.
The equilibrium behaviours depends on the value of k (level of redeployment
flexibility) and λ (level of asymmetry in the resources available), vis-a-viz the
following parameters:
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• λ′′ = N−12N ,
• k′ = ⌊2λN − 2N√2λ− 1 + 1⌋, and
• k′′ = b2λN + 1c
Another important parameter to describe the game equilibria is
M := int(
2λN − k + 1
2
),
where int(·) denotes the nearest integer value function.
Figure 4.4: Attacker’s mixed strategy under k-chain structure
Theorem 4.7 (Equilibrium Strategies). When the redeployment network is a
k-chain structure, we have the following subgame equilibrium.
(1) Defender evenly allocates its troops to each battlefield.
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(2a) When attacker has more troops, i.e., λ ≥ 1, then for any k-chain redeploy-
ment network, with 1 ≤ k ≤ N , attacker will attack all the battlefields and
evenly allocate its troops to each battlefield.
(2b) When λ′ ≤ λ < 1,
• If k ≤ k′, attacker will randomly choose to attack M = int(2λN−k+12 )
number of adjacent battlefields, and evenly distribute its troops across
those battlefields.
• If k′ < k ≤ N , attacker will attack all the battlefields and evenly
allocate its troops to each battlefield.
(2c) When λ′′ ≤ λ < λ′, for any 1 ≤ k ≤ N , attacker will randomly choose to
attack M adjacent battlefields and evenly distribute its troops across those
battlefields.
(2d) When 0 < λ < λ′′,
• if k ≤ k′′, attacker will randomly choose to attack M adjacent battle-
fields and evenly distribute its troops across those battlefields.
• If k > k′′, the redeployment network is dense enough that defender
can win all the battlefields regardless of attacker’s strategy.
Proof. (Sketch) In a k-chain, by symmetry and concavity of the payoff function,
the defender deploys equal number of troops, say d, on all battlefields. Suppose
attacker has chosen to attack m battlefields in the set S. i.e., ai > 0 for i ∈ S.
The payoff matrix, excluding the battlefields gave up by the attacker, can be















xij ≤ d, xij ≥ 0
}








βj : αi+γi ≥ 1, βj−γi/ai ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ Γ(j), αi, γi, βj ≥ 0
}
(4.2)





















. . . ≥ γ[m]
a[m]
,
for some ordering of the indices. In a k-chain, the term
γ[1]
a[1]
appears k times in the




in the summands depends on how many neighbours the node [2] has that is not
adjacent to the node [1]. This is smallest when [2] is adjacent to [1]. Using this
logic, it is easy to see that the sum in the above expression is minimum when all
m nodes are adjacent to one another.
We can then subsequently prove all a[k]’s are identical. The rest of the proof
follows from detailed case by case analysis of the values. The details are given
in the Appendix D.1.
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Figure 4.4 sketches the equilibrium strategies played by the attacker when λ
and k takes different values for the case of 10 battlefields. The line k′ is the
boundary separating the scenarios where attacker selects M battlefields to attack
and the scenarios where attacker attacks all battlefields. The line k′′ separates
the scenarios where attacker chooses to attack M battlefields and the scenarios
where attacker loses all the battlefields for sure.
(a) λ ≥ 1 (b) λ′ ≤ λ < 1
(c) λ′′ ≤ λ < λ′ (d) 0 < λ < λ′′
Figure 4.5: Value of the game (defender’s expected payoff)
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The following theorem presents value of the game under the optimal equilibrium
strategies.
Theorem 4.8 (Value of the game (Defender’s expected payoff)). In the Colonel
Blotto Game with redeployment,
• When λ ≥ 1, all k-chain structures give the same subgame equilibrium and
value of the game is N2λ .
• When λ′ ≤ λ < 1, and when redeployment flexibility is not high (k ≤ k′),
value of the game is (M+k−1)M2λN + N −M , and it is a piecewise concave
quadratic increasing function of k. When the redeployment flexibility is
high enough (for all k > k′), value of the game is N2λ and is independent of
k.
• When λ′′ ≤ λ < λ′, for all k, value of the game is (M+k−1)M2λN + N −M ,
and it is a piecewise concave quadratic increasing function of k.
• When 0 < λ < λ′′ and when redeployment flexibility is not high (k ≤ k′′),
value of the game is (M+k−1)M2λN + N −M , and it is a piecewise concave
quadratic increasing function of k. When the redeployment flexibility is
high (for all k > k′′), value of the game is N and is independent of k.
Figure 4.5 plots the value of game with respect to k under different conditions
of λ for the case of 10 battlefields. When λ ≥ 1, the value of the game is
independent of k. Hence when the attacker has the same or more resources,
redeployment flexibility does not add value to the defender. When the attacker
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has less but comparable forces, i.e., λ′ ≤ λ < 1, a small level of flexibility can add
tremendous value for the defender. In fact, for the case of 10 battlefields, a 4-
chain structure for the defender can already perform as well as the full flexibility
structure. When λ < λ′, the value of the game always increases with the increase
in k, but the diminishing returns only kick in when k is sufficiently large. Note
that in this case, because of the asymmetry in the force sizes, the attacker focuses
its attack on a smaller set of nodes, and for the defender to be able to exploit
the redeployment flexibility, a denser network structure will be preferred.
Colonel Blotto game is a simultaneous game between attacker and defender and
in our case, when k = 1, there is no possibility for redeployment in the third stage
and we simply recover the classic Blotto game setting. The following corollary
gives the solution of the game when k = 1 explicitly as an analog to the classic
Blotto game.
Corollary 4.9 (k = 1). When k = 1, if λ = 1, attacker will attack all the
battlefields. Both defender and attacker have the expected payoff N2 ; If λ < 1,
attacker will randomly choose λN number out of N battlefields and evenly allocate
its troops. Defender achieves the expected payoff of (1 − λ2 )N , and attacker’s
expected payoff is λN2 .
Recall the equilibrium of classic Blotto game with auction CSF in Roberson
(2006) as follows.
Proposition 4.10 (Roberson (2006) Theorem 2). When λ ≤ 1, there is a unique
Nash equilibrium and each player to allocate its forces according to the following
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univariate distribution functions. For the attacker, Fa(x) = (1 − λ) + xλN2D , x ∈
[0, 2DN ]; his expected payoff is
λN
2 . For the defender, Fd(x) =
xN
2D , x ∈ [0, 2DN ];
and her expected payoff is (1− λ2 )N .
We can see that with the proposed “one-sided auction CSF”, we recover the
game value of classic Blotto game with auction CSF. Moreover, for the classic
Blotto game with auction CSF, only the marginal distributions of both players’
optimal strategies are known. However, with the “one-sided auction CSF”, we
can have the full description of both defender and attacker’s optimal strategies.
4.4 General Redeployment Network: Numerical Method
The solution to the Blotto game with redeployment hinges on the network struc-
ture. In this section, we present an analytical approach to reformulate this
two-stage game into a co-positive programming model, which can be used to con-
struct approximate solution and reveal the equilibrium structure of this game.
Interesting, the marginal moments of the mixed strategy adopted by the attacker
can be recovered from this conic program. We describe this numerical procedure
next.
To facilitate the numerical computation, we assume there is a finite set of strate-
gies that the attacker can use, i.e. the number of troops that the attacker can
allocate to each battlefield is restricted in a finite set
S = {ak, k = 1, ..., s|a1 = 0}.
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At the same time, we transform the values in S to a corresponding set




Since the attacker’s deployment is restricted in the set S, we introduce indicator
variable ykj , k = 1, .., s, j = 1, ..., N such that it takes value of 1 if the forces
deployed is ak in battlefield j. We can then write the payoff function for the
defender in terms of y, using the following IP:



















, ∀j : (i, j) ∈ G
∑
j:(i,j)∈G xij ≤ di, ∀i : (i, j) ∈ G




j y1j in the objective function represents the number of battlefields
given up by the attacker.
Attacker Analysis:

















ykj = 1, ∀j, ykj ∈ {0, 1}}.
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Each solution of y corresponds to an attacker’s pure strategy. The attacker needs
to choose a probability distribution, piA(y) over Y to ensure that the expected
payoff is minimum. Note that since f3(d,y) is a concave function of d for any
y, f2(d) is also a concave function of d.
Defender Analysis:
Given that the defender has a pure optimal strategy in equilibrium, his challenge
is to choose a feasible deployment d to maximize the concave function f2(d). i.e.,




4.4.1 Completely Positive Reformulation of Attacker’s Problem














2 aˆk ∀(i, j) ∈ G
αj , βi ≥ 0, ∀i, j
(4.7)
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2 aˆk − sij = 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ G
αj + βi + sij + sˆij = B ∀(i, j) ∈ G
αj , βi, sij , sˆij ≥ 0, ∀i, j
y ∈ Y
(4.8)
The constraint involving B (a large number) is added to ensure that the feasible
domains for αj , βi and the slack variable sij are bounded. This constraint is nec-
essary to construct equivalent completely positive reformulation of the attacker’s
problem.
Note that the problem has a quadratic objective function and linear constraints.
We can therefore use Burer(2009)’s conic reformulation to characterize the at-
tacker’s problem. Interesting, the solution obtained from this conic reformula-
tion is an optimal mixed strategy for the attacker’s problem. Specifically, Burer
(2009) showed the equivalence of the following two formulations,
min xTQx+ 2cTx
s. t. aTi x = bi, ∀i = 1, ...,m
x ≥ 0
xj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ B
min Q ·X + 2cTx





i , ∀i = 1, ...,m
Xjj = xj , ∀j ∈ B 1 xT
x X
 <cp 0
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where B is the set of indexes of binary decision variables, and “cp 0” denotes
membership in the completely positive cone. The variable X is a linear relax-
ation of the product xxT. Note that the original 0-1 variables x is mapped to
a continuous variable x in the new conic programming problem, with x now
representing a convex combination of the original 0-1 solutions. This allows us
to re-construct the mixed strategy solution for the attacker by solving the com-
pletely positive cone. Let fCP2 (d) denote the solution to the equivalent connic
program using Burer’s approach. More specifically, it is tedious, but the readers
can check readily, that the completely positive cone can be expressed compactly
in the following manner, using appropriately chosen entries:
fCP2 (d) = min H(d) ·X + cTp Dual variables
s.t. A1p = b1 pi
diag(A1XA
T
1 ) = b2 φ







 <cp 0 ρ
(4.9)
where H(d) is a linear matrix of d, with the corresponding dual variables shown
on the righ hand side.
Proposition 4.11. The completely positive program (4.9) is an equivalent for-
mulation of the attacker’s problem, i.e, f2(d) = f
CP
2 (d) for given d. In particu-
lar, the optimal solution, py
∗ in (4.9) gives the marginal probability of attacker’s
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optimal mixed strategy.
In general, solving a co-positive/completely positive program is an NP-hard
problem except when the problem possesses a special structure. We know this is
indeed the case when the redeployment network is a k-chain structure, since we
have already derived the closed-form equilibrium. Indeed, with that property,
Problem (4.7) can be strengthened. Specifically, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.12. If the redeployment network is a k-chain structure, the optimal
solution to Problem (4.7) satisfies
α∗ = 0.
With this result, we can add a valid cut, eTα∗ = 0, to Problem (4.7). Note that
DNN relaxation is one of the most common way to approximate the solution
of co-positive programs. In Section 7, we will see that with this valid cut, the
solution to the DNN relaxation in the k chain recovers the closed-form solution.
4.4.2 Co-positive Reformulation of defender’s Problem
In order to solve the defender’s initial deployment problem, we need to solve
maxd f
CP
2 (d). To do this, we consider the dual problem of the completely positive
cone, i.e., a co-positive program. This exploits the established duality theory in
conic programming, which is an advantage over the traditional MIP approach.
Under appropriate technical conditions, there is no duality gap between the
primal and dual conic programs.


















1 Λ(φ)A1 −AT2 Λ(κ)A2

The dual problem is









s. t. C(d)−M <co 0
(4.10)
Therefore, we have a first stage problem formulated as















The optimal solution d∗ obtained from Problem (4.11) gives the equilibrium
strategy of the defender. The marginals of the attacker’s mixed strategy can
be obtained by solving Problem (4.9) with d = d∗. The optimal solution py
corresponding to variable ykj give the probability of deploying ak troops to front
j.
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4.5 Heterogenous Battlefields
Our conic program can be easily extended to model heterogenous battlefields, i.e.
when different battlefields may have different values to the players. We assume
each battlefield is of the same value to both parties.


















k 2ykjak, ∀j : (i, j) ∈ G∑
j xij ≤ di, ∀i ∈ (i, j) ∈ G
xij ≥ 0, ∀i, j
(4.12)
The corresponding completely positive representation of attacker’s problem then
becomes
fCP2 (d) = min H(d) ·X + chTp Dual variables
s.t. A1hp = b1 pi
diag(A1hXA
T
1h) = b2 φ







 <cp 0 ρ
(4.13)
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where ch and A1h are coefficients containing battlefield value vectors, h. The
first stage co-positive program problem is















where, similarly, Ch(d) and Mh are modified by h.
4.6 Numerical Study
In this section, we apply our model to several redeployment networks. Due to
the fact that solving a co-positive and completely positive program is in general
an NP-hard problem, we solve the DNN relaxation of the corresponding co-
positive the completely positive program. We first apply the conic programming
framework to the k-chain redeployment game, and compare the conic solution-
s with the closed-form solutions obtained earlier. This serves to demonstrate
the accuracy of the solution obtained by the DNN relaxation. We then apply
the computational framework to study redeployment games with asymmetric
structure and games with heterogeneous battlefields.
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4.6.1 Symmetric Redeployment - k-Chain Graph
In this section, we strudy the game when the redeployment network is a k chain.
In particular, there are N = 10 battlefields. The defender has D = 10 units of
troops. We solve the DNN relaxation problem of the co-positive and completely
positive program with the valid cut given in Lemma 4.12.
The values of the game, the parameters λ and k, and the defender’s optimal
strategies are given in Table 4.1 for all the cases. Attacker’s mixed strategies
Case (λ,k) Value
Defender’s pure strategy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(1.5, 2) 3.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00
(1.5, 4) 3.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(1, 2) 5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.6, 3) 7.77 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.98
(0.5, 3) 8.30 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.3, 3) 9.26 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Table 4.1: Values of the game and defender’s strategies
are given in Figure 4.6. Note that both the defender and attacker’s equilibrium
strategies for all the cases are (almost) identical to the closed-form equilibrium
we derived earlier, showing that the DNN solves the game theoretical problem
exactly, barring minor numerical errors.
Take Case 4 as an example, where the attacker has 6 troops and the defender re-
deploys using the 3-chain. The DNN relaxation of the co-positive problem (4.11)
gives the optimal defender’s strategy, which is to evenly allocate all 10 troops to
10 battlefields. Furthermore, the marginal probabilities of the attacker’s optimal
strategy are obtained by solving the DNN relaxation of completely positive pro-
gram (4.9) given the defender’s optimal strategy. For each battlefield, there is
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(a) Case 1 (b) Case 2
(c) Case 3 (d) Case 4
(e) Case 5 (f) Case 6
Figure 4.6: Attacker’s mixed strategies
50% chances that it will not be attacked, and 50% chances that it will be attacked
with 1.2 troops. Note that the closed-form solutions we have constructed earlier
shows that the attacker’s optimal response is to randomly select 5 (consecutive)
battlefields and allocate 1.2 troops to those selected. This gives exactly the same
marginal probabilities for the attacker’s strategy. Finally, the value of the game
is 7.77, which is very close to the game value of 7.92, given in Theorem 4.8. This
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fact implies the performance of the DNN relaxation is considerable good when
we have symmetric redeployment network.
4.6.2 Other Redeployment Structures
In this section, we study the following two graphs given in Figure 4.7. Both
graphs are disconnected variants of 2-chain structure. We would like to explore
whether connectivity also matters in the redeployment game.
(a) Graph 1 (b) Graph 2
Figure 4.7: Non-k-chain graphs
We study the case N = 10, and λ = 1 and 0.5 respectively. We apply the
conic programming framework to solve the game. The values of the games and
the number of troops allocated to each battlefield by the defender is shown in
Table 4.2. We also list the closed form solution of 2-chain structure to show the
comparison. Marginal distributions of attacker’s mixed strategies are given in
Figure 4.8.
Note that while the two graphs gave the same game value for the defender as
in the 2-chain when λ = 1, the 2-chain structure becomes more valuable for the






1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 chain 10 5.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Graph 1 10 5.00 1.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50
Graph 2 10 5.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
2 Chain 5 8 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Graph 1 5 7.49 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.01
Graph 2 5 7.49 1.00 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 0.98 1.00 0.97 0.47
Table 4.2: Values of the game and defender’s strategies for non-k-chain graphs
(a) Graph 1 with attacker having 10
troops
(b) Graph 2 with attacker having 10
troops
(c) Graph 1 with attacker having 5
troops
(d) Graph 2 with attacker having 5
troops
Figure 4.8: Attacker’s mixed strategy under the two non-k-chain graphs
defender when λ = 0.5. This happens because the attacker uses mixed strategies
in the latter case, choosing to attack only a random subset of the nodes.
This numerical example presents an important insight for attacker-defender game
- connectivity and chaining structures matter when variation of “demand” is
large in typical supply chain systems. In the attacker-defender game, attack-
er’s response is not random, but strategically determined based on defender’s
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allocation strategy and the redeployment network structure. When attacker has
more troops, his optimal strategy turns out to have less variation. Therefore, the
benefit of chaining and connectivity vanishes in this case. On the other hand,
when we face an attacker with fewer resources, his optimal response is to choose
randomly a subset of nodes to attack. Chaining and connectivity now matters
for the defender.
For example, in the second game, ten battlefields are divided into five clusters (1
and 2; 3 and 4; 5 and 6; 7 and 8; 9 and 10). The first moment of the attacker’s
mixed strategy in Figure 4.8d and an analysis of the correlation matrix shows
that the attacker’s optimal strategy is as follows - He randomly selects two out
of five clusters and allocate 1 troops on each of the two battlefields in these two
clusters. He then randomly chooses one of the remaining battlefields to attack
and allocate the one troop to it. The value of the game is 7.5. In the case of 2
chain, the optimal strategy of the attacker is to randomly select five consecutive
battlefields and each allocate one troops. The lack of connectivity in Graph 2
essentially allows the attacker to gain more in the two sub-clusters.
4.6.3 Heterogeneous Battlefields
In this numerical study, we explore when both players are facing heterogeneous
battlefields, how would they allocate and redeploy their troops. In particular, we
wish to see what are the differences in terms of optimal strategies between the two
games shown in Figure 4.9. The first game (Figure 4.9a) is a ten-battlefield game
under an asymmetric graph. All battlefields are of unit value to both players.
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However, the defender has full flexibility to redeploy its initial allocation in the
first battlefields to the first six battlefields in the redeployment stage. In the
second game (Figure 4.9b), it is a five-battlefield game under dedicated graph.
The values of battlefields are {6, 1, 1, 1, 1}. We first study the case when defender
and attacker both have 10 troops and followed by the case when defender has
10 troops and the attacker has 5 troops. We have the following results in Table
(a) Game 1 (b) Game 2
Figure 4.9: Two games in interests






1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Game 1 10 5 3.48 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Game 2 10 5 – – – 6.52 – – 0.870 0.870 0.870 0.870
Game 1 5 7.55 3.38 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.50 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02
Game 2 5 7.58 – – — 6.02 – – 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
Table 4.3: Values of the game and defender’s strategies for these two games
There are several interesting implications from the numerical result. Firstly,
these two games are equivalent in terms of game value. For the part of the
graph when defender has full flexibility, he can simply use one node to represent
all the battlefields and the value of the new node are the summation of battle-
fields’ values. Secondly, in both games, when attacker has sufficient resources
Homeland Security Games 160
(a) Game 1 (Attacker has 10 troops) (b) Game 2 (Attacker has 10 troops)
(c) Game 1 (Attacker has 5 troops) (d) Game 2 (Attacker has 5 troops)
Figure 4.10: Attacker’s mixed strategy under dedicated graph and 2-chain
graph
(10 troops), he will attack all the battlefields. His optimal strategies are pure
strategies inferred from Figure 4.10a and Figure 4.10b. Specifically, he will allo-
cate the troops proportionally to the value of battlefields. When attacker does
not have sufficient resources (5 troops), he has to balance between attacking the
more flexible but more valuable part of the graph (node 1 to 6 in Game 1, or
node 1 in Game 2) and attacking the less flexible but less valuable part (node 7
to 10 in Game 1 or node 2 to 5 in Game 2). Attacker’s optimal strategies given
in Figure 4.10c and Figure 4.10d show a mixture of strategies attacking these
two portions of the nodes.
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4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study a sequential attacker-defender game where defender has
the option to redeploy its resources after observing the attack. The sequential
treatment extends the classical Colonel Blotto game to a more realistic setting.
In general, this game is a challenging problem. We obtained an equivalent re-
formulation of the game as a co-positive program. By analyzing this equivalent
conic reformulation, we can obtain many interesting properties of the game, i.e.
value of the game, defender’s pure strategy, and the first two moments of at-
tacker’s mixed strategy. When the redeployment structure has a nice form, such
as “k-chain” structures, the closed-form equilibria can be obtained. We further
explore how the redeployment network structure affects the game, showing that
a sparse redeployment network structure can already capture the value of re-
deployment for the defender, and thus the defender does not need to establish
full or dense flexible redeployment network structure in order to achieve high
level of performance in this game. Our numerical studies also expose another
factor of the value of redeployment network. Specifically, when attacker uses
more randomized strategies or when he is weaker compared with the defender, a





The aim of this research is to explore applications of co-positive and completely
positive programming in disaster management. We are motivated by recent re-
search which reveals the modeling power of co-positive and completely positive
programs on NP-hard problems, especially distributionally robust problems. In
Chapter 1, we formulate a general distributionally robust framework which ex-
tends the problems studied in literature and construct its equivalent complete-
ly positive reformulation. This framework is general enough to capture many
moment-bound problems with nonlinearity, nonconvexity and discreteness. As
a by product, we also illustrate the power of completely positivity in address-
ing moment problems especially when the support sets of random variables are
subsets of nonnegative orthant. This general framework serves as a theoretical
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foundation to the three practical problems in disaster management studied in
Chapter 2, 3 and 4. It can also serve as a tool to study and reformulate other
complicated problems.
Disaster management consists of four stages, namely disaster risk assessment,
risk preparation, mitigation and prevention, post-disaster response, and post-
disaster recovery. Different strategies and management wisdoms are used in
different stages as well as facing different types of disasters. In general, disasters
can be classified into two types, natural disasters and man-made attacks. In
Chapter 2 and 3, we address risk mitigation and post-disaster response problems
facing natural catastrophes; and in Chapter 4, we study homeland security games
when defender faces terrorist attacks. In the following sections, we would like to
highlight important results and implications in those three applications; make
comments on limitations of co-positive and completely positive programs when
used to model practical problems and present future possible research directions.
5.1 Supply Chain Disruption Risk Mitigation
The first application we study is supply chain disruption risk mitigation problem.
Specifically, given a supply chain system, every node in the supply chain network
is facing potential disruption risk from events such as natural disasters. The
question we address is how to strategically allocate inventory to every node in the
supply chain before disruption so that the risk of disruption can be minimized.
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There are several important theoretical contributions and interesting managerial
implications obtained.
Our first contribution is that, different from disruption risk management litera-
tures, we explicitly present the performance of supply chain throughout disrup-
tion via a resilience curve and propose to use two performance metrics, TTR
and TTS, to measure the disruption impacts. The supply chain resilience model
is directly build upon the evolvement of lost sales during supply chain’s TTR.
Therefore, both impact of disruptions and supply chain’s survival and recovery
ability can be integrated in the model. Another benefit of incorporating TTR
concept is that we can directly link supply chain’s performance to each company’s
recovery ability, measured by companies’ TTR.
Secondly, instead of analyzing disruption’s impact on supply chain from the
expected perspective, we apply the risk measure “CVaR” to measure the impact
of disruptions. Due to the fact that full information on disruption probability
is hardly obtained, especially in the case of facing natural catastrophic events,
we formulate the risk mitigation problem as a distributionally robust problem
where only first-two moments of joint disruption distribution are known. Due
to nonsmooth structure of the risk measure “CVaR”, the problem is generally
hard. We manage to show the problem of minimizing “worst-case CVaR” by
strategically allocating inventory across supply chain network is equivalent to a
co-positive program. By solving the relaxed semi-definite program, we obtain
well performed inventory mitigation strategies. Moreover, our distributionally
robust model can be used to perform sensitivity analysis. This sensitivity analysis
Conclusion 165
can be used to pinpoint critical companies in the supply chain network whose
capacity, inventory or recovery ability affects the performance of supply chain
during disruption the most.
Thirdly, through the numerical study, several interesting implications are pre-
sented. The most interesting one is that we find the optimal inventory strategy
is not always monotone with respect to total inventory budget. When inventory
budget is low, increase in the total budget will lead to the increase in both first
and second-tier supplier’s inventory levels. When total budget is high, the op-
timal inventory levels for second-tier suppliers begin to drop. This implies that
companies located in different part of supply chain network affect the supply
chain risk mitigation performance differently.
5.2 Post-disaster Humanitarian Aid Supply Chain De-
sign
In Chapter 3, we address a post-disaster humanitarian logistic problem. We are
motivated by a real challenge in post-disaster humanitarian operations after Ty-
phoon Haiyan hit Philippines. One of the most critical issues is that shipping
of relief supplies is subjected to disruptions. Shipping decisions has to be made
before logistic managers having complete knowledge on the conditions of trans-
portation infrastructures. The question is how to strategically select different
transportation modes and decide transportation capacities of each mode before
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uncertainties resolve. Our work proposes a two-stage distributionally robust
stochastic program to tackle this issue.
The primary contribution of our work is that we propose a new performance mea-
sure, “Time-to-survive(TTS)” to quantify humanitarian efforts in post-disaster
logistics. Specifically, TTS, in this context, is defined as the maximum time
during which relief items can fully sustain the affected people’s demands. This
performance objective aligns with the goal of post-disaster humanitarian opera-
tions much better than cost minimization. Specifically, we study the problem of
capacity allocations to each available shipping mode in the first stage so that the
supplies can reach affected people and sustain them as long as possible in the
second stage. However, with this new time dimensional objective introduced,
the problem structure becomes more complex. The key assumption in our mod-
el is to assume total demand, total capacity and total budget are fulfilled or
consumed evenly and continuously throughout the whole TTS duration. The
shipping problem is modeled in each time instance where demand, capacity and
material flow are present as demand rate, capacity rate and material flow rate.
With this treatment, we manage to show the two-stage distributionally robust
problem can be equivalently represented by a co-positive program. The capacity
allocation strategy can be obtained via solving the relaxed semi-definite program.
We then apply the conic programming model to Typhoon Haiyan case and i-
dentify the capacities of each transportation mode used for shipping relief items.
We compare our capacity allocation strategy with a benchmark LP model which
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treats the disruptions in a deterministic way. There are several interesting im-
plications from this numerical study. Firstly, there is an apparent and sharp
trade-off between risk and cost. Specifically, when total capacity budget is low,
less reliable but low cost transportation modes are heavily used. When total
capacity budget increases and passes certain threshold, transportation modes
gradually switch to reliable but expensive ones. Secondly, this trade-off is not
present in the benchmark model because this LP model does not take account of
risks and treats the effective capacity as a deterministic fraction of total invested
capacity. We conduct simulation to further compare the capacity strategies ob-
tained from our conic framework (COP strategy) and the one from benchmark
LP model when total capacity budget is relatively low. Interestingly, these two
strategies propose exact opposite procurement strategies. COP strategy propos-
es to solely procure from Cebu supplier whereas LP strategy suggests to procure
only from Manila supplier. The underlying intuition is that Cebu supplier as
well as shipping from Cebu are more expensive but more reliable than procuring
from Manila supplier and shipping from there. COP strategy takes both cost
and risk into consideration and suggests not to ship from Manila due to high
risk. However, LP model does not consider risks, therefore, only selecting low
cost supplier and cheap transportation mode. Due to lack of risk consideration,
LP model performs poorly compared with COP strategy in simulation.
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5.3 Homeland Security Games with Redeployment
In Chapter 4, we study an antiterrorist problem where attacker can launch simul-
taneous attacks to multiple locations. Specifically, we build on classic Colonel
Blotto game and study a two-stage attacker-defender game where both play-
ers simultaneously allocate their limited forces to multiple fixed battlefields in
the first stage. In the second stage, defender, after observing the attacker’s al-
locations, will redeploy his forces according to a given redeployment network.
In general, finding an equilibrium strategy in this game is challenging. When
the redeployment structure has a nice form, such as “k-chain” structures, we
can obtain closed-form equilibria. For the game under a general redeployment
network, we obtain an equivalent reformulation of the game using a co-positive
program. By analyzing this equivalent conic reformulation, we obtain many in-
teresting properties of the game, i.e. value of the game, defender’s strategy, and
the first-two moments of attacker’s mixed strategy.
The first contribution of our work is that we add a redeployment stage in
attacker-defender game. This additional stage of redeployment is critical in many
antiterrorist events. This reflects the realistic scenario in many environments,
such as under the counterterrorism and cyber security setting, where defender
can rely on established defense system or mechanism to respond to attacker’s in-
trusion. In fact, this additional stage of redeployment is critical in many antiter-
rorist events. A good response strategy to the observed attack can significantly
reduce number of casualties and injuries. We further study the value of rede-
ployment by analyzing the closed-form solutions when redeployment network is
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k-chain structure. The key implication is that with limited redeployment arcs
established in a right way, defender can win all the battlefields.
The second contribution is that we establish the equivalence between such com-
plex game and completely positive and co-positive programs. Through numerical
studies, we show the duality gap as well as relaxation gap for certain problems
are very small. The relaxation problem recovers closed-form solutions of k-chain
redeployment structure games and other known optimal equilibria of some games
under specific structures.
Another interesting implication from our numerical study result is that we reveal
the link between homeland security game with redeployment and process flex-
ibility problem. In process flexibility literature, chaining and connectivity are
shown to be very crucial properties. A structure with those properties, such as
long chain, can, in fact, achieve almost the same performance as the full flexi-
ble structure. We show that this may not be the case in the attacker-defender
game with redeployment. The key difference is that attacker’s allocation is not
purely random like random demands in process flexibility case. When attacker
is strong, his optimal strategy is simply pure strategy without randomization. In
this case, benefit of chaining and connectivity in terms of risk pooling vanishes.
However, when attacker is weak and uses more randomized strategy, the value
of chaining and connectivity is very prominent.
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5.4 Limitations and Future Works
The primary limitation in applying co-positive programming is that optimal
solutions cannot be found in general. This is because firstly, strong duality be-
tween completely positive and co-positive program is not easy to establish due
to intrinsic complexity of the problem. Even if strong duality holds and can be
proved, we have to apply relaxation techniques to solve the problem, with the
relaxation gap remaining unknown in general. This leads to suboptimal solution-
s. In Chapter 2, through numerical studies, we show even without knowing the
true optimal inventory allocations, the suboptimal solutions still outperform the
benchmark case. The conic program framework in this case is a valuable tool to
provide well performed inventory strategies. In Chapter 3, the capacity alloca-
tions obtained for the Typhoon Haiyan case are also suboptimal but outperform
a natural benchmark case significantly. Interesting implications can be derived
from the obtained capacity allocations such as trade-offs between cost and re-
liability. In the case of attacker-and-defender game, approximated solutions of
the game are less acceptable because “approximated” strategy of a player can
be of no meaning in some context. However, in our game, the strategy space
is continuous, we can view the approximated strategies as actions near optimal
solutions. The proximity between approximated solution and the optimal solu-
tion is captured by duality gaps as well as relaxation gaps. From several of our
numerical studies, especially for k-chain and non-k-chain structures, the subop-
timal results are very close to the optimal solutions which implies the gaps are
very small for those cases.
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The second limitation is that currently we could not solve large scale problems.
For all of our numerical studies, we used cvx Mosek solver. This solver’s capacity
can only handle as large as 200-by-200 DNN matrices which limits the problem
scale we can solve. The running time is also not satisfactory especially for the
Typhoon Haiyan numerical study. We can deal with large-scale problem by
decomposing it into smaller problems. However, more works need to be done to
approach this issue directly and more efficiently.
Appendix A
Chapter 1- Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1.2
Proof. From the decomposition, we have x =
∑





































Due to Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, its equality condition implies ∃ζi, such that
ζiαk = a
T
i βk, ∀k ∈ κ,∀i = 1, ...,m. Since ∀k ∈ κ0, αk = 0, we have aTi βk =
0, ∀i = 1, ...,m, ∀k ∈ κ0. The bounded feasible region assumption (A1) implies












Since ∀k ∈ κ+, αk > 0, we have aTi βkαk = ζi = bi. Therefore,
βk
αk
is a feasible to
the linear constraints in Problem (1.2).
Proof of Lemma 1.3






















)2 − βk(j)αk ≥ 0,∀k ∈ κ+. Since α2k > 0, we have (βk(j)αk )2 =
βk(j)
αk
,∀k ∈ κ+. Therefore, βk(j)αk ∈ {0, 1},∀j ∈ B,∀k ∈ κ+.
Proof of Proposition 1.4
Proof. By the construction the Problem (1.5), it is a relaxation of Problem (1.4).
To see the equivalence, let p∗, X∗, and Y ∗ be the optimal solution to Problem
(1.5), and consider the rank-1 decomposition of the completely positive matrix
at this optimal solution, i.e.,

1 µT p∗T
µ Σ Y ∗T


































where αk ∈ R+,
∑
k∈κ
α2k = 1, βk,γk ∈ Rn+, ∀k ∈ κ . Similarly, let κ = κ+ ∪ κ0,
where κ+ = {k ∈ κ | αk > 0}, and κ0 = {k ∈ κ | αk = 0}.
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From Lemma 1.2 and Lemma 1.3, we have γkαk , ∀k ∈ κ+ be the feasible solutions
to Problem (1.4) and γk = 0, ∀k ∈ κ0. We can rewrite the decomposition as

1 µT p∗T
µ Σ Y ∗T


































Let  ∈ (0, 1). Define the distributions of a sequence of random vectors c∗ and




 )) = (
βk
αk
, γkζk )) = α
2
k, ∀k ∈ κ+;
P ((c˜∗ ,x∗(c˜
∗
 )) = (
√
|κ0|βk
 , any feasible solution)) = 
2 1
|κ0| , ∀k ∈ κ0
It can be easily verified these are valid distributions with the first-two moments
of c˜ as µ and Σ as  goes to 0. Furthermore, it can also be verified that E[x∗(c˜∗ )],
E[x∗(c˜∗ )c˜
∗T
 ], and E[x
∗(c˜∗ )x∗(c˜
∗T
 )] go to p
∗, X∗ and Y ∗, respectively as  goes
to 0. As  goes to 0, the random vectors (c˜∗ ,x∗(c˜
∗
 )) converge almost surely
to (c˜∗,x∗(c˜∗)). The objective value also converges to a finite value E[x∗(c˜∗)].
Finally, we have
Zp ≥ E[Z(c˜∗)] ≥ E[c˜∗Tx∗(c˜∗)] = In · Y ∗ = Zc.
Because Problem (1.5) is also a relaxation of Problem (1.4), we know Zc ≥ Zp.
Therefore, Zp = Zc.
Proof of Proposition 1.6
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Proof. Necessity: Let (w, Xw) be a element in the set M. Consider the decom-












where ζk ∈ R+,
∑
k∈κ
ζ2k = 1, vˆk ∈ Rp+,∀k ∈ κ . Let κ = κ+ ∪ κ0, where









Following Lemma 1.2 and Lemma 1.3, we have ∀k ∈ κ+, vˆkζk is feasible to linear
constraint and binary constraint in support set D; and vˆk = 0, ∀k ∈ κ0.
Before we proceed to the proof, we would like to first establish the following
lemma.
Lemma A.1. ∀k ∈ κ+, vˆkζk is feasible to the quadratic constraint in support set
D, (M2v˜) ◦ (M3v˜) = 0.
Proof. diag(M2X










Because M2 and M3 satisfies the condition that for all v feasible to linear
constraint M1v˜ = b
v











)T = 0, ∀k ∈ κ+.
With this lemma, we conclude ∀k ∈ κ+, vˆkζk is feasible all constraints in support
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We can construct a distribution of a binary random vector v˜ in the following
way. P (v˜ = vˆkζk ) = ζ
2
k ,∀k ∈ κ+. The probability of v˜ takeing values other than
vˆk
ζk
,∀k ∈ κ+ is 0. This binary random vector satisfies all the constraints in
support set D almost surely. We then have µ = w = ∑
k∈κ+









. Hence, we can see µ and Σ are feasible first-two moments
of this binary random vector v˜.
Sufficiency: Supposing (µ,Σ) is a feasible (n, 2,D)-moment sequence, we have
µ = E[v˜]; Σ = E[v˜v˜T]. Define w = E[v˜], Xw = E[v˜]. Then w = µv;Xw =
Σv. By taking expectation of all the constraints in D, we have M1w = bv1,
diag(M1X
wMT1 ) = b
v
1 · bv1, and diag(M2XwMT3 ) = 0. Due to the fact that
v˜i ∈ {0, 1} we have v˜i = v˜2i , Taking expectations gives wi = Xwii , ∀i ∈ Bv.
Finally, v˜ ≥ 0 almost surely implies
 1 wT
w Xw
 <cp 0 This completes the
proof.
Proof of Theorem 1.7.
Proof. By the construction the Problem (1.7), it is a relaxation of Problem (1.6).
The see the equivalence, let px∗,w∗, Xx∗, Xw∗, and Y x∗ be the optimal solution
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to Problem (1.7), and consider the rank-1 decomposition of the completely pos-
itive matrix at this optimal solution, i.e.,

1 px∗T w∗T
px∗ Xx∗ Y x∗


































where αk ∈ R+,
∑
k∈κ
α2k = 1, βk,γk ∈ Rn+, ∀k ∈ κ . Similarly, let κ = κ+ ∪ κ0,
where κ+ = {k ∈ κ | αk > 0}, and κ0 = {k ∈ κ | αk = 0}.
From Lemma 1.2, Lemma 1.3, and Lemma A.1, we have βkαk ,∀k ∈ κ+ be the
feasible solutions to Problem (1.4) and βk = 0, ∀k ∈ κ0. Similarly, these three
lemmas also implies γkαk ,∀k ∈ κ+ be the feasible solutions to the feasible moment
problem and γk = 0,∀k ∈ κ0. We can rewrite the decomposition as

1 px∗T w∗T
px∗ Xx∗ Y x∗




















Define a random vector v∗ and its corresponding feasible solutions x∗(v∗) as
follows






)) = α2k,∀k ∈ κ+.
It can be easily verified this is a valid and feasible distribution which satisfied
the first two moments as µ and Σ of v˜. By the same argument as in Natarajan
et al.(2011), Problem (1.6) is equivalent to Problem 1.7.
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B.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.1. Denote the optimal dual variables to the dual problem
(2.5) as (α∗,β∗,γ∗, δ∗). Consider the following lost sale problem with zero in-
ventory when there is no disruption. In order for the supply chain to sustain












xij + lj ≥ dj , ∀j ∈ N
∑
j∈M∪N ,(i,j)∈G







− uj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈M, t ∈ Tj
∑
i∈Ak
ui ≤ ck, ∀k ∈ P
xij ≥ 0,u, l ≥ 0
(B.1)








s.t. (α, β, γ, δ, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5) ∈ F
(B.2)
Denote the optimal dual variable of Problem (B.2) are (α0,β0,γ0, δ0). Due to









k = 0. Due to the fact that the feasible region of Problem (2.5) coincide
with that of Problem (B.2), (α∗,β∗,γ∗, δ∗) are also feasible solutions to Problem





















Proof of Lemma 4.12.
Notice the structure of the feasible region of Problem (2.5) (F in Appendix
B). For any feasible solution (α, β, γ, δ, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5), we can always find
(α,Kβ,Kγ,Kδ,Ks1 + (K − 1)α,Ks2,Ks3,Ks4, s5) are feasible for arbitrary
large K.
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Notice in the objective of Problem (2.9), the coefficients for β and δ are all
non-positive. Hence, the optimal solution β∗, δ∗ will not exceed the maximum




fi, ∀j = 1, . . . ,m, δk ≤ nmax
i=1
fi, ∀k = 1, . . . , p. We also know that βj , ∀j
and δk, ∀k has to be 0 if y is 0. We then have βj ≤ nmax
i=1
fiy,∀j = 1, . . . ,m;
δk ≤ nmax
i=1
fiy,∀k = 1, . . . , p.
Using a similar construction idea, we can see (Kα,Kβ,Kγ,Kδ,Ks1,Ks2,Ks3,Ks4, s5)
is always a feasible solution to Problem (2.9) as long as Kα ≤ f . Therefore, one
can verify that αi ∈ {0, fi} holds in optimal. In other words, αis5i = 0,∀i =
1, . . . , n.
According to the definition of TR, it is valid to add TR ≤ pmax
i=1
T ri .
Next, we already have the constraint on α that αj + s
5
j = fj . Since when y = 0,
αj = 0,∀j, it is valid to add the cut αj + s12j = fjy.
Finally, y ≤ 1 is valid due to the fact that y is binary.
Proof of Lemma 2.4.
Recall that by Proposition 2.3, we have an equivalent completely positive refor-
mulation (2.11) of Zm(r, θ) = maxv˜∼(µv ,Σv)E[(Z(v˜, r) − θ)+]. If we set r = r∗
and θ = 0, we have Zm(r∗, 0) = maxv˜∼(µv ,Σv)E[(Z(v˜, r∗))+]. Since the lost
sales are always greater than 0, we have (Z(v˜, r∗))+ = Z(v˜, r∗). Therefore, we
get Zm(r∗,0) = maxv˜∼(µv,Σv)E[Z(v˜, r∗)] = Zeˆ(r∗).
Proof of Proposition 2.5 to Proposition 2.7
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Suppose (px∗,pw∗,ps∗, Xx∗, Xw∗, Xs∗, Y x∗, Y xs∗, Y ws∗) is the optimal solution
of Problem (2.17). Consider the decomposition of the optimal completely positive
matrix.

1 px∗T pw∗T ps∗T
px∗ Xx∗ Y x∗ Y xs∗
pw∗ Y x∗T Xw∗ Y ws∗






























happening. The proof in the following is to construct feasible solutions to the




Proof of Proposition 2.5.




spond to dual and slack variables {αk,βk,γk, δk, TRk , yk, sjk(∀j 6= 6), s6k}. If T rt
decreases by , i.e., T rt ← T rt − . We consider the following three cases:
• For those k such that vˆ∗ktζ∗k = 1,
τ∗k
ζ∗k
will remain feasible after changing T rt to
T rt − .
• For those k such that vˆ∗ktζ∗k = 0 and T
r
t < T
R(v), then construct sˆ6tk := s
6∗
tk +
and the other variables remain the same values as
τ∗k
ζ∗k
. Then the new
solution, denoted as τˆkζ∗k
, is feasible under the new parameter T rt − , with




• For those k such that vˆ∗ktζ∗k = 0 and T
r
t = T
R(v), if plant t attains the
maximum TTR alone (change scale  can be small enough such that t’s
TTR is still the largest among all), then we construct new solution with
TˆRk := T
R − , sˆ6ik := s6∗ik −  ≥ 0, ∀i 6= t and sˆ6tk := s6∗tk . The objective




i 6=t ciδi(v)), which is no less than
ctδt(v) according to Lemma 2.1.
• For those k such that vˆ∗ktζ∗k = 0 and T
r
t = T
R(v) but there are other plants
attaining the maximum TTR together with plant t. Then sˆ6tk := s
6∗
tk + 
and the other variables remaining the same values as
τ∗k
ζ∗k
would be a set of
feasible solutions to the problem when T rt decreases by . In this case, the
objective value is decreased by ctδ
∗
t .































































is a feasible solution to (2.17) with Z eˆ(r∗)|T r− − Z eˆ(r∗)|T r ≥ −ct(p∗δt − Y ∗δtt).
Therefore, lim→0+
Z eˆ(r∗)|Tr−Z eˆ(r∗)|Tr−
 ≤ ct(p∗δt − Y ∗δtt).
Proof of Proposition 2.6.
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This proof follows the exactly same logic as the one for Proposition 2.5, we omit
the details here.
Proof of Proposition 2.7.
It is easy to see the completely positive program (2.17) is convex in ri, i = 1, ...,m.





Therefore Z eˆ(rˆ∗)|rt− − Z eˆ(r∗)|rt ≥ p∗βt. In contrast, consider increase rt by




will remain feasible. Therefore Z eˆ(rˆ∗)|rt+ −









B.2 Feasible Region of Problem 2.5
F =









+ s2l = 0, ∀i ∈M, ∀j ∈M2, (i, j) ∈ G







l = 0, ∀k ∈ P, i(k) ∈ Ak, i(k) ∈M2
−δk + βi(k) + s4l = 0, ∀k ∈ P, i(k) ∈ Ak, i(k) ∈M1
αj + s
5
j = fj ∀j ∈ N
α ∈ Rn+,β ∈ Rm+ ,γ ∈ Rtp+ , δ ∈ Rp+
s1 ∈ R|G2|+ , s2 ∈ R|G1|+ , s3 ∈ Rm2+
s4 ∈ Rm1+ , s5 ∈ Rn+

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B.3 The Specific Completely Positive/Co-Positive Re-
formulation of Problem 2.9
Let O represent matrices with all 0 elements of proper dimensions; Λ is the
diagonalization operator which generate a matrix with diagonal entry corre-
sponding to the vector elements; diag(·) denotes the diagonal elements of a
matrix; ING2 ∈ {0, 1}|G2|×n is an indicator matrix with the element on row l
and column j as 1 if the arc in G1 of index l is connected to the node j ∈ N ;
IMGk ∈ {0, 1}|Gk|×m, k = 1, 2 is an indicator matrix the element on row l and
column i as 1 if the arc in Gk of index l is connected from the node i ∈ M ;




where (i, j, l) ∈ G2, t ∈ Tj , and the number k corresponds to the index of γjt in
γ; IT ∈ {0, 1}m2×tp is an indicator matrix with the element on row i and column
k as 1 if k corresponds to the index of γit in γ for all t ∈ Ti; IP1 ∈ {0, 1}m1×p
is an indicator matrix with the element on row i and column k as 1 if the node
i ∈M1 belongs to plant k ∈ P; IP2 ∈ {0, 1}m2×p is an indicator matrix with the
element on row i and column k as 1 if the node i ∈M2 belongs to plant k ∈ P;
IM1 ∈ {0, 1}m1×m is an indicator matrix with the element on row i and column
i as 1 for all i = 1, ...,m1; and IM2 ∈ {0, 1}m2×m is an indicator matrix with the





ING −IMG1 O O O O I|G1| O O O O O 0 O O 0 0
O −IMG2 CTG2 O O O O I|G2| O O O O 0 O O 0 0
O IM1 O −IP1 O O O O IM1 O O O 0 O O 0 0
O IM2 −IT −IP2 O O O O O IM2 O O 0 O O 0 0
IN O O O O O O O O O IN O O O O 0 0

B1 is the coefficient matrix corresponding to the constraints in set F .
B2 =

dT 0T 0T −cT 0 0 0T 0T 0T 0T 0T 0T 1 0T 0T 0 0






O O O O O O 0 Im O 0 0






O O O O O O 0 Im O 0 0
0T 0T 0T 0T 1 0 0T 0T 0T 0T 0T 0T 0 0T 0T 1 0
0T 0T 0T 0T 0 1 0T 0T 0T 0T 0T 0T 0 0T 0T 0 1

B2 is the coefficient matrix corresponding to the linear cuts.
B3 =
(
O O O O 1 0 O O O O O −Ip 0 O O 0 0
)










 0T 0T 0T 0T 0 −1 0T 0T 0T 0T 0T 0T 0 0T 0T 0 0
In O O O 0 0 O O O O O O 0 O O 0 0

A3 =
 1T 1T 0T 1T 0 0 0T 0T 0T 0T 0T 0T 0 0T 0T 0 0












O O O O 12(d) 0 O O O
O O O O 0 0 O O O
O O O O 0 0 O O O
O O O O 0 0 O −Λ(c)2 O
1
2(d
T) 0T 0T 0T 0 0 0T 0T 0T
0T 0T 0T 0T 0 0 0T 0T 0T
O O O O 0 0 O O O
O O O −Λc2 0 0 O O O
O O O O 0 0 O O O

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The specific coefficient matrices in the completely positive reformulation problem
3.6 is given as follow. Define matrix D1 and D2 as
D1 :=

ING2 −IMG2 O O 0 O I|G2| O O O 0 O O 0 O
O −IMG1 CTG1 O 0 O O I|G1| O O 0 O O0 O
O IM2 −IT −IP2 0 O O O Im2 O 0 O O0 O




0T rT 0T 0T bc C
uT 0T 0T 0T 0T 1 0T 0T 0 0T
O Im O O 0 O O O O O 0 Im O 0 O
In O O O 0 O O O O O 0 O In 0 O
0T 0T 0T 0T 1 0T 0T 0T 0T 0T 0 0T 0T 1 0T









where those zero matrices, O, are of proper dimensions which we omit here for
the sake of neatness; ING2 ∈ {0, 1}|G2|×n is an indicator matrix with the element
on row l and column j as 1 if the arc in G1 of index l is connected to the node
j ∈ N ;
IMGk ∈ {0, 1}|Gk|×m, k = 1, 2 is an indicator matrix the element on row l and
column i as 1 if the arc in Gk of index l is connected from the node i ∈M ;




where (i, j, l) ∈ G2, t ∈ Tj , and the number k corresponds to the index of γjt in
γ;
IT ∈ {0, 1}m2×tp is an indicator matrix with the element on row i and column k
as 1 if k corresponds to the index of γit in γ for all t ∈ Ti;
IP1 ∈ {0, 1}m1×p is an indicator matrix with the element on row i and column k
as 1 if the node i ∈M1 belongs to plant k ∈ P;
IP2 ∈ {0, 1}m2×p is an indicator matrix with the element on row i and column k
as 1 if the node i ∈M2 belongs to plant k ∈ P;
IM1 ∈ {0, 1}m1×m is an indicator matrix with the element on row i and column
i as 1 for all i = 1, ...,m1;
IM2 ∈ {0, 1}m2×m is an indicator matrix with the element on row i and column
(i+m1) as 1 for all i = 1, ...,m2;
and Im and In are identity matrices with dimension m and n.
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The objective coefficients a1 and A2(c) are defined as follows.
a(c)1 :=
(
dT 0T 0T 0T hTc cT 0T 0T 0T 0T 0 0T 0T
)
Denote the dimension of the vector of decision variables x as w. A2(c) is a
w-by-p matrix with all entries 0 except the ones corresponding to Y δv as Λ(c).
Appendix D
Chapter 4 - Appendix D
D.1 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 4.7 and Theorem 4.8
Suppose defender has deployed d unit of troops on each of the N fronts, and
attacker has chosen to attack m battlefields in the set S. i.e., ai > 0 for i ∈ S.















xij ≤ d, xij ≥ 0
}

































. . . ≥ γ[m]
a[m]
,
for some ordering of the indices. In a k-chain, the term
γ[1]
a[1]
appears k times in the




in the summands depends on how many neighbours the node [2] has that is not
adjacent to the node [1]. This is smallest when [2] is adjacent to [1]. Using this
logic, it is easy to see that the sum in the above expression is minimum when all
m nodes are adjacent to one another. Specifically, all the other terms appears






















To study attacker’s optimal strategy, we first establish the following lemma.
Lemma D.1. The optimal solution of Problem (D.3) satisfies γ∗[i] = 1,∀i ∈ S.
Proof. First, we show the optimal γ∗[i],∀i = 1, ...,min{m,N − k + 1} is always
between 0 and 1. Let {γ∗[i], a∗[i],∀i = 1, ...,m} be the optimal solution of attacker’s
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problem. Suppose this optimal solution admits a certain γ∗[t] > 1 for a t between
1 and min{m,N − k + 1}. Define γˆ[i] = γ∗[i], aˆ[i] = a∗[i],∀i 6= t, i ∈ S, γˆ[t] = 1,






. It is easy to see {γˆ[i], aˆ[i]} is a feasible solution to Problem
(D.3). In the meantime, the ranking of terms
γˆ[i]
aˆ[i]
remains. It is easy to see with
this feasible solution, we strictly decrease the objective value. This contradicts
the assumption that {γ∗[i], a∗[i], i = 1, ...,m} is the optimal solution. Therefore, we
cannot have an optimal γ∗[i],∀i = 1, ...,min{m,N − k + 1} greater than 1.
Secondly, for those γ[i], i = min{m,N − k + 1}, ...,m, it is not optimal to take
values greater than 1. By the same argument, we let {γ∗[i], a∗[i], i = 1, ...,m} be
the optimal solution of attacker’s problem. Suppose there is one γ∗[t] > 1, for a







, aˆ[i] = a
∗




∆i ≤ a∗[t]−aˆ[t], and ∆i takes positive
values such that the ranking of terms
γˆ[i]
aˆ[i]
remains1. This feasible solution gener-
ates a smaller objective value than the assumed optimal solution with γ∗[t] > 1.
Therefore, we have all the γ[i], i = min{m,N − k+ 1}, ...,m takes value between
0 and 1 in optimal.




























We can exchange the minimization with respect to γ and maximization with






















Because the inner minimization problem is linear in γ, we have the optimal
solution much be vertices of the polytope {γ|0 ≤ γi ≤ 1}. Suppose in optimal





= 0,∀t ≤ k ≤ m. Attacker can decrease the
objective value by forgoing battlefields [t] onwards. Therefore, for any t, γ∗[t] = 0
cannot be optimal. The optimal solution is the vertex γ∗i = 1, ∀i = 1, ...,m.





























By similar argument, we can also shown the optimal solution of γ is the vertex
γ∗i = 1, ∀i = 1, ...,m. We omit the details here.
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Now we are ready to study the optimal strategy of the attacker. Due to the













This objective is a convex function in attacker’s strategy. With the constraint
a[i] ≤ a[j],∀i ≤ j, i, j ∈ S, it is easy to see the in optimal, a[i] = a[j], ∀i, j ∈ S.
This means attacker should evenly allocate its troops across all the battlefields
he launches attack.
Finally, given that defender evenly allocated troops across all battlefields and
attacker evenly allocates troops at selected battlefields, it is easy to see the payoff
function, which is a maximization problem with respected to redeployment xij
obtains its optimal when
∑
i∈Γ(j) xij are all the same for all j ∈ S. Now we are
ready to prove Theorem 4.7 and Theorem 4.8. Suppose attacker forgoes N − i
number of battlefields and evenly distribute all the forces across i battlefields.








s. t. 1 ≤ i ≤ N
i is integer
(D.4)






+N − i = (i+k−1)i2λN +N − i. This is a convex
quadratic function. There is a global minimizer 2λN−k+12 . Therefore, attacker is
to choose i∗ = M = int(2λN−k+12 ). To ensure the condition of case 1 is satisfied.
We must have i∗ + k − 1 ≤ N , which is equivalent to k ≤ 2(1 − λ)N + 1. The
optimal objective function has value of (i
∗+k−1)i∗
2λN +N − i∗.
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Case 2. Suppose i∗ + k − 1 > N . The objective function becomes i2λ + N − i.
When λ ≤ 12 , i∗ = N − k + 1, value function is N−k+12λ + k − 1; whereas λ ≥ 12 ,
i∗ = N and the value function is N2λ .
Next we need to compare the value functions when λ and k takes different values.
Firstly, λ > 1. This implies k ≤ 2(1 − λ)N + 1 < 1. For all k = 1, ..., N , the
condition k ≤ 2(1−λ)N+1 cannot hold. Suppose we restrain i+k−1 ≤ N (case
1), the optimal i we can get is N − k + 1. The value function is N−k+12λ + k − 1.
Suppose we choose the optimal i to be N (case 2). The value function is N2λ .
Because N2λ ≤ N−k+12λ + k − 1 for all k = 1, ..., N and λ > 1. Attacker is optimal
to choose i∗ = N . Value of the game is N2λ , and it is independent of k.
Secondly, λ = 1. In this scenario, the condition k ≤ 2(1− λ)N + 1 only hold for
k = 1. The only optimal choice of i is i∗ = N . Value of the game is N2λ , and it is
independent of k.
Thirdly, 12 < λ < 1. In this scenario, we need to compare the value function of
(i+k−1)i
2λN +N − i and N2λ when i = M . If the former is smaller, than it is optimal
to choose i∗ = M . Otherwise, it is optimal choose i∗ = N . This is equivalent to
show whether i2 + (k− 1− 2λN)i+N2(2λ− 1) ≤ 0 at i = M . The two roots of




2 . We see
2λN−k+1
2
is always between this two roots. Hence, if [2N(λ − 1) + (1 − k)]2 + 4N(1 − k)
is nonnegative, then it is optimal to choose i∗ = M . Otherwise, it is optimal to
choose i∗ = N .
When λ ≥ 3N−2
√
N2−N−1
2N , for all k ≤
⌊
2λN − 2N√2λ− 1 + 1⌋, [2N(λ−1)+(1−
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k)]2 +4N(1−k) ≥ 0. We have i∗ = M . Value of the game is (M+k−1)M2λN +N−M ,
and it is a piecewise quadratic increasing function of k.
For all
⌊
2λN − 2N√2λ− 1 + 1⌋ < k ≤ N , [2N(λ−1)+(1−k)]2 +4N(1−k) > 0.
We have i∗ = N . Value of the game is N2λ , and it is independent of k.
When 12 < λ <
3N−2√N2−N−1
2N , for all k = 1, ..., N , [2N(λ − 1) + (1 − k)]2 +
4N(1− k) ≥ 0. We have i∗ = M .
Finally, λ ≤ 12 . The condition k ≤ 2(1−λ)N + 1 always holds for all k = 1, .., N .
It can be show that (i+k−1)i2λN +N − i is always smaller than N−k+12λ + k− 1 when
i = M . Therefore, it is optimal to choose i∗ = M . Notice that when λ ≤ 12 ,
2λN − k + 1 can be smaller than 0. In that case, defender can win all the
battlefields regardless of the attacker’s strategy.
Specifically, when n ≥ N−12N , 2λN − k + 1 ≥ 0 for all k = 1, ..., N . Value of the
game is (M+k−1)M2λN +N −M , and it is a piecewise quadratic increasing function
of k.
When λ < N−12N , for all k ≤ b2λN + 1c , 2λN − k + 1 ≥ 0; Value of the game
is (M+k−1)M2λN +N −M , and it is a piecewise quadratic increasing function of k.
However, if b2λN + 1c < k ≤ N , then 2λN − k + 1 < 0. In that case, defender
can win all the battlefields regardless of the attacker’s strategy. Value of the
game is N and it is independent of k.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.7 and Theorem 4.8.
Proof of Corollary 4.9
Proof. From Theorem 4.7 and Theorem 4.8, we know that when k = 1 and
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λ = 1, attacker will attack all the battlefields. Defender’s expected payoff is
N
2 and attacker’s expected payoff is N − N2 = N2 . When λ < 1 and k = 1,
attacker’s optimal strategy is always choose to attack M battlefields. In this
case, M = λN . Defender’s expected payoff is (M+k−1)M2λN + N −M , and in this
case, it is (1− λ2 )N , and attacker’s expected payoff is λN2 .
Proof of Lemma 4.12
Proof. Recall Problem 4.7 is as follows,













2 aˆk ∀(i, j) ∈ G
αj , βi ≥ 0, ∀i, j
(D.5)
Firstly, by the symmetry of k chain and the concavity of the objective func-
tion with respect to defender’s deployment, we know defender always evenly
distributes its troops across all the battlefields. Secondly, due the to defined CS-
F, if attacker wish to launch attack (i.e.,allocate positive troops), he will always
deploy more than two times forces than the defender at that node, otherwise, he
is better off not attack that node. With this two properties, we can see the coef-
ficient of αj , which is
∑
k 2ykjak, for all j except for the j with
∑
k 2ykjak = 0 is
always larger than the coefficient of βi, which is di, for all i. Since Problem 4.7 is
a minimization problem, we have the optimal solution satisfies, α∗j = 0,∀j.
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D.2 Covariance Matrices of Two Non-k-chain Games
In the case when defender has 10 troops and attacker has 5 troops, the covariance
matrices for the two non-k-chain games, Cov1 and Cov2 are as follows.
Cov1 =

0.25 −0.25 0.06 −0.06 −0.04 0.04 −0.04 0.04 −0.04 0.04 −0.04 0.04 −0.04 0.04 −0.04 0.04 −0.04 0.04 −0.04 0.04
−0.25 0.25 −0.06 0.06 0.04 −0.04 0.04 −0.04 0.04 −0.04 0.04 −0.04 0.04 −0.04 0.04 −0.04 0.04 −0.04 0.04 −0.04
0.06 −0.06 0.25 −0.25 −0.04 0.04 −0.04 0.04 −0.04 0.04 −0.04 0.04 −0.04 0.04 −0.04 0.04 −0.04 0.04 −0.04 0.04
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